

EXCLUSIVE INTERVIEW: HOWARD DEAN'S GRAND PLAN

THE AMERICAN **Prospect**

LIBERAL INTELLIGENCE

AUGUST 2005

**Wallis v. Jacoby:
Democrats and God**

**Has NY Publishing
Sold Its Soul?**



Rove **THE PLAME** **SCANDAL**

**Former President Bush
says those who expose
intelligence sources are
"the most insidious
of traitors."**

Well, Mr. President?

BY JOE CONASON

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
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Cover design by Aaron Morales

SUBURBAN SWEATSHOPS



"In this compelling book, Jennifer Gordon combines the harrowing stories of individuals with a broad perspective on suburban economics to create a vivid analysis of immigrant labor in America...Her unflinching study raises questions about the future of immigrant rights and the causes behind the 'disturbing renaissance of sweatshop work.'"
—PUBLISHERS WEEKLY

"This important new book... is a self-reflective insider's account of Jennifer Gordon's efforts—and of how difficult marrying law and organizing proved to be."
—Scott Cummings and Ingrid Eagly, LEGAL AFFAIRS

"This is a beautifully written, uplifting story where good—in the form of resourceful and creative advocacy involving thousands of immigrants—occasionally triumphs over the evils of a grim underground economy. In lucid prose, Jennifer Gordon shows how immigrant workers courageously fought to build paths to democracy. At the same time, she offers intriguing new approaches for lawyers and organizers in the struggle for social justice."

—Lani Guinier, co-author of *The Miner's Canary*

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Exit With Honor

THE AMERICAN PEOPLE WANT OUT OF IRAQ, BUT critics of the Iraq War seem stymied by the mess that the Bush policy has created. Here is an exit strategy that makes sense as geopolitics and domestic politics: The U.S. commits to leave Iraq on a date certain, say August 1,

2006. We use this yearlong period to negotiate the creation of an international peacekeeping entity, also responsible for aiding Iraq's reconstruction. The date certain signals that we're serious.

This force would include troops from moderate Muslim nations, such as Tunisia and Egypt; other nonaligned nations such as India; and traditional peacekeepers, such as the Scandinavian countries. It could be sponsored by the United Nations or as a freestanding body. The U.S. would pay at least half the cost.

This policy works on four grounds.

First, it re-engages the international community with an enterprise in which the United States has placed itself in costly and feckless isolation. It would also help repair the broader damage of Bush's isolation and rekindle the cooperation that the U.S. needs to defeat terrorism.

Second, it keeps faith with the people of Iraq. Many critics of the Bush policy have nonetheless argued that the United States, having created the mess, needs to remain until Iraq is tolerably stable. By substituting an international force for an American occupation army, we remove the United States as a lightning rod, which could reduce the level of violence; we substitute competence for incompetence; and we increase the chances of eventual stabilization. By removing the U.S. as overseer, we signal the Shia, the Sunnis, and the Kurds to broker their own grand bargain to govern their country.

Third, a majority of Americans now believe that this war was a bad idea and is not worth the cost in lives, mutilations, and dollars. But we can't just leave anarchy. This allows exit with honor.

Finally, as domestic politics, this strategy offers a credible alternative for President Bush's critics in both parties, one that trumps the administration's course.

BUT WOULD THE INTERNATIONAL community really agree to fill this vacuum? Some members of Bush's Potemkin "coalition of the willing" including Italy and Bulgaria, are talking about withdrawal, not recommitment. However, nations that have been unwilling to bail out a failed, arrogant policy might be more easily persuaded to join a multilateral effort, given an American exit. And if the burden of committing a constabulary force were widely shared, no one nation would suffer major casualties. Admittedly, most Europeans would prefer to contribute money, troops for border patrols, and sorely needed training efforts outside Iraq rather than peacekeepers inside Iraq, but it all helps.

The role of Muslim nations is tricky. The Shia majority in Iraq, only just freed from Sunni domination, doesn't want a

foreign occupation force dominated by Sunnis. Moreover, many Muslim governments are poor candidates either because they are direct or indirect parties to the conflict (Turkey, Iran) or do not come with clean hands (Syria, Pakistan). Still, the broader Muslim world surely would welcome an American exit and an increased role for the international community.

Could this alternative succeed? Under the present course, we face interminable occupation, quagmire, increasing insurgency—and a belated, ignominious exit eerily reminiscent of Vietnam. By contrast, an international peacekeeping force could actually increase troop strength to adequate levels, something politically impossible if it remains an American project.

The removal of American troops also means that the United States would no longer stand accused of wanting permanent bases or plundering Iraq's oil. With a reduced level of distrust, the possibility of brokering a political solution among the Shia, the Sunnis, and the Kurds would increase, and the guerrilla insurgency would be more politically isolated.


Of course, risks would remain, including civil or separatist war, an Iraq-Iran axis, and Iraq as a haven for terrorists. But

under international stabilization, all of these risks would be reduced, and Iraq would be less of a magnet for anti-Americanism. In the event of a genuine regional threat to our own security, such as Iranian nuclear weapons, the United States would retain all of the options it currently has.

In past UN peacekeeping operations, from Cambodia to the former Yugoslavia, the U.S. has kept its troops out when that course made strategic sense. This approach to Iraq is entirely in the spirit of tough multilateralism that dates to the Roosevelt administration. It certainly beats isolationism or endless occupation, as policy and as politics. **TAP**

— ROBERT KUTTNER

American withdrawal in favor of an international peacekeeping force is the best alternative now.



... Greenberg's
most depressing
statement was
"Navasky was too
accommodating."

— BURTON SHAPIRO
BRONX, NY

Recycled?

IN A SIX-PAGE ARTICLE ["Labor's Civil War," June 2005], Harold Meyerson includes a half-paragraph summary of union-revitalization proposals put forward by various activists in the Communications Workers of America (CWA). Then, relying on the authority of an anonymous "SEIU [Service Employees International Union] official," Meyerson quickly dismisses these ideas as "prescriptions for disengagement with the bulk of the American workforce."

According to Meyerson and his informant, CWA organizers are focusing too heavily "on the 8 percent that's unionized"—while waiting for Congress to enact labor-law reform or "American workers [to] revolt en masse," 1930s-style—because the union includes "people with a radical past."

This is a ridiculous caricature of the CWA's internal and external organizing. Contrary to the impression left by Meyerson, the CWA has an extensive record of engagement with the nonunion majority, including that portion of it that can organize but is denied the right to negotiate a contract. Look, for example, at our union building among

state workers in Texas, Oklahoma, Mississippi, Tennessee, Virginia, and West Virginia. Instead of waiting for any of these states to authorize full collective bargaining in the public sector, the CWA went ahead and helped state workers form organizations that now have a combined membership of nearly 25,000.

The growth of groups like the Mississippi Alliance of State Employees and the Texas State Employees Union is due to effective worker mobilization on the job and to statewide lobbying. Such campaigns have relied on both full-time organizers and hundreds of shop stewards, who do indeed "go on leave" to sign up fellow workers "in nonunion workplaces"—in this case, their own.

If *The American Prospect* covered unions more broadly—and didn't devote so many column inches to recycling essentially the same Meyerson story about the SEIU and UNITE-HERE—its readers might be better informed about the activities of other unions whose approach may be different but who are no less focused on organizing the unorganized.

STEVE EARLY
CWA District 1
Woburn, MA

We Write Up

THE AMERICAN PROSPECT is a masterful contribution to understanding our world. Robert Kuttner's "The Death and Life of American Liberalism" [June] was very informative but made me a little uncomfortable because it made the assumption that readers would understand all that was said. For example, "For every Evan Bayh there are two or three Byron Dorgans" is beyond my comprehension because I do not follow all members of Congress that carefully. I wonder if other readers feel left out. Maybe you should write down to your readers more.

HUGO BORRESEN
Jacksonville, FL

Hail, Victor!

THERE MUST BE MANY times when a writer spends paragraph after paragraph on a topic, carefully detailing parts and pieces yet unaware that he or she is talking only about him- or herself. Watching it is a marvelous process, especially when it is invisible to the speaker/writer. It was apparent through 15 paragraphs of David Greenberg's review of Victor Navasky's *A Matter of Opinion* ["Up With Rags," July].

As a subscriber to *The Nation* since 1937, I have seen and followed the joys and hazards of a magazine that takes seriously the various meanings of the word "liberal." It did and does have cranks. And they are literate and informed writers. It did and does have people of rock-hard commitments to radical observations, with the emphasis on the Latin root of

the word. It had and has leaders of courage deep enough to face time in jail for an idea.

Through all those years, I disagreed enough times to write poisonous letters to my friends about the magazine's positions, but I never canceled my subscription. Why? As a high-school student, I found strength in liberal sensibilities, and in most of the liberal positions I found in *The Nation*.

Mr. Greenberg describes his wanderings from the Liberal Party to *The New Republic* to the minds of the Algonquin Round Table and onward. To be understood. To his credit, he does not avoid why you should read the book if you wandered, as he did, through liberal and neoliberal positions on life's journey.

As one of his self-discoveries, Mr. Navasky went, as any growing person does, through a discovery of his emergent skills. This comes as no surprise for anyone who has looked trouble in the face and then sought solutions. What is so surprising about that? But it certainly surprised Mr. Greenberg. Again, we have a picture of the self. As I read, I felt it improper for a review of someone else.

Perhaps Mr. Greenberg's most depressing statement, and another self-revelation inappropriate for a review, was, "Navasky was sometimes too accommodating." One must ask what "liberal" means to Mr. Greenberg. In that example, he joins those who talk about too much democracy. The term means what Mr. Navasky did, not what Mr. Greenberg thinks he should do.

When I finished reading the review, I wondered why I had to learn—in two sentences in the middle of the review, and

in the last paragraph—what he liked about the book instead of hearing it in the body of the review. I don't find that unaware self-indulgence admirable.

BURTON SHAPIRO
Bronx, NY

David Greenberg responds:

In my review-essay, I argued that some liberals, including perhaps Victor Navasky, have at times been too indulgent of anti-liberal radicals like Gore Vidal and Alexander Cockburn, who mean them only ill. Such an argument has absolutely nothing in common with "those that talk about too much democracy," as Burton Shapiro put it. For Shapiro to suggest so is glib and disingenuous. But then, so is his letter. Shapiro must have been able to see (as other *Prospect* readers could) that my review dealt substantively and extensively with the merits of Navasky's fine memoir. In fairness, Shapiro wanted me to spell out, in the manner of his local newspaper, what I liked and disliked about the book. For my part, I think it will be a sad day when journals of opinion start featuring thumbs-up, thumbs-down reviews and doling out stars and half-stars at the expense of engaging the broader questions of an intellectual work or a writer's career. Perhaps Mr. Shapiro should be subscribing not to *The Nation* and *The American Prospect* but to *Library Journal*. The reviews there are good, evaluative, and short.

Unexplained

ARLIE HOCHSCHILD'S parable of the chauffeur and the millionaire makes some good points on the matter of how it is that ordinary

folks have been manipulated by Bushist politics to agree to ignore the needs of the poor. But she doesn't really address the question, to use the *Prospect*'s words, of "why middle-class people identify with the rich instead of the poor." And this is what I find most perplexing: Why is it that the not-so-well-off who don't want to give more to the poor favor giving more to the rich in the form of tax cuts? After all, you can be against downward redistribution without being for upward redistribution.

I've heard often enough that the middle and lower middle class identify with millionaires more than with the poor, but I have yet to hear a satisfactory explanation of it, and Hochschild doesn't provide one. It's understandable—if deplorable—that when times are tough you take care of your own and forget the needy, but why do people stand for seeing programs cut that benefit *them* to give a handout to the wealthy?

TRACY KOSMAN
Bala Cynwyd, PA

Corrections: Jason Vest's "Pray and Tell" [July] misidentified Peter Bergen as a fellow at the Brookings Institution. He is a Schwartz Fellow at the New America Foundation.

Due to a typographical error, Robert Kuttner's response in last month's "Correspondence" section put Representative Peter DeFazio in Ohio. He is, of course, from Oregon.

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Devil in the Details



PULLING PUNCHES

DEMOCRATS WHO'VE been touting plans to nationalize the mid-term elections next year with a good-government ("goo-goo," in the parlance of political pros) campaign centered on Republican corruption seem to need a refresher course on how to play hardball.

In late June, the Senate Indian Affairs Committee held the third in its series of hearings on the sprawling casino-lobbying scandal involving former Tom DeLay cronies Jack Abramoff and Michael Scanlon. Most observers have felt confident that this multifaceted saga, which implicates numerous Republican operatives and lawmakers

beyond the House majority leader and is the subject of an ongoing federal criminal probe, would taint the Republicans and yield dividends for Democrats at the polls.

But Democrats seem to have expected committee Chair John McCain to do their partisan work for them. In fact, the Arizona "maverick," eyeing an '08 Republican presidential run, has made it abundantly clear that his committee's investigation will not examine the actions of lawmakers. (He assured Republican colleagues of as much in a widely reported meeting in March.) Given that money from Abramoff's Indian clients has been con-

nected not only to DeLay but also to Congressman Bob Ney and Senators Conrad Burns and David Vitter, such a self-imposed restriction "obviously makes for a pretty huge hole in the investigation," according to Naomi Seligman of Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington (CREW). Sure enough, the June 22 hearing aired plenty of fun details about Abramoff and Scanlon's various shenanigans—but mentioned nary a single lawmaker's name.

McCain's tightrope walk may be unsurprising, but one might have expected ranking member Byron Dorgan, the North Dakota Democrat, to push the discussion in a more partisan direction. Dorgan moved perfunctorily, however, through his questioning, neglecting the opportunity to press the president of a right-wing think tank when the subject arose of a 2000 trip to Scotland by DeLay and Abramoff, funded by tribal money funneled through it. Meanwhile, Democrats have raised no public objection to McCain's restrictions on the investigation's scope. "Dorgan's people just haven't pushed it," said an official at an outside watchdog group.

Similar political punch pulling seems evident among House Democrats. CREW recently drafted ethics complaints against Ney (for his role in the Abramoff scandal) and Representative Randy "Duke" Cunningham (for his

innovative housing arrangements, crafted with the apparent assistance of a defense contractor), but House rules require an actual member to bring a complaint before the Ethics Committee. So far, not a single Democrat has been willing to do so—on orders from party leaders. The leaders want the Ethics Committee to initiate the investigation itself, but such restraint hardly characterized Newt Gingrich's aggressive, and successful, attack on the Democrats in the late '80s and early '90s.

Whether Democrats are crippled by a bizarre high-mindedness or a craven desire to protect some of their own ethically challenged members, the pointlessness of an ethics campaign that no one actually *pushes* should be obvious. When you're so discreet you can't even be a good goo-goo, maybe it's time to give up politics and hire yourself out as a butler.

— SAM ROSENFELD

NAN IN ACTION

OBSESSING OVER A POSSIBLE Supreme Court retirement comes naturally to Nan Aron, president of Alliance for Justice, a Washington-based association of environmental, civil-rights, mental-health, and other progressive organizations that monitors judicial nominations. But late June was particularly frenzied. She says

she couldn't sleep for nearly a week, wondering, is William Rehnquist *really* going to retire? "Everyone was anticipating [that he would]," she says, sitting at her desk in a comfortably cluttered office overlooking Dupont Circle on a recent Wednesday afternoon. "But I kept putting myself in his shoes and thinking, 'I'm not going to step down.'" Still, the news that it was Sandra Day O'Connor and not Rehnquist (at least, not yet) threw her and the rest of the people in her office for a loop.

"We thought, 'Holy shit,'" says Julie Bernstein, the 35-year-old communications director, looking over at Aron.

"What I thought?" says the somewhat more circumspect Aron. "Pivotal seat."

"The first thing we said to the staff was, 'You're in for the summer of your life,'" she adds. "And you're going to work the hardest you've ever worked."

"We said, 'You can't go away on the Fourth of July,'" Bernstein adds.

Within an hour, staffers had sent out their first e-mail of the day. By 2 p.m., Aron was speaking at a press conference in the Mansfield Room in the Capitol. Elegant and unruffled in heels and a navy-blue skirt despite the 93-degree heat outside—and the fact that "the most closely held secret in Washington" had just thrown her plans off-kilter—she was flanked by Ralph Neas, president of People for the American Way; Marcia

Greenberger, co-president of the National Women's Law Center; David Bookbinder, a Sierra Club senior attorney; and other leaders of progressive organizations.

"We are urging the White House, President Bush, and his advisers to engage in consultation with the Democrats," Aron told a room full of reporters. "None of us up here is spoiling for a fight."

Not yet, anyway. But it's a safe bet that Aron will lead the charge to ensure that the new Supreme Court justice is "open-minded," as she puts it. And, clearly, she relishes the prospect. "It's our opportunity to talk about the issue we love: the Court."

— TARA MCKELVEY

GAZA-CONS

FOR YEARS, WASHINGTON'S neoconservative establishment has uniformly cheered Ariel Sharon for his aggressive promotion of Israel's occupation policy. But as the Israeli prime minister's vaunted Gaza disengagement revs up this August, the familiar chorus of hosannas has descended into cacophony.

Hard-liners are torn between loyalty to the prime minister they've lauded for decades and sympathy for Israel's ultras, the settlers, who feel betrayed by Sharon's Gaza pullout plan. The American Enterprise Institute's Michael Rubin called the

Global **military expenditures** topped \$950 billion in 2003 ... Arms transfers accounted for **\$25.6 billion** of this figure ... 60 percent of all arms sales from 2000–03 were made to **developing nations** ... The five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) are the **largest arms dealers**, contributing 88 percent of all conventional arms sales ... Of the G8 nations, Japan is the only country that **fails** to make the top 10 arms-exporting countries ... In 2004, China and India were the two largest recipients of global arms sales ... China relies mostly on **outdated Russian weapons** for its purchases, but is pressuring the European Union to lift its arms embargo so it can purchase technologically advanced weapons and upgrades ... The U.S. share of total arms deals in 2003 was **45 percent** ... The total value of these sales was \$6.2 billion ... A year before, that figure was \$8.9 billion ... The **United States sells weapons to Oman**, a country that spends twice as much on its military as on health and education services ... The United States sold weapons to **18 of the 25** countries actively engaged in military conflict, including Angola, Chad, Colombia, and Pakistan ... Such conflicts claim an estimated **half-million lives** each year ... 80 percent of casualties are **civilians** ... In 2003, 80 percent of the top 25 importers of U.S. arms, including Saudi Arabia and Uzbekistan, were identified as either "**undemocratic**" or **human-rights violators** by the U.S. State Department ... \$845.6 million of U.S. arms sales that year went to Israel ... President Bush's fiscal year 2006 budget seeks to **increase** military aid to Israel by \$80 million ... Of nations said by the State Department to **harbor terrorists**, nearly 90 percent have been sold weapons by the United States ... In spite of these facts, the United States and the European Union have enacted "**Codes of Conduct**" for arms sales ... They stipulate that **companies should not sell** arms to countries with undemocratic governments or regimes that engage in human-rights abuses, nor to nations where internal or external conflicts will be increased due to the presence of weapons ... **Taxpaying Americans** subsidize domestic arms-trading companies to the tune of \$6 billion to \$7 billion annually ... 95 percent of Lockheed Martin's \$31 billion annual sales are **military transactions** ... America's **highest-paid CEO**—pulling down \$88.7 million in 2004—was George David of United Technologies, which last year did \$5.1 billion in military sales.

move “irresponsible” and warned that Israelis will be “sacrificed upon the altar of [Sharon’s] legacy.” The Zionist Organization of America says withdrawal will “creat[e] a terrorist state in Gaza.”

A February memo from the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) underscores the tensions that Sharon’s turn has created within the Israel lobby. While praising the withdrawal as a testament to Israel’s generosity, it also decries the “considerable” price of disengagement, bemoaning the process as “very painful” for Israel. An AIPAC spokesman downplayed the divide. “If Israel feels like this is good for them, then it’s good,” he explained. “Israel will do

what Israel will do.” But others are eschewing neutrality in a policy dispute that may be as consequential for them as it is for Sharon.

The dissension among the neocons mirrors the divisions in Sharon’s Likud Party, where longtime Sharon rival Benjamin Netanyahu has opposed the Gaza pullout. But Netanyahu’s position, and the settlers’, is distinctly a minority perspective in Israel. “The split that has taken place between the pragmatists and the more right-wingers in Israel is now being reflected in the American debate,” said Lewis Roth, assistant executive director of Americans for Peace Now, the U.S.-based support group for the Israeli peace movement.

Could Ariel Sharon, of all people, end up isolating the U.S. neocons on matters Middle Eastern? Stranger things have happened—maybe.

— ASHEESH KAPUR SIDDIQUE

SELF-MADE TV

AL GORE MAY NOT HAVE invented the Internet, but this August he and entrepreneur Joel Hyatt are taking the technology to the next level with the launch of Current, a new youth-focused, Internet-inspired cable channel. Current, which will be broadcast into about 20 million homes beginning August 1, aims to be MTV and Google rolled into one, a sort of televised blogosphere whose goal is to “democratize” broadcast media.

Gone are the 30- to 60-minute features that dominate network television. Instead, they’ve been replaced with 1- to 5-minute “pods,” short videos that will offer snippets of news, fashion, celebrity gossip, and technology updates. To top it all off, each half-hour of programming will conclude with a review of the most frequently searched topics from—you guessed it—Google.

While this sort of pod programming smacks of youth favorite MTV (and striving-for-youth staple VH1), Current—which, contrary to the hopes of some, will be avowedly apolitical—aims to take it one step further, building its professional programming around viewer-made videos submitted via the Web. Blogs made everyone a pundit; Current, apparently, will make everyone a producer.

So will Current deliver on

the vision of grass-roots, participatory television?

“We are hopeful, but it remains to be seen if Current will be a truly alternative outlet and accessible to youth who don’t usually have the resources to make their own videos,” said Jen Soriano, program director for the Youth Media Council, an organization that trains young people to be media activists. “Without mechanisms for reaching out to these communities, ... this could be just another corporate giant, only with a friendlier face.”

In a world as competitive as cable television, balancing mass appeal with independent sensibilities is a challenge. Despite its grass-roots aspirations and pseudo-Leninist lingo (the company has a “vice president for marketing and vanguard ideas”), Current is no media outsider. Indeed, its management team includes Anne Zehren, the founding publisher of *Teen People*, and David Neuman, the former chief programming officer at CNN. How this merger of corporate savvy and do-it-yourself production will affect programming is just one of many unanswered questions swirling around the channel’s launch.

Current will also be challenged to pack innovative news and cultural analysis into its short format, said Robert J. Thompson, director of the Center for the Study of Popular Television at Syracuse University.

“Six minutes is better than 30 seconds on the nightly news,” Thompson said. “But that doesn’t exactly revolutionize the way these stories are being told.”

— ALYSON ZUREICK

TRANSCRIPT

From the White House press “gaggle,” July 11, 2005:

McClellan: If you’ll let me finish.

Question: No, you’re not finishing — you’re not saying anything. You stood at that podium and said that Karl Rove was not involved. And now we find out that he spoke about Joseph Wilson’s wife. So don’t you owe the American public a fuller explanation? Was he involved or was he not? Because contrary to what you told the American people, he did indeed talk about his wife, didn’t he?

McClellan: David, there will be a time to talk about this, but now is not the time to talk about it.

...
Again, I’ve responded to the question.

...
Again, you’re continuing to ask questions relating to an ongoing criminal investigation, and I’m just not going to respond any further.

...
I appreciate your questions. You can keep asking them, but you have my response.

...
I’ve responded to the questions.

...
I’ve responded to the questions, Dick.

...
Again, after the investigation is complete, I will be glad to talk about it at that point.

...

Down Is Up (or So Some Say)

BY ROBERT S. MCINTYRE

NEW PROJECTIONS FROM THE CONGRESSIONAL Budget Office suggest that this year's deficit will be \$75 billion or so less than last year's record level. Similar figures will be reported by the Bush administration just after this column goes to press. The right is

already claiming victory.

"Our policies continue to boost the economy and tax revenues," says Representative Jim Nussle, chairman of the House Budget Committee. "These numbers prove what we've said all along," chimed in House Speaker Dennis Hastert. Indeed, claims Stephen Moore in *The Wall Street Journal*, "the numbers are an eye-popping vindication of the Laffer Curve."

Now wait a minute. Far from "an eye-popping vindication" of right-wing theories, the recent budget news is merely an eye-glazing vindication of the laws of arithmetic. Consider:

When Bill Clinton left office, he had turned the huge non-Social Security deficit he inherited from the first President Bush—equal to 4.6 percent of the economy—into a small surplus. He did that by boosting revenues by a fifth and cutting spending by a seventh. But George W. Bush quickly took us back to the bad old days. By the end of last year, non-Social Security revenues had plummeted from 15.1 percent of the economy to a 62-year low of only 11.3 percent. Coupled with increased spending (largely on Iraq), that produced a deficit of 4.9 percent of the economy.

To be sure, taxes are doing better this year. Corporations are paying more, mostly due to a tax increase (the big corporate tax cuts that depressed revenues in fiscal years 2002 through 2004 expired). Personal income taxes are up, in part because there weren't any significant new tax cuts this year. Even so, this year's

non-Social Security revenues are likely to be about a fifth below what Bush inherited from Clinton, and the deficit outside of Social Security will probably be close to \$500 billion, or 4 percent of the economy.

Here are the rankings of non-Social Security tax receipts as a share of the economy since 1943: Fiscal 2003 and 2004 are tied for the lowest; fiscal 2002 ranks third-lowest; this year will probably rank fifth-lowest—hardly anything to clap about.

In a nutshell, Clinton cut spending, raised taxes, and, with the help of a booming economy, balanced the budget. Bush has cut taxes and increased spending—and deficits have skyrocketed. It's a familiar pattern that even the most ardent believer in voodoo economics ought to be able to see. Unless, of course, facts just don't matter.

Which brings us back to Moore's citing of the Laffer Curve. A simple parabola sketched out on a cocktail napkin back in 1974 by the felicitously named Arthur Laffer (then a University of Chicago business professor), this theory holds that there is a magical, ideal tax rate that produces the most revenues for the government. Tax less than that rate, and you'll get less revenue. Tax more, and you'll also get less. Rather like Goldilocks, you might say.


In practice, Laffer and his disciples applied his theory only to the top income-tax rate. Although Laffer's number-free graph didn't specify the ideal rate, during the Reagan administration it was assumed to be 50 percent, which is what President Reagan's 1981 tax-cut bill prescribed. Reagan was so enamored of the Laffer Curve idea that he famously promised to pay for his defense buildup with the revenues generated by his tax cuts.

That, of course, didn't work out. Yet despite that failure, the Laffer Curve has remained in the background as one of several bedrock, albeit incoherent, tenets of what has passed for "conservative" economics over the past three decades. There is one codicil: Whatever the current top tax rate, it's always too high.

To be sure, GOP leaders haven't trumpeted Lafferism during the Bush administration until very recently. On the contrary, Bush started off telling us we needed to cut taxes because the government simply had too much money. When that fantasy was quickly disproved, Bush cited the need to stimulate the weak economy (even though his tax cuts were backloaded into the future). Once the economy recovered, the tax cuts were defended as a way to force huge reductions in supposedly wasteful (and unspecified) government programs. Now, as spending has risen anyway, Republicans have come full circle, back to the ridiculous Reaganesque claim that their tax cuts are helping raise the money to pay for Bush's profligate spending.

You shouldn't believe any of these excuses, but certainly no rational person can believe all of them. Ultimately, it seems, the reason that Republican politicians and their allies favor tax cuts is because, well, they favor tax cuts. If that means bankrupting our country, so be it. **TAP**

Robert S. McIntyre is the director of Citizens for Tax Justice.



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Four Wars

BY ERNEST C. HOLLINGS

IN THE IRAQ WAR, WE FAILED TO COMMIT THE troops necessary to secure the country, and now we are in a mess. In the Terrorism War, we are creating more terrorism. In the Afghanistan War, we have yet to capture Osama bin Laden. And in the Trade War, our

manufacture is so outsourced that an incident with China would cause us to cancel Christmas.

First, Iraq. Immediately after the election in 1966, I was with General William Westmoreland in Vietnam, a country with a population of 16 million. With 535,000 troops, the general wanted still more troops to bring the war to a head. In Iraq, a country of 26 million, we're trying to secure it with 140,000 troops. We lost more than 58,000 GIs trying to "Vietnamize" Vietnam. Are we to lose 58,000 more to "Iraqify" Iraq? There is no education in the second kick of a mule. We should start withdrawing now.

"But you can't cut and run" is the cry. We cut two years ago when we announced "mission accomplished," leaving looting and the blowing up of facilities, and letting thousands of Republican Guards go free. Now we are hunkered down, responding like emergency medical services as we investigate car bombings.

"But there will be a civil war" is another cry. There already is. We learned in World War II that there is one thing stronger than democracy. That's religion. We liberated Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia 62 years ago, and they have yet to opt for democracy. We liberated Kuwait 14 years ago, and while that regime now allows women to vote, it has yet to opt for real democracy. Democracy can't be force-fed. It must be homegrown. It takes more than an election. Iraq had a partial election because the Grand Ayatollah Ali

al-Sistani told the Shia to vote. The Sunnis refused to vote for the same reason. The Kurds had the only honest election, demanding autonomy. The best we can hope for is an Islamic democracy.

We were deceived into Iraq. In 1996, incoming Prime Minister of Israel Benjamin Netanyahu commissioned a think tank to propose a solution to the Palestinian problem. Comprising Richard Perle, Douglas Feith, and David Wurmser, it proposed a "Clean Break"—i.e., to sever negotiations with Yasir Arafat and democratize the Middle East by bombing Lebanon; next, to invade Syria for having weapons of mass destruction; and finally, to replace Saddam Hussein with a Hashemite ruler favorable to Israel. Rejected by Netanyahu, the group returned to America and organized the Project for the New American Century (PNAC) with Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz, Scooter Libby, Steve Cambone, et al. In 1998, the PNAC sought a resolution in Congress for regime change in Iraq. Passed by a voice vote in the Senate, the resolution was intended to encourage opposition in Iraq. With the election of George W. Bush in 2000, "Clean Break" hit pay dirt: Cheney became vice president, and the top three positions in the Pentagon went to Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, and Feith; Perle was appointed chairman of the Defense Policy Board; Libby was made an assistant to the vice president; and Cambone was placed in the Department of Defense, campaigning for "Curveball."

This explains why, days before becom-

ing president in 2001, Bush sought a briefing on Iraq at the Pentagon. It explains why former Treasury Secretary Paul O'Neill said of the first National Security Council meeting, which had been called to discuss the recession, that all the others in attendance wanted to discuss was Iraq. It explains why on September 12, 2001, the president asked Defense Secretary Rumsfeld for a plan to invade Iraq even though Iraq had nothing to do with September 11. And finally, we know from the "Downing Street Memo" that "the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy."

Opposition to U.S. policy in the Mideast has been building. For more than 30 years, youngsters there have been taught in madrassas that the United States is the infidel. By 9-11, 10,000 to 20,000 Islamic youth had graduated from Taliban camps in Afghanistan. Returning to their home countries, they developed and recruited thousands more. Prior to 9-11, Osama bin Laden and others tried to get our attention by blowing up barracks in Lebanon and Saudi Arabia, bombing one tower of the World Trade Center, blowing up embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, and attacking the *USS Cole* in the Persian Gulf. Bin Laden's 2001 attack on the World Trade Center and Pentagon finally got our attention. He contended that our support of Israel and our presence in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the Gulf constituted another Crusade against the Muslim world.

The invasion of Iraq without cause proved his point to Muslims. Theretofore rejected, bin Laden became a hero. The cry went out: "If you want the infidel, come to Baghdad." Daily reports of U.S. "atrocities" spread by Al-Jazeera, the Arab broadcasting network, helped the spread of terrorism. President Bush constantly pledges to "hunt them down one by one" and "bring them to justice." This is war! You don't have to hunt them down. They are now millions, from Morocco to Indonesia. The president misses the important finding of the 9-11 commission: Eliminate bin Laden and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, and many more leaders will take their place. We talk the talk of war but refuse to walk the walk. Thirteen-hundred and 22



Count 'Em: Iraq, terrorism, Afghanistan, and trade; disasters all.

days after Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor, we received the surrender of Japan. Now, in the same number of days after 9-11, we have yet to find bin Laden.

Our trouble in the Terrorism War is that we're trying to win militarily. You can't kill an idea with a sword. Eliminating cells like the Taliban is necessary. But the principal weapon against terrorism now is diplomacy by proven diplomats, not lectures on democracy. Democracy in Saudi Arabia or Pakistan would elect Osama bin Laden president.

As for the Trade War: The United States had just won its independence when Britain suggested that America trade what it produced best, and Britain trade with America what it produced best—David Ricardo's doctrine of comparative advantage. Alexander Hamilton, in his report on manufacturers, told the Brits to bug off—we are not going to remain your colony, shipping our iron ore, timber, rice, cotton, indigo, etc.; we're going to develop our own manufacture. The first bill to pass the U.S. Congress on July 4, 1789, was a 50-percent tariff on numerous products. Protectionism! Trade War! Abraham Lincoln followed suit, protecting steel for the transcontinental railroad; Franklin Delano Roosevelt protected America's agriculture; Dwight Eisenhower protected oil; and John F. Kennedy protected textiles. We built this industrial giant with protectionism, and with this industrial power, we won World War II. With the only manufacture after WWII, the United States wisely enacted the Marshall Plan, sending money, equipment, and expertise to Europe and the Pacific Rim. Setting an example for "free trade," we opened American markets and withheld enforcement of our trade laws. But Japan and Korea stayed

closed. Now China follows suit, draining our manufacture.

Today the United States imports 60 percent of what it consumes. More importantly, we had to wait for flat-panel displays from Japan in order to go into Kuwait in 1991. Now, we have a \$36 billion deficit in advanced technology trade with China. Those who want to defend Taiwan will have to wait for China to send us the weapons. China is now setting standards and patenting these standards. With her market size she will soon control world production. With foreigners financing our deficits to the tune of \$2 billion a day, that money is coming back in the form of the buying up of America—Chrysler, IBM, steel production, and now Unocal and Maytag. We are at the brink. As former Sony chief Akio Morita once said, "That world power that loses its manufacturing capacity will cease to be a world power."


There is not now, and there never has been, free trade. Like world peace, it's a wonderful goal, but not obtained by tomorrow—or by surrender. One has to compete. And competition in the global economy is not for profit but for market share. Japan finances and protects production and dumps below cost its export. Instead of comparative advantage we have a comparative disadvantage—our standard of living. Before corporate America opens its doors in the United States, it must provide, under law, a minimum wage, clean air, clean water, Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid, plant-closing notices, parental leave, safe working places, safe machinery, labor rights, etc. This gives rise to a fifth column in the Trade War: corporate America! Hard manufacture, services, and software have all learned to avoid the expense of the

American standard of living by producing offshore. All they need is to cry "free trade," so that the U.S. market will remain open for dumping. Congress not only keeps it open but stupidly finances the outsourcing. In the Trade War, we have met the enemy, and it is not China. It is us!

We must organize for battle. We need to correlate all responsible for trade policy into a Department of Trade and Commerce. Stop financing the offshoring and appoint an assistant attorney general of trade to enforce trade laws. The number of customs agents, burdened with trade, drugs, and homeland security, must be increased. And to remove a barrier we must raise a barrier—then remove both. Free trade! But trade!

The security of the United States rests as upon a three-legged stool. The first leg, values, has never been questioned. Until now—with the invasion of Iraq and our treatment of prisoners at Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay, America is in doubt. The second leg, the military, is now questioned—by us. The volunteer army is coming apart. The third leg, the economy, has been fractured in the Trade War. With the United States determined not to have enough troops in Iraq, and the insurgents determined to have enough, we need to get out of the Iraq War and into the Trade War. Finally, we need to go to the front line of the Terrorism War in the Middle East with an experienced diplomat, Dennis Ross. As Pakistani President Pervez Musharaff told a Senate delegation last year, "Settle the conflict of Israel and Palestine, and 85 percent of the terrorism in the world will disappear." **TAP**

Ernest C. Hollings is a former Democratic senator from South Carolina.



“ Parents are often unaware that today's marijuana is different from that of a generation ago, with potency levels ten to twenty times stronger than the marijuana with which they were familiar. ”

— John Walters, Office of National Drug Control Policy

The European Union says, "It ain't so."

"Statements in the popular media that the potency of cannabis has increased by ten times or more in recent decades are not supported by the limited data that are available from either the USA or Europe. The greatest long-term changes in potency appear to have occurred in the USA. It should be noted here that before 1980 herbal cannabis potency in the USA was very low by European standards....

"The natural variation in the THC content between and within samples of herbal cannabis or cannabis resin at any one time and place far exceeds any long-term changes that may have occurred either in Europe or the USA."?

— Overview of Cannabis Potency, 2004, European Union Monitoring Centre on Drugs and Drug Addiction (Full report at www.csdp.org/research/insights6w)

Drug policy should be based on science, not politics.

Common Sense for Drug Policy

www.CommonSenseDrugPolicy.org www.DrugWarFacts.org

www.AddictInTheFamily.org

Mike Gray, Chair; Robert Field, Co-Chair

Dispatches

"The Bork-era Democrats held a 55-seat majority led by Robert Byrd; today [the Democrats] are looking up at 55 Republicans."

— PAGE 15

BUBBLEHEAD

Californian Chris Cox, the president's choice to reverse the reforms at the SEC, could be Bush's single most destructive regulatory appointee.

BY ROBERT KUTTNER


MOST ECONOMISTS EXPECT something bad to happen to the U.S. economy sometime this decade, due to the deficit and debt overhang, the trade imbalance, the dependence on foreign borrowing, the sundry asset bubbles, and more. When the history of the next crash is written, President Bush's appointment of California Republican Congressman Christopher Cox to chair the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) during this fragile era will deserve its own chapter.

If confirmed, as he almost surely will be, Cox could very well be Bush's single most destructive regulatory appointee. Financial markets are one of the very few areas where even laissez-faire types concede that a measure of regulation is necessary. But Cox is a true believer who imagines that financial markets can police themselves. He has been a relentless foe of even the modest regulation enacted by the outgoing Republican SEC chairman, William Donaldson. The two other Republican commissioners are ideological clones of Cox, who will have a working majority to do whatever he wants. It is widely expected that he will preside over the evisceration of the commission. Says a former commissioner, "This is the worst thing to happen in the SEC's 70-year history."

COX IS ALSO UNCOMMONLY LUCKY. His nomination will come before the Senate at a time when Washington has bigger fish to fry. The scandal of his ap-

pointment has been buried in the blizzard of news during this journalistically unseasonable July.

Moreover, many Senate Democrats who would ordinarily go after an extremist Bush nominee are being prudently silent because their own Wall Street allies and benefactors are totally in support



Lackey: Chris Cox

of Cox. These include liberals with Wall Street constituents (New York's Chuck Schumer and Hillary Clinton), those with Silicon Valley venture-capitalist constituents (California's Dianne Feinstein and even Barbara Boxer), and those with banking and insurance constituents (Joseph Bide of Delaware and Chris Dodd of Connecticut). Cox's critics are further disadvantaged by the fact that there are two Democratic vacancies on the commission. The White House will likely promote a deal in which Democrats can get

commissioners recommended by the Senate Democratic leadership to fill those slots—but only if they go easy on Cox.

Paul Sarbanes, the Senate Banking Committee's heroic ranking Democrat, plans to ask some tough questions, but he won't have many allies. If you want to plumb the matter of just how the Democratic Party has been losing its soul, take a close look at the Cox hearings.

IT IS NOT EVEN THREE YEARS SINCE the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the appointment of reformer Donaldson to lead the SEC. The stabilization of financial markets and resurgence of stock prices is due in no small part to these reforms. At the time of Sarbanes-Oxley, after the collapse of Enron and MCI WorldCom, Wall Street executives declared Hallelujah!—the system had been saved. Republicans, who only weeks before had opposed the whole idea, lined up to support the measure.

The law basically required honest corporate books, prohibited certain conflicts of interest, created a new body to explicitly police accountants, and set up new systems of corporate accountability to prevent another Enron. But it was not self-executing. It required actions by the SEC, and the Wall Street support was short-lived. All of Donaldson's initiatives have been bitterly opposed by the business lobbies and their point man in Congress—one Christopher Cox.

In 1995, Cox, then a member of the House Commerce and Finance Committee, was a leading sponsor of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, a measure that made it much harder for swindled investors to sue those who had misrepresented stocks. Cox's version of the bill would have protected even "reckless" misinformation. A slightly modified bill was part of Newt Gingrich's "Contract with America" and became law in 1996

over President Bill Clinton's veto. Two years later, Cox was a key sponsor of successful legislation to preempt similar suits in state courts. These two laws led directly to Enron, WorldCom, and the other scandals because they substantially weakened the threat of shareholder litigation.

All the circumstantial evidence suggests that the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, which works hand in glove with Cox, orchestrated the "June coup" in which Donaldson abruptly "resigned," and the White House had Cox ready to go as his successor. Donaldson had told his colleagues that he planned to stay on through the end of this year. He had extended the lease through 2005 on his Washington apartment (his permanent home is in New York). Right up to the day of his sudden resignation, his press interviews and conversations with fellow commissioners suggested that he was planning to move forward with his reform agenda.

DONALDSON HAD TURNED OUT TO be quite a surprise—and a big disappointment to Wall Street. A onetime chairman and CEO of the New York Stock Exchange, he was also a close social friend of the Bush family. After the short and disastrous reign of Donaldson's predecessor at the SEC, former accounting-industry lobbyist Harvey Pitt, observers expected that he would be a useful symbol of integrity, but no activist. However, Donaldson, then 72 and near the end of his career and not looking to call in any favors, decided that Wall Street needed reforming for real.

Working closely with Harvey Goldschmid, the Democrats' cerebral senior commissioner, Donaldson led the commission to issue one regulation after another that appalled the two other Republican commissioners and their Wall Street allies. These included measures implementing key provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley, requiring arm's-length relationships between corporations and their auditors and requiring CEOs to attest personally, under penalty of perjury, to the accuracy of corporate books. In addition, Donaldson sided with the commission's two Democrats, Goldschmid and Roel Campos, in a series of 3-to-2

votes, and issued several other regulations long sought by reformers. One required the expensing of stock options. Another called for broker-dealers to give all buyers and sellers the best available stock price rather than giving better deals to insiders and favored customers.

Two other regulations, also passed by 3-to-2 votes and resisted with particular bitterness, required mutual funds to have independent (nonmanagement) chairs and mandated SEC registration of hedge funds. Financial interests challenged the former in court, and on his last day in office, Donaldson reinstated the regulation on mutual funds after an appellate court had thrown it out, contending that the SEC had not made an adequate assessment of its impact. Donaldson ordered an impact study to be done in record time so that the regulation could be restored. This was not the action of a man who left voluntarily.

UNLIKE OTHER AGENCIES WHOSE senior staffers have been colonized by ideologues, the SEC has largely maintained its tradition of professionalism.

JUDGE-MENT DAY

Bork earned his "borking"—but it took 55 Democratic senators to do it. Fighting a Bush Supreme Court nominee today is a different game.

BY JEFFREY DUBNER

THE VERB "BORK" IS ONE OF THE more tendentious entries in *Webster's New Millennium Dictionary*. Webster's records "bork" as meaning "to seek to obstruct a political appointment or selection; also, to attack a political opponent viciously." While the first half of the definition is accurate, the second element is but one version of recent history, the conservative one. Through this lens, Bork suffered "naked character assassination," as Andrew McCarthy recently wrote for the *National Review Online*.

For liberals, on the other hand, "borking" means something quite different. "Robert Bork defeated Robert Bork," argues People for the American Way Pres-

ident Ralph Neas, who chaired the Block Bork coalition. "Borking," by his lights, is the process of giving the public "an opportunity to understand, to know what the judicial philosophy is of this individual who will be confirmed for life."

But Cox is not only likely to weaken most of the above measures; as chairman, he has immense power over how the SEC is run. He could replace career people with free-market allies. Enforcement decisions proposed by senior staff are approved or rejected by a majority of commissioners—for example, whether to extract stiff fines and refer prosecutions or let swindlers off with slaps on the wrist. Wall Streeters view Cox as one of their own. He is also expected to revive a proposal that Donaldson buried, to preempt many enforcement actions by pro-consumer state attorneys general such as New York's Eliot Spitzer.

It would be one thing if the last episode of systemic failure and market meltdown had occurred in 1929, beyond most people's personal experience. But Enron, WorldCom, the disgrace of the accountants, the scandals of stock huckstering and self-dealing, the revelations of stock-option abuse and CEO larceny, the ensuing bubble and collapse—all occurred in the past half-decade. Once again, it falls to progressives to protect capitalism from itself. **TAP**

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To Neas, the strategy in 2005 is much as it was in 1987, if President Bush nominates an ideologically extreme candidate to the open seat left by Sandra Day O'Connor (and possibly the one left by Chief Justice William Rehnquist, whose retirement was widely expected at press time). Democrats have a chance to defeat a radical nominee only if they are able to educate the public and convey the inevitable effects on people's lives of the ascendance

of a hard-right judicial philosophy.

But much has changed in the 18 years since Bork's rejection. Liberal groups seeking to prevent the emergence of a radically conservative Supreme Court face a much more daunting challenge than they did with Bork.

THE MOST OBVIOUS DIFFERENCE BETWEEN the two battles, of course, is the mirror-image makeup of the Senate. Whereas the Bork-era Democrats held a 55-seat majority led by Majority Leader Robert Byrd, today Byrd and his party are looking up at 55 Republicans led by Bill Frist, whose presidential aspirations depend on the confirmation of justices approved by the religious right.

This in itself seems like a near-fatal strike against Democratic hopes to block a nominee: While rejections of Supreme Court nominations are by no means historical rarities—more than 20 percent of Supreme Court nominees never made it to the bench, and six of the last 20 nominations have failed—it is quite uncommon for a nominee to be defeated when one party controls both the White House and the Senate. Only once in the past 75 years has a president seen a Senate run by his ostensible allies stonewall his choices, and the circumstances of that defeat were anomalous, to say the least. Lyndon Johnson's elevation of Associate Justice Abe Fortas to the seat of the departing chief justice, Earl Warren, and the accompanying nomination of Homer Thornberry as associate justice were derailed by a filibuster just one month before the 1968 election; Johnson had been a self-proclaimed lame duck for months.

Senate Democrats may not have recourse to a Fortas-style filibuster, however. In the May compromise deal allowing the confirmation of three of Bush's most radical nominees, seven Republican senators forswore the "nuclear option" that would have eliminated judicial filibusters—with the caveat that, as South Carolina Republican Lindsey Graham explained hours after signing the deal, "if there's a filibuster in the future, Lindsey Graham has the right to change the rules." Graham and GOP colleague Mike DeWine, as well as Democratic signa-

tory Ben Nelson of Nebraska (up for reelection next year), have repeatedly portrayed the deal as a significant constraint on Democratic filibustering.

Even caucus unity could be a problem for the Democrats, although observers believe that moderate Democrats will largely defer to the leadership's determination on whether a nominee merits blocking. "Generally, the broader caucus looks to the work done by members on the [Senate Judiciary] Committee," notes Melody Barnes, Ted Kennedy's chief counsel on the committee from 1995 to 2003. "It would almost be like sending the miner's canary down and then ignoring the canary when it came back up" for individual senators to ignore the findings of the committee staff.

But the roll-call votes for the three most controversial judges ushered in by the compromise are ominous reminders that the Democratic caucus may not stand so united. The deal guaranteed only cloture votes (votes to end debate and hold a binding confirmation vote) from its signatories, not final approval of the nomination. Yet each of the three received at least one Democratic vote for confirmation.

IN THE FACE OF THESE HEFTY SPEED bumps, liberals have one strategy: education.

"These rare moments offer unprecedented opportunities for the public to

reflect and discuss and engage in this issue," says Nan Aron, president of the liberal advocacy group Alliance for Justice. Only by "show[ing] the American people not only how right-wing the nominee might be but how it affects their daily lives, how it will affect their children and their grandchildren," Neas says, can liberals hope to stop a nominee's confirmation.

But even here the difference between 1987 and 2005 is troublesome. In 1987, Orrin Hatch, then the Republican ranking member on the Judiciary Committee, lamented the reduction of the hearings to "30-second bites"; today, participants will be lucky to get 10 seconds' airtime without interruption.

The brief format fits liberals poorly and conservatives well. The argument for strict construction is difficult to sustain at length, but its 10-second rationale—that "judges should interpret the law, not make the law"—is both familiar and inarguable. Liberals will be hard-pressed to extrapolate convincingly from a latter-day Bork's beliefs to the American life that would follow.

Just getting the message out will be a challenge greater than any faced by the Bork-era liberals, let alone preventing the president from appointing and confirming radically conservative justices if he so chooses. It is not, all told, a promising scenario—but it is the scenario that exists. **TAP**

DOWNSIZING, IRAQ-STYLE

This fall, the "coalition of the willing" will become the coalition of the shrinking. And no, it's not because of the bombings in London.

BY TARA MCKELVEY

ON JULY 6, PRESIDENT GEORGE W. Bush celebrated his 59th birthday in Copenhagen with a friend, Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen. It was an important moment for Bush, and not only because of the Greenland stamp collection he received as a birthday present. He also got a chance to show his appreciation to members of a

club that has become increasingly unpopular: the "coalition of the willing." There are roughly 520 Danish troops stationed in Iraq, and Bush paid tribute to their families. Unfortunately for Bush, there may be a lot fewer people around to thank at his next birthday party.

Chances are the Danes will remain members of the coalition. Rasmussen

has repeatedly pledged his allegiance to Bush and the U.S. efforts in Iraq. But the Spaniards have famously pulled out of the group, following the March 2004 election of a socialist government headed by Prime Minister José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero. The Italians confirmed on July 8 that their 3,160 troops would start leaving Iraq in September. The Poles announced earlier this year that they would pull their 1,500 troops from Iraq by January 2006. And less noticed, perhaps, but no less important is the planned withdrawal of Ukrainian troops (1,650 of them, scheduled to leave in the fall). Meanwhile, Dutch troops have already left, and Bulgarian soldiers are on their way out.

In May 2003, the coalition was composed of 30-plus countries and had a

ings and co-author of *America Unbound*. "They will say, 'We're not to be derailed from policy by a bunch of terrorists.'"

At least not for a few weeks. And, of course, no nation *should* leave the coalition because of threats from terrorist networks. But the fact is that several countries now withdrawing or considering withdrawal—Italy and Japan among them—had begun thinking of pulling their troops well before the London bombings occurred. It's a delicate process. Elena Potodorova, the Bulgarian ambassador in Washington, says her compatriots were upset by the deaths of five Bulgarian soldiers in the Iraq War earlier this year. "That was the first time Bulgarians had experienced loss as a U.S. ally and a member of NATO," she says. "It was a real baptism by fire."

One defense consultant says the loss of troops, especially the Poles (considered to be particularly well-trained), will hurt the anti-insurgency efforts.

total of 173,000 troops stationed in Iraq, according to the Brookings Institution's "Iraq Index." By June 2005, the group had dropped by a dozen members and to roughly 158,000 troops. As a journalist at the French publication *La Croix* writes, it's beginning to look less like a "coalition of the willing" and more like an "alliance in tatters."

IT DOESN'T HELP THAT BRITAIN, America's leading ally in the Iraq War, was targeted in a recent terrorist attack. On July 7, shortly after rush-hour bombings killed more than 50 commuters in London, an al-Qaeda group posted a warning, which may or may not be authentic, on the Internet that Italians and Danes could be next. The threat was brushed off by Italian and Danish officials, who renewed their commitment to the coalition shortly after the bombings occurred.

Some observers say the attacks will unite the countries under attack more than divide them. "It will increase the solidarity among Western countries and put the issue back into a pre-Iraq mind-set," says Ivo H. Daalder, a senior fellow at Brook-

But, she adds, her government's decision to pull out of Iraq was reached mainly because a United Nations Security Council mandate for military operations in Iraq expires on December 31. The plans for withdrawing Bulgarian troops were discussed over a long period and finally approved by the parliament in May. "We were trying not to react in an unexpected or panicky way," she explains.

Regardless of how a decision about withdrawing troops is made, the results are the same: fewer soldiers in Iraq working to tamp down the violence. And even though Pentagon officials like Lieutenant Colonel John Skinner are enthusiastic about the group—"I still think there's a strong and healthy coalition," he says—the upcoming departures isolate the United States even more.

"The coalition was there to permit the Bush administration to say, 'Hey, we are acting in conjunction with a wide range of like-minded nations,'" says Andrew J. Bacevich, a professor of international relations at Boston University and author of *The New American Militarism: How Americans Are Seduced by*

War. "But at the time, the argument was not that persuasive."

It's even less convincing now. And besides the public-relations problem, there's the question of military strategy. The troops being withdrawn may be small in number, but they serve a purpose. Charles Heyman, a London-based defense consultant with Jane's Strategic Advisory Services, says the loss of troops, especially the Poles (because they're considered to be particularly well-trained), will hurt the anti-insurgency efforts.

"The coalition forces are very skilled," Heyman explains. "They can go to a place like Fallujah and clear it out, but they can't stay there to dominate the ground by night and day. In Vietnam, Americans had the ground during the day and lost it by night. In Iraq, they really don't have it."

"When you have any sort of insurgency campaign, the number of military forces is absolutely vital," he continues. "An analysis of past insurgency campaigns in places like Malaya, Northern Ireland, Cyprus, and Algeria shows you need one member of security forces for 30 members of a population. To make a good dent in the insurgency in Iraq, which has a population of 20 million, you need about 500,000 members of the security forces. We just don't have anywhere near that. The total figures for coalition forces—and for operational Iraqi troops—are about 220,000."

POLES, BULGARIANS, AND OTHERS may be heading home, but there's one coalition member not planning on leaving anytime soon—at least if you judge by the new sidewalks, fitness center, and facilities being built at Camp Victory, a U.S. Army base located at Baghdad International Airport. And while the rest of Iraq may be increasingly unstable, Americans on the base are trying to instill a sense of order and stability (a Pentagon official told me that they've even started to give out speeding tickets).

But real stability is a long way off, and the impending departure of a few thousand well-trained soldiers only raises more questions about America's diplomatic position and about how long U.S. forces will have to stay. **TAP**

Rove on the Ropes

Sure, let's gloat: The president's guru has been flirting with this kind of scandal for years. It's time the bill came due.

BY JOE CONASON

FROM THE VERY BEGINNING, THE WHITE HOUSE propaganda assault against former Ambassador Joseph C. Wilson IV and his wife, Valerie Plame Wilson, a longtime officer in the CIA, looked like the work of Karl Rove. The malicious leaks against the Wilsons—which have led to the appointment of a special prosecutor and the imprisonment of a *New York Times* reporter—displayed the style Rove has developed ever since his youthful apprenticeship with the Nixon gang: false information, whispered and broadcast, designed to damage reputations of “enemies” and to divert attention from substance, to further partisan advantage and to exact personal vengeance.

Throughout his adult life, the president's chief political adviser and deputy chief of staff has escaped responsibility for the ugly and blatant tactics that have marked his career in campaigns and in public office. Awful things have happened to people foolish or unfortunate enough to fall within the shadow of his wrath, from the Alabama judge whose life was ruined by whispers of pedophilia to Senator John McCain, whose wife and child were smeared by anonymous calls during the South Carolina primary in 2000, to former anti-terrorism czar Richard Clarke, whose decades of national service were erased by a sudden wave of baseless vilification—and, of course, to Vietnam War hero John Kerry, who found his service record dirtied up just enough to neutralize the Democrat's advantage as a combat veteran over George W. Bush during last year's presidential election.


The man whom the president calls “Turd Blossom” and “Boy Genius” is a powerful bully. Fear of retribution has stifled those who might have revealed his secrets. He has enjoyed the impunity of a malefactor who could always claim, however implausibly, deniability—until now.

Whether Rove faces legal consequences for his role here will

hinge on whether any official, including Rove, violated the Intelligence Identities Protection Act of 1982, which is carefully drawn to exclude prosecution of unintentional and innocent disclosures of an agent's identity—or whether any official lied or obstructed justice in the course of this investigation.

On the legal question, Rove deserves the presumption of innocence as much as any American. But he must also be judged according to a broader standard based on the values that Bush

once promised would be paramount in this presidency: honor, integrity, and character. To understand how Rove smudged those values, it is necessary to review the essential facts of the case, and to clear away the disinformation broadcast by the White House and its media allies over the past two years.



Under Fire: “Boy Genius” Rove

THE FACTS

On July 10, *Newsweek* reported the contents of an e-mail turned over to special prosecutor Patrick Fitzgerald by *Time* magazine, following a long legal battle over the testimony and notes of *Time* White House correspondent Matthew Cooper. That e-mail, sent by Cooper to bureau chief Michael Duffy on July 11, 2003, described Cooper's brief “double super secret background” conversation with Rove about the Wilsons. Rove had told him that neither CIA Director George Tenet

nor Vice President Dick Cheney had sent the former ambassador to the West African nation of Niger, where he sought information on supposed uranium sales to Iraq. Instead “it was, KR said, Wilson's wife, who apparently works at the agency on wmd issues who authorized the trip.” Cooper's e-mail went on to say “not only the genesis of the trip is flawed an[d] suspect but so is the report. [Rove] implied strongly there's still plenty to implicate Iraqi interest in acquiring uranium fro[m] Niger ...” Thus did two years of White House denials of any role in the leaking of Valerie Plame's identity suddenly become defunct.

The matter under investigation by Fitzgerald can be traced

back to the spring and summer of 2003. That was when Joseph Wilson decided that he could no longer keep quiet about the bel-
ligerent misinformation emanating from the Bush White House
to justify the war against Iraq.

More than a year earlier, Wilson had traveled to Niamey,
Niger's capital, at the request of the CIA. The objective of his un-
paid mission was to assess whether Iraqi dictator Saddam Hus-
sein had secretly attempted to buy partially enriched uranium
from the Nigerians in defiance of United Nations resolutions. If
the intelligence suggesting such a deal turned out to be true,
the argument for military action against a potential nuclear
threat from Baghdad would be bolstered.

In the course of a long diplomatic career, Wilson had served
as a junior officer in Niamey; as U.S. ambassador to Gabon, an-
other uranium-producing country; and as senior officer for
African affairs at the National Security Council. He had also
weathered a harsh, dangerous posting in Baghdad as deputy

SCOTT McCLELLAN: THE STORY CHANGES



September 29, 2003

"The president knows that
Karl Rove wasn't involved."

October 10, 2003

"[Rove] assured me he
wasn't involved in this."

July 11, 2005

"We're not going to get
into commenting on it."

chief of mission prior to the Gulf War in 1990, where his out-
standing bravery led President George Bush Senior to praise
him as a hero.

That résumé—plus his personal familiarity with the politi-
cal and diplomatic elite in Niger—certainly qualified Wilson to
inquire into allegations about that country's uranium trafficking
with Iraq. At the request of midlevel CIA officials in the Direc-
torate of Operations, he went to Niger for eight days without
compensation beyond his expenses. He reported back to the
agency that he had found no significant evidence of any such
deal with Iraq.

Ten months later, in his State of the Union address, President
Bush alluded to Iraqi attempts to purchase uranium from Africa
as evidence of the mounting threat from Baghdad. Wilson lis-
tened to the president in disbelief; he even wrote in his autobi-
ography, *The Politics of Truth*, that perhaps the president had
been referring to "an African country other than Niger," so at odds
was the assertion with what Wilson found. Over the next few
months, the former ambassador quietly tried to urge the White
House to end the growing controversy over the false "16 words"
by taking responsibility.

When those quiet efforts failed, Wilson wrote an op-ed arti-
cle for the July 6, 2003, edition of *The New York Times*, recount-
ing his mission to Niger, headlined "What I Didn't Find in Africa."
Wilson's sharp debunking of the Niger fabrication caused severe

embarrassment to the president, then-National Security Ad-
viser Condoleezza Rice, and other White House officials respon-
sible for highlighting the bogus Niger allegation—which turned
out to be based on documents forged in Italy.

Eight days later, syndicated columnist Robert Novak reported
that "senior administration officials" had denigrated Wilson and
revealed that "his wife, Valerie Plame, is an agency operative on
weapons of mass destruction." Novak quoted those officials as
saying that Wilson's wife "suggested sending him to Niger to in-
vestigate" *Time* magazine published a similar report online
on July 17 under Cooper's byline.

THE SPIN

Ever since the story broke, and certainly since the investigation
was launched, the White House and its defenders have turned
to methods that have become all too familiar: attack the crit-
ics, make it seem as if they have hidden agendas and secret mo-
tives, and if their loyalty to flag and country can be impugned,
all the better.

The first tack was to discredit the Wilsons. By inventing a
phony suspicion of "nepotism" on their part, the leakers sought
to divert attention away from the actual issues of distorted in-
telligence, to discredit a critic with professional stature and in-
side knowledge, to intimidate present and former government
officials who might consider blowing the whistle, and—most
crucially—to give war a chance, evidence or not.

But, in fact, the former ambassador's trip was no "boondog-
gle" authorized by his wife. Valerie Plame Wilson lacked the au-
thority to send her husband to Niger, and he profited in no way
from his unpaid, weeklong sojourn in one of the poorest desert
countries on earth, thousands of miles from his wife and 2-year-
old twins. She did not even need to suggest his name to her col-
leagues or superiors because he had completed a similar mission
for the agency four years earlier. But there would have been
nothing wrong with such a suggestion anyway. The CIA officers
who sent Joseph Wilson to Niger knew he was more than qual-
ified to undertake that task.

Plame, for her part, had worked undercover in Europe and the
United States to prevent weapons proliferation, earning profes-
sional accolades and promotions. Prior to the leak, her closest
friends and neighbors believed that she was an "energy analyst"
for a fictional company called Brewster-Jennings Associates.

By disclosing her actual job, Novak ended her career—and
potentially endangered her and every contact known to have
done business with her. The uproar over her "outing" led to
public and editorial demands for an investigation to discover
which "senior administration officials" were responsible for this
outrageous and arguably illegal act. Rove was an obvious sus-
pect. For one thing, Rove and Novak had a history: Rove was
fired from George Bush Senior's 1992 re-election campaign for
supposedly leaking a story about a close Bush Senior confidant—
to Novak (Rove and Novak deny it). Such suspicions reflected
more than mere speculation. Shortly after the Novak column
appeared, Rove had reportedly called *Hardball* host Chris
Matthews with the message "Wilson's wife is fair game." The
stunned Matthews, who has since refused to comment on the

incident, apparently had the decency to call Wilson and inform him of Rove's ominous remark.

Plame was indeed "fair game," according to the Republican pundits and politicians who have participated in the years-long assault on the Wilsons, because she wasn't truly an undercover agent. Various writers, publications, and Web sites have claimed, without proof, that her identity was well-known. Her regular presence at CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia, they have argued, indicates that she wasn't undercover. The CIA differed with those amateur assessments, as the agency made clear in statements to the press as well as in its official letter seeking a probe of the leak, requesting "an investigation into the disclosure earlier that year of the identity of an employee operating under cover."

Her undercover status was again confirmed during the struggle over Fitzgerald's subpoenas to Cooper and Judith Miller of *The New York Times*. When a three-judge appellate panel upheld those subpoenas and rejected arguments that the reporters were entitled to protect their sources, they noted that Fitzgerald had provided voluminous—but still secret—grand-jury evidence that he was seeking to prosecute a serious crime against national security. An unhindered prosecution, wrote Circuit Judge David Tatel, "appears essential to remedying a serious breach of public trust." That could not be true unless the prosecutor believes and can prove that Plame was undercover—and that leaking her identity jeopardized national-security sources and methods.

Another tack has been to go after Fitzgerald. He took over the case at the end of 2003, after questions arose about long-standing political connections between Rove and then-Attorney General John Ashcroft. Ashcroft recused himself, and Deputy Attorney General James Comey named Fitzgerald, the U.S. attorney for northern Illinois and a prosecutor with a reputation as tough, straight, and nonpartisan.

The Washington Times editorialized recently that Fitzgerald has spent \$2 million and "can't supply value for the government's money." But in truth, having cheered on Kenneth Starr for five years in his rambling, highly partisan (and \$70 million) Whitewater investigation, the right has no credible complaint against Fitzgerald. He is a Bush appointee, chosen to investigate this case by another Bush appointee, at the behest of a Bush-appointed attorney general and with the acquiescence of the president himself—who has declared, sincerely or not, his desire to "get to the bottom" of this matter, according to White House Press Secretary Scott McClellan. Bearing those credentials, Fitzgerald has tried to uncover the leakers' identity for two years, enduring jeers from *The Wall Street Journal* editorial page and the rest of the Republican noise machine. Unlike Starr, his office hasn't leaked, and the targets of his investigation remain unknown.

DECISION TIME

It is certainly possible that Karl Rove committed no crime and that he is not, as his attorney insists, a "target" of Fitzgerald's investigation. He may have spoken truthfully during his three reported appearances before the grand jury and in his earlier

interviews with the FBI. The prosecutor could be seeking instead to indict the person or persons who may have violated the intelligence-identities law by revealing Plame's identity to Rove and others in the White House—and to squeeze Rove into providing names, dates, and details of the plot against the Wilsons.

Yet whether he trespassed a single narrowly drawn statute or not, he deserves to be held accountable for his irresponsible and cowardly attack on a woman who has devoted her life to her country, exemplifying the patriotism he and the president so often extol for their own partisan purposes. Rove may never be indicted, but he certainly revealed Plame's identity—and encouraged the vile campaign against her and her husband.

As for Bush, he must be held responsible for the misconduct of his staff, even (or perhaps especially) the cherished "Boy Wonder" who propelled him into the Oval Office. In an unrehearsed moment during the early days of the scandal, Bush talked about how difficult it might be to locate the "evil-doers" in this case.

"I don't know if we're going to find out the senior administration official," he said on October 7, 2003. "Now, this is a large administration, and there's a lot of senior officials. I don't have any idea. I'd like to. I want to know the truth. That's why I've instructed this staff of mine to cooperate fully with the investigators—full disclosure, everything we know the investigators will find out. I have no idea whether we'll find out who the leaker is—partially because, in all due respect to your profession, you do a very good job of protecting the leakers. But we'll find out."

At a press conference on June 10, 2004, a reporter asked Bush two questions about the case: "Do you still stand by what you said several months ago, a suggestion that it might be difficult to identify anybody who leaked the agent's name? ... And do you stand by your pledge to fire anyone found to have done so?" The president replied: "Yes. And that's up to [Fitzgerald] to find the facts."

Contrary to expectations, Fitzgerald is finding those facts, and the day is approaching when Bush must confront their implications—or turn away, and finally prove that his rhetoric of honor and integrity has no meaning. No doubt he has been reminded more than once of what his father said in April 1999, when the former president and ex-CIA director attended a ceremony dedicating the agency's headquarters in his name:

Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, narco-trafficking, people killing each other, fundamentalists killing each other in the name of God ... As our analysts know, as our collectors of intelligence know, these are our enemies. To combat them we need more intelligence, not less. We need more human intelligence. That means we need more protection for the methods we use to gather intelligence and more protection for our sources, particularly our human sources, people that are risking their lives for their country.

Even though I'm a tranquil guy now at this stage of my life, I have nothing but contempt and anger for those who betray the trust by exposing the name of our sources. They are, in my view, the most insidious of traitors. **TAP**

Howard's Beginning

Love him, hate him—and different Democrats do each—Howard Dean is taking the fight to the GOP. The question is, can he do more than fight?

BY JODI ENDA

THERE IS LITTLE ROOM LEFT TO STAND IN THE ATLANTA nightclub Eleven50, a cavernous former opera house that sports an outsized mirror ball and the thumping electronic dance music favored by the hip, scantily clad, under-35 set. But on this humid weeknight in early June, the crowd is decidedly unhip, mostly well past its fourth decade. Nevertheless, this silk-and-seersucker set—who paid \$50 to \$5,000 to get in—acts as if there is a rock star in the room. The 650 men and women are cheering wildly, hanging over the balcony, lighting up the room with flashbulbs and begging autographs of the short, graying, and bland-looking doctor who they desperately hope will become the savior of their beloved Democratic Party.

The unreserved enthusiasm of the hoi polloi stands in marked contrast to the more aloof behavior of another class of Democrats, one to whom Howard Dean has been less inspiring than anxiety-producing during his first half-year as chairman of the Democratic National Committee (DNC). At the Eleven50, only one elected official—Atlanta Mayor Shirley Franklin, who also is the state party treasurer—joins Dean on stage. Not one of the six Democrats elected to statewide offices, including the two running for governor, is there. Not one of the state's six Democratic members of Congress is there. Not one state House member. Not one state senator. Asked later why just one elected official showed up, the state party spokesman invoked the same excuse four times: "The mayor of Atlanta was there."

The division of opinion between the boisterous crowd and the absent higher-ups in Atlanta reflects a stark truth: Little has changed since Dean screamed his way into presidential campaign history in early 2004. He remains blunt, mouthy, "quick of the lip," as one admirer put it. He is not afraid of a fight; in fact, he is girding for one. He does not pull punches, and he is proud of that. He also excites, invigorates, and reaches out to people who never viewed themselves as political.


He worries people, too. While it is too early to judge Dean's effectiveness—the 2006 and 2008 elections will provide the best proof—it is possible to examine the impact of his leadership on four key constituencies: rank-and-file activists and voters, pro-

fessional operatives in Washington and around the country, elected officials, and big-money donors. The rank and file adores his style. The operatives—including, perhaps surprisingly, the ones based in Washington—give Dean good marks on substance, united in the belief that his "50-state strategy" to rebuild the party is the right approach. But the elected officials and the big-money people are not Deaniacs by a long shot. Aside from a few public comments (by Joe Biden and John Edwards, notably), they are reluctant to criticize him for the record. I spoke with more than 50 people for this article, and I wanted to speak with many more—but I was astonished at the number of Democrats who have returned my calls for years who did not when the subject was Howard Dean.

The conventional wisdom on Dean is that he's a divisive loudmouth who may be doing his party more harm than good (GOP quotes to this effect regularly find their way into the media, for whom Dean serves as a big, fat target). There is some truth to this view; fairly or not, Dean's broad-brush comments about Republicans are likely to dominate coverage of him for some time.

But this view ignores something critical: The Democrats of the Bush era weren't doing so great *before* Dean, and they have serious problems that are not of Dean's making. The party is decades behind the Republicans organizationally; it is, despite some undeniable oppositional successes like the Social Security fight, still staring at long-term minority status; and it's seen by many as so bereft of ideas that it has come to this: While explaining the Watergate break-in to generations too young to remember it, Jay Leno quipped, "See, back in those days, the Democrats actually had some ideas worth stealing."

These problems are what Dean came to Washington to fix. To do that, he'll need to get all his constituencies behind him. What can he realistically hope to accomplish? Can he bring the party to equal footing with the Republican National Committee (RNC)? Can state party building and small money offset Dean's problems with the party's elites? These, more than his headline-grabbing way with words, are the real questions of the Dean era, and the criteria by which his party will succeed or fail.



HOWARD BRUSH DEAN III IS THE 47TH PERSON TO CHAIR the DNC since it was organized in 1848. It's a job that's changed with the politics of the time and the political skills of the holder. Jim Farley, a tough Irish New Yorker, helped secure the support of the city and state Democratic bosses for Franklin Delano Roosevelt at a time when local party organizations, particularly from a few urban centers, firmly controlled the workings of the national party. In the late Eisenhower years, Paul Butler, one of the most important chairmen in the Democrats' history, repositioned the party so that it didn't look so southern and segregationist. In the late 1980s, lobbyist and lawyer Ron Brown segmented the electorate in such microscopic detail that, by 1992, Bill Clinton knew exactly where Democratic voters were and turned them out.

At first, Dean wasn't sure he wanted the job. "Well, it was my second choice," he told me with a laugh during a sit-down interview at the party's headquarters on Capitol Hill in June. "But it seemed to me this is the best way to change the country." He briefly considered starting a third-party movement but realized that would take too long. He also thought about running for president again in 2008 but decided it would be tough for any Democrat to win if the party weren't remade, said one longtime adviser (his current job, Dean insists, absolutely precludes an '08 candidacy).

His political friends thought he'd be bored within weeks. Yet ever since he won the post in February—building up so much

support, particularly from red-staters, that his rivals dropped out—Dean has reveled in just about every aspect of his job, from the behind-the-scenes strategizing to the constant airport hopping and speechifying to the very public Republican-bashing.

The centerpiece of Dean's plan is to build up state parties with what he calls a 50-state strategy. He wants to place four DNC-paid organizers in every state to build up support on an ongoing basis—not just in election years, and not just during presidential races. Under something called the Partnership Program, says DNC communications director Karen Finney, assessment teams from Washington visit each state and meet with party and community leaders and activists to determine what a state needs to do to win. "The idea here is that we're not taking a cookie-cutter approach," she told me. For instance, Democratic officials in West Virginia asked for money to hire a youth organizer, while those in Mississippi asked for a communications director.

The states must submit a plan and set goals that they will be required to meet. The assessment team has visited 46 states, Finney said, and the DNC has authorized 25 of them to start hiring organizers. Dean's goal, she said, was to get all the new hires in place by the end of the year.

What Dean is trying to change here is an almost exclusive focus in the past by the DNC on electing a president, which has led it to overlook Republican regions. In the 2004 presidential election, for example, the Democrats focused on just 17 states.

Now, they are reaping the consequences of that strategy. State parties have faltered throughout the country, and Democrats have lost governors' mansions, statehouses, and congressional seats. States are breeding grounds for federal officials; four of the last five presidents had been governors, and most members of Congress began in local or state government. What's more, it is the state legislatures that have the powerful task of redrawing congressional districts every decade. Just how much does it matter? Democrats lost five seats in the U.S. House of Representatives last year as a result of Republican-finessed redistricting in Texas alone.

"The people at the DNC and in Washington have all been fixated so much on presidential politics that there's not a base in the states to win. Those people up there are so parochial and so myopic that they can't see it," says Don Fowler, who chaired the DNC in 1995-96. Focusing only on the presidency, said Fowler, whose son, Donnie, ran against Dean for chairman, is a "cardinal sin."

By mid-July, Finney said, Dean had traveled to 29 states. Among them were some of the deepest-red states, including Texas, Mississippi, Kansas, Oklahoma, and Georgia (Dean splits his remaining time between DNC headquarters and his family's home in Vermont). None is a state in which John Kerry came remotely close to 50 percent. The next Democrat probably won't, either, but for Dean, that's all right: The point is not to produce an immediate Electoral College win but a crop of young politicians who, over time, can potentially move the states over to the Democratic column. In the meantime, Democrats in those long-neglected states are energized.

Dean's cross-country treks have won him strong support among state Democratic chairs. "You tell me there's not one state chair that isn't glad to see Governor Dean come in," exclaims South Carolina's Democratic chair, Joe Erwin.

"He got a fantastic reception, the biggest crowd we've ever had, to my knowledge, in a Mississippi Democratic Party function," state party chair and former Congressman Wayne Dowdy told me after Dean visited Jackson in March. More than 1,000 contributors shelled out nearly \$100,000 at what Dowdy euphorically characterized as "the most successful event we've ever had." Dowdy said he left the fund-raiser, at the Clarion Hotel, at close to midnight, nearly an hour and a half after the speechifying stopped. Dean was still there, he said, shaking hands.

"Dean still has star appeal," Dowdy says. "People like him. They don't like everything he says, but they know he's genuine."

State chairs say that they were in the wilderness under previous regimes. "I've had more communications with the DNC in the last five months than in the previous two years," Randy Button, chairman of the Tennessee Democratic Party, told me. He gushed about a fund-raiser Dean headlined this spring, raising \$60,000. "I was not supportive of Howard Dean when he ran" for chairman or for president, Button said. "But I'll tell you, I'm a big fan now. He has converted me. He is a very genuine person."

THE 50-STATE STRATEGY HAS FEW DETRACTORS AMONG Democrats, and why would it? It's smart over the long term and uplifting in the short run. But the question remains: Will four DNC operatives in Oklahoma and Alabama make any difference if the party isn't more defined? A sales force is all well and good, but it needs a product to sell. And the party still needs to define itself.


"We don't seem to have any ideas," lamented Gary Jones, a retired financial real-estate developer and former DNC Finance Committee member who attended the Atlanta fund-raiser. "We seem to be opposed to everything."

Dean agrees. The party can't just denigrate the president, he told me. It needs ideas and a message. The ideas, which the DNC will work on with Congress members and other officeholders, are likely to focus on defense and national security, economic security, health care, and education, Dean said. The message will be developed by advertising professionals, he said, from outside the Beltway.

Here's where Dean could find himself at odds with leaders on Capitol Hill, elected officials who see the cultivation of ideas and a message as their job. As Harry Reid's communications director, Jim Manley, told me, "Dean's job is to amplify the message from the Hill."

In this sense, Dean's challenge is similar to Butler's in the late 1950s. Butler had to remake the image of the party, and he did so by bringing leading liberal thinkers—John Kenneth Galbraith, Thomas K. Finletter, and others—into party decision making and policy setting under the umbrella of something he called the Democratic Advisory Committee. But in the process, he butted heads with then-Speaker Sam Rayburn and Senator Lyndon Johnson.

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DENNIS BRACK

Ultimately, Butler expanded the appeal of the party—remember, in 1956, when Butler was chairman, there was no difference between the two major parties on race (and today's cultural issues didn't exist), so the Democrats had to work to get northern liberals and moderates. Dean must do much the same, but in the opposite direction.

And so he talks like this: "The Democratic Party is essentially a party based on morality. From a biblical point of view, if you ran a checklist of moral values, I think we'd be on firmer ground than the Republicans are. They have successfully painted us as a party that doesn't have morals, and nothing could be further from the truth." Dean has a checklist: Possessing moral values means not letting kids go to bed hungry, providing a decent education, taking care of the environment, looking after senior citizens, not building up the debt, and loving your neighbors. Jesus, he says in just about every speech, did not say you could pick your neighbors.

Dean has asked DNC Chief of Staff Leah Daughtry, a Pentecostal minister, to tap into the community of faith-based voters, especially in those mushrooming "mega-churches." Daughtry, who calls herself a "Bible thumper," said Democrats are trying to shift the discussion from abortion and gay rights—wedge issues Republicans have used to whip up support among religious conservatives—to the kinds of problems most families wrestle with. When she talks to clergy members, she tells them that "they've got 20,000 members who have to deal with bread-and-butter issues. How many gay people have asked you to marry them? But how many have elderly parents, or are worried about the education of their kids?"

Even as the party extends a hand to people it previously wrote off, it must do more to keep its most loyal voters in the fold. The GOP has been working relentlessly to win over Hispanics and other minorities, groups the Democrats often are accused of taking for granted. To that end, Dean has hired Christine Owens, formerly of the AFL-CIO, to oversee outreach to core constituencies.

WE'RE SITTING IN A STARK, WHITE CONFERENCE ROOM in the Democratic Party's national headquarters on Capitol Hill—a building erected so close to the train tracks that the room periodically shakes. I'm asking Dean about the one thing he is asked about most often: himself, and in particular, his way of expressing himself.

January: "I hate the Republicans and everything they stand for."

March: "Republicans are brain-dead."

June: A lot of Republicans "have never made an honest living in their lives."

June again: The GOP is "pretty much a white, Christian party."

Dean is only mildly reflective when asked about his verbal gaffes. Actually, it's not clear he even considers them gaffes. "I'll tell you an example of a big gaffe," he says, with a hint of sarcasm. "We're no safer now than we were since before Saddam Hussein was captured." Dean was paraphrasing one of the more controversial pronouncements of his presidential campaign. "Now,

most people in America agree with me. So my timing's a little off, but not the veracity of what I say."

The problem, as Dean sees it, is not what he says but how his comments are misinterpreted, twisted, and "cranked up" by the RNC and the media. His aides try to explain that he tells the same stories again and again, and sometimes, upon retelling, he forgets to explain fully. They are Dean shorthand, these advisers say. This is how they explain the "white, Christian party" remark. "He's said that 500 times," said one longtime Dean adviser who asked to remain anonymous. "But he said it slightly differently, and *bing!*"

Dean lashed out at Republicans for not working hard enough the morning after Donna Brazile, head of the DNC's Voting Rights Institute, gave him a copy of a draft report showing that in Ohio during the 2004 election, African Americans stood in voting lines three times longer on average than whites. "When I heard what he said, I said, 'Oh, shit, I shouldn't have given him that report,'" Brazile told me shortly afterward. Dean was less trou-

***"He's said that 500 times," said one longtime
Dean adviser who asked to remain anonymous.
"But he said it slightly differently, and bing!"***

bled. "You know, I speak probably a little more, with some hyperbole, which most people in politics do," he says. "But I'm not going to back down because what I'm saying is true."

"So, sure, I can choose my words more carefully, but believe me, I'm going to be as blunt and in-your-face as I need to be," he says, his piercing blue eyes giving no ground. Before a photographer starts shooting, Finney leans in to fix Dean's hair. But that's about all she can fix. His language is his own. He is, to a great extent, a free agent.

"The reason for me to choose my words more carefully is not because I'm afraid people aren't gonna like me—that's not my job right now," he says. "The reason for me to change is to make sure that the Republicans can't use what I say as a diversionary tactic to divert them from their enormous failures to defend the country and to run the place with a reasonable fiscal attitude."

So, I ask him, will you try to think through what you say to prevent it from being misconstrued? "No," he says with a smile. "I think you can expect more fireworks."

The fireworks may be slipups, but one senses Dean enjoys them. They are his call to arms. "I tell you what: The base of this party, which was really demoralized, thinks it's great," Dean said, shrugging off those who think otherwise. "Look, people want us to fight back. The biggest problem with the Democratic Party is we think that if we join 'em, we can win. We can't. What they're doing to this country is appalling. They can't manage money. They've made the armed services in the United States much weaker, not to mention not giving them adequate equipment to do the job and not taking the advice of people who know what they're doing in the Pentagon. This is a gang that

can't shoot straight. And that can't manage anything. They're completely, completely addicted to power, and they've forgotten about the American people. And somebody has to fight that. And the Democrats are gonna fight it. And there's a lot of Democrats out there who want to fight it. So I may not always choose my words wisely, but I think people really, really want to fight."

That explains how Dean reacted when, days before our interview, Vice President Dick Cheney said on national television that the DNC chair might be loved by just one person: his mother. No one was happier to hear that than Dean.

"Thank God, finally we have somebody representing the Democratic Party who can actually force the vice president to attack us," Dean tells me, with no small amount of hubris. "We need to be in their face. These people are bad for America, and they aren't truthful people. And we need to be in their face, reminding people of what we would do differently."

Thank God, in other words, for Howard Dean.

In fact, a lot of Democrats agree with Dean's assessment of himself. "I think it's refreshing, and I rather hope he keeps it up,"

among some Democrats—his willingness to speak his mind—has others holding him at arm's length.

Dean has yet to win over many elected officials and big-money donors. Consider that none of the most visible Democrats in the country—including Senate Minority Leader Reid; House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi; Senate Minority Whip Dick Durbin; Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee Chair Rahm Emanuel; Kerry and his running mate, Edwards; and potential presidential contenders and Senators Hillary Rodham Clinton and Biden—would return repeated phone calls requesting interviews for this story.

Biden, of Delaware, was one of the few Democrats to criticize Dean openly following some of the doctor's latest incendiary comments. "He doesn't speak for me with that kind of rhetoric, and I don't think he speaks for the majority of Democrats," Biden said in June on ABC's *This Week*. Edwards said, "The chairman of the DNC is not the spokesman for the party. He's a voice. I don't agree with it." Leon Panetta, former chief of staff to President Clinton, said Dean's comments divert attention from what the Democrats really need to do: present a "clear vision" of where they want to take the country. As head of the party, he said, Dean should "not become a lightning rod."

Perhaps more disconcerting is the sense among southern political observers that Dean's invectives are alienating white southerners, the Democrats turned Republicans whom the party needs if it is to carry

the South again. "Every time he comes in, he probably manufactures more Republicans," said Merle Black, a political scientist at Emory University in Atlanta. "He's insulting large numbers of people." Claibourne Darden, a longtime Atlanta political consultant to both parties, told me, "Dean is going over in the South every bit as well as fire ants have. But there's a lot more fire ants than there are Democrats now." Darden said Dean's provocative comments are considered extreme by southern moderates and puts Dean "right up there with David Duke," calling the chairman a "kiss of death" for Democrats.

That's certainly not true everywhere. In tried-and-true blue states, high-profile Democrats are not afraid to cozy up to Dean. At a May fund-raiser in Bethesda, so many Congress members, U.S. Senate candidates, state lawmakers, and local officeholders were on hand that they couldn't all fit on the podium.

Still, even Dean's supporters acknowledge that he sometimes crosses the rhetorical line. But they describe him as something of a double-edged sword, and say they are willing to take the bad to get the good. "What makes him so refreshing and so galvanizing for so many Democrats is his willingness to be firm and have convictions. There is a part of the party that is tired of wishy-washiness," says Maria Echaveste, White House deputy chief of staff under Clinton and a senior adviser to Dean's presidential campaign (she's also a member of this magazine's board). Nonetheless, she added, "There are times I wish he had an edit button."

Lynn Cutler, a former DNC vice chair and informal adviser to Dean's presidential campaign, lavished praise on him for hopscotching the country to build up state parties and unearth new

Dean is effusive: "Thank God, finally we have somebody representing the Democratic Party who can actually force the vice president to attack us."

Jerry Clark, a former union executive and gay-rights activist, said as he munched strawberries at a DNC fund-raiser in a Washington museum in June. "I think of him as being, in this particular dimension, almost Trumanesque." Dean would be pleased to hear that: Harry Truman is his idol. It only makes sense that supporters commonly yell "Give 'em hell, Howard!" at Dean speeches.

For his legions of supporters, Dean is like Billy Graham; he is their evangelist, showing them the way. "I could talk forever about Howard Dean," Elly Shaw-Belblidia, a nutritionist from Gaithersburg, Maryland, said as she walked to the subway following a recent DNC fund-raiser in Bethesda, Maryland. The first time she heard Dean speak, in 2003, she "was gaga. I became addicted to Howard Dean. I'm a Dean groupie." He might shoot from the hip, say Dean's devotees, but at least he's shooting, which is more than most Democrats have been doing.

DEAN RARELY READS FROM A SCRIPT. AT 56, HE IS BLESSED with a good memory and a quick mind, and he delivers different versions of the same speech, almost never referring to notes. His gift allows him to leave a lectern and stroll about a stage, holding a microphone in one hand while gesticulating with the other. It allows him to act natural and animated, to look people in the eye, to connect more directly with his audiences. It allows him to be spontaneous.

Spontaneity almost always is good in politics. It's one of the things that made Bill Clinton a more engaging and effective speaker than George Bush Senior. But it can be dangerous as well. So it is with Dean: The very attribute that gives him power

voters. "When he goes to these places where nobody's been and gets covered, it's great," she says. "But when you get these additional comments, these throwaway lines, then this becomes the issue. I think calling all Republicans white Christians who never worked a day in their life might be a step too far. It just throws fodder at them." But, Cutler added in an e-mail following our interview: "What the party is doing under Gov. Dean on strengthening state parties is unprecedented and fresh in approach Terrific stuff."


The other people not so happy with Dean are the money people. The DNC is lagging far behind the RNC in fund raising. In the first half of this year, the Democratic Party reported raising \$28.5 million, considerably less than the \$52.9 million reaped by the RNC through May (the RNC did not release June figures before this story went to press). Dean's spokespeople tried to put a positive spin on it, as press people usually do. Dean is raising more than \$1 million a week, they said, and the \$28.5 million is more than the DNC has brought in under any other chair in a nonelection year. Nonetheless, Democratic operatives counter that Dean's predecessor, Terry McAuliffe, a legendary moneyman, built the party's fund-raising apparatus up so much—increasing the number of givers sevenfold from 2001 through 2004—that Dean should be considerably further ahead. Dean is trying to make up some of the difference with something he calls "Democracy Bonds," a new device that allows donors to contribute to the DNC via credit card each month. His focus here, as it was in his presidential campaign, is on small-money donors.

But there is a sharp difference between raising money for a presidential race and for a party. Individuals can give just \$2,100 to a presidential (or any federal) candidate per election, but they can donate \$26,700 to a political party. So while small givers play a big role in a candidate's campaign, big givers are crucial to the DNC's long-term stability. Dean has been running around the country courting regular folks but paying precious little attention to wealthy givers who have bankrolled the party in the past, according to several Democratic strategists who spoke on condition of anonymity. Some, they said, have closed their checkbooks. The donors they mentioned, businesspeople and moguls on both coasts, did not return my repeated phone calls.

Dean told me he does not intend to slight anyone, and that he does and will continue to meet with large donors. A Dean fund-raising event generally is two-tiered, consisting of a private (sans media) bash for larger-money donors followed by a larger, more open event for the smaller givers. Finney said 30 percent of the people who have contributed to the DNC this year never have before, and that most of them were "low-dollar donors." She said she did not know how much money has come from smaller- versus larger-money donors. But in an April press release, the DNC bragged that \$12.1 million of the \$14.1 million it had raised through March came from small-money donors (though it didn't define what that meant), and that the average donation was \$50.80.

Whether an upsurge in small donations can make up for a drop in large ones, or whether the big-money donors will come back to the party as an election nears, remains to be seen. The move toward smaller-money donors is admirable philosophically, and it may wean the party off of corporate support. But there's such a thing as too much of a good thing, and the Democrats will not be in good shape in November 2006 if Dean hasn't stroked the big-money donors by then.

"A IN'T NO MOUNTAIN HIGH ENOUGH" BLARES FROM THE speakers as Dean signs a T-shirt and poses for snapshots and a homemade video after his speech at Atlanta's Eleven50. Oliver Brown stands to the side of the dance floor, reflecting on his several decades as a Democratic Party activist. At different times, the septuagenarian notes, the party has needed different types of leaders. Now, he says, it needs Howard Dean.



"I think he's just what the Democrats need—an energizer," he tells me. "We don't need any more apologizing."

Dean possesses the intellect, the instinct, and the muscle to turn his party around. He knows what has to be done, and has embarked on a course that even detractors say is desirable. He is taking the party to the states, developing ideas and a message to wrap around them, changing the way the party talks to and reaches out to Americans. He must make the Democratic Party matter again, not just as a tool to block bad bills and nominees but as an incubator of ideas, an instigator of change. The question is whether his greatest virtue—the fight within him—also is a fatal flaw.

Most Democrats I spoke to, even those with misgivings, said they were willing to take a risk with Dean. As Minyon Moore, former DNC chief operating officer, put it: "When you've been doing the same thing for years and years and years and you're not winning, doing something different might cause you to win. Turn the *Titanic*."

Dean demonstrated during his presidential race that he can inspire and innovate. He also is capable of self-destructing, of opening his mouth and inserting an iceberg. But the crowd at the Eleven50 and Democrats across the country know they have more to worry about than what Howard Dean says. Now, they're just waiting to see what he does. **TAP**

London Bawling

Conservative reactions to the bombings offer a case study in wing-nuttery: Protect Bush and emphasize state terrorism (so we can invade someone new!).

BY MATTHEW YGLESIAS

IF IT'S TRUE THAT CONVENTIONAL WISDOM, LIKE QUICK-dry cement, usually hardens within 48 hours of an event—think of the January 1998 Lewinsky revelations and the immediate pronouncements that the matter would lead to impeachment—the reactions to the July 7 London terrorist bombings provide a case study in how the right seeks to use an incident, even a tragic one, to advance an agenda that events have already proven wrong, if not disastrous.

The intersection of the ever-faster news cycle, unprecedented partisan polarization, summer-vacation schedules, and national-security threats hardly makes for rational conversation, so it should come as little surprise that one of the very first conservative media responses to the coordinated series of detonations that rocked London on the morning of July 7 was a hysterical blog post. “We. Are. Not. Safe.,” intoned John Podhoretz on “The Corner,” the staff blog of the *National Review Online*. “These fiends will drench the streets of the world’s free societies with the blood of the innocent unless they are stopped.”

Notorious television pundit Bill O'Reilly rushed home from his holiday to broadcast a crazier-than-usual July 8 show that saw him denying the obvious reality that, as a guest suggested to him, “There are innocents being killed in Iraq, too” (“No, there aren’t,” he responded); loudly objecting to descriptions of the murders in London as “tragedies”; and offering to mail viewers “boycott France” bumper stickers, as if this were somehow relevant.

Further up the right-wing intellectual food chain, others were already cobbling together more coherent accounts of the day’s events—with potentially catastrophic consequences. Frank Gaffney, *Washington Times* columnist and president of the Center for Security Policy, argued in a swiftly assembled column for the *National Review Online* that the attacks proved, well, that the entire conservative political agenda was now more necessary than ever. “Governments,” Gaffney wrote, “must remain seized with and give priority to countering terrorists and their state-sponsors,” deploying “military measures aimed at disrupting [terrorist] operations and denying the safe-havens” from which attacks are launched. The “most imminent” response priority should be to cancel “Israel’s planned surrender of the Gaza Strip and parts of the West Bank under present, and foreseeable, cir-

cumstances.” For good measure, Gaffney even informed us that the G8 agenda of “debt relief and other aid for Africa and initiatives meant to affect global warming” constitutes “a distraction we cannot afford at the moment.”

Its lack of factual grounding aside, Gaffney’s response at least met minimal standards of coherence that other pundits lacked in the heat of the moment. Roger Bate, a resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) charged with *The Weekly Standard’s* morning-after commentary, offered only lazy “old Europe”-bashing. “Where,” he asked, “are the really strong statements on fighting terrorism from either [German] Chancellor [Gerhard] Schröder or [French] President [Jacques] Chirac?” They were, in fact, exactly where you would expect them to be: quoted in major newspapers. You just had to read down into the stories. The attack “once again inspires us with horror,” Chirac said, adding that it “strengthened even further our sense of solidarity.” “The international community,” said Schröder, “must do everything in its power to fight terrorism together with all the means at its disposal.”

“The Corner,” meanwhile, continued its degeneration into nonsense and panic. Rich Lowry, the *National Review’s* editor, endorsed the view that someone ought to “find a terror camp somewhere and hit it” because “terrorists should, for these purposes, be treated as one nation, and all should be held responsible for any one attack.” Katherine Jean-Lopez assailed CNN’s Soledad O’Brien for observing that Londoners witnessed things “that only people at war see” in a manner implying that “she didn’t get that they ARE IN FACT AT WAR.”


THIS IMPULSE TO LASH OUT IS COMPLETELY UNWARRANTED. Nothing could be clearer to a native New Yorker who’s returned to his hometown many times in the past several years than the fact that even the massive devastation of September 11 has not fundamentally altered—or even appreciably affected—that city’s basic vitality. In the immediate wake of those attacks, this was not clear; nor was it obvious whether worse was in store. Since then, we’ve learned that it is probably not. The horrifying Madrid bombings were an order of magnitude less deadly than 9-11, and the London attacks a further order

of magnitude less lethal than Madrid. Al-Qaeda and its affiliates evidently lack the numerical strength to deluge the West with low-grade terrorism and lack the wherewithal to pull off spectacular World Trade Center-style attacks more than once in a blue moon. The risks—of chemical warfare or catastrophic nuclear terrorism—remain very real. But they are best combated through an emphasis on securing nuclear materials and guarding against the shipment of radioactive cargo into the United States—efforts that the Bush administration has utterly failed to undertake.

The people of London have, by all accounts, reacted to the killings by mourning the dead and defiantly moving on with their lives. It's the response to be expected from a city that has been subjected to on-and-off terrorist attacks for decades, and the most strategically sound approach to a mode of assault that relies on inducing panic and terror. To the pundits of the American right, however, the London bombings pose an existential

now; so the right seeks, once again, to reconfigure the nature of the relationship, this time with terrorist attacks understood as a front in the Iraq War. As Lowry put it in typical morning-after commentary, "The Spanish cut and ran from Iraq after the Madrid train bombings in 2004, hoping to take the target off their back, but painting one all the larger on the backs of any countries supporting the fight against extremism in Iraq." This completely misconstrues the actual chronology of events in Spain, but accuracy is hardly necessary when the clear point is to imply that the Bush administration's domestic political opponents are somehow in league with terrorism. "The Brits, having suffered much worse during the Blitz and the height of the [Irish Republican Army] bombing campaign in the 1970s, won't surrender so easily," Lowry assured us.

Interestingly, the conservatives positing such a motive to the bombings are, in essence, in agreement with left-wingers who



Just One More Excuse: To worship George W. Bush, say the pundits of the right

threat—not to the United Kingdom or to the United States but to the intellectual edifice they've created to defend the Bush administration's handling of national-security policy.

With the weapons-of-mass-destruction rationale for invading Iraq long dead and the grandiose pseudo-Wilsonianism of the president's second inaugural address ringing hollow as elections failed to bring peace to Iraq, the White House has taken to explaining the war as an effort to "take the fight to the enemy." As Donald Rumsfeld put it as far back as 2003, when it first became clear that Iraq was not to be the cakewalk he promised, it's better to fight terrorists in Baghdad than "in Boston or in Baltimore or Boise."

This notion, known and propagated in the conservative blogosphere as the "flypaper" justification for the war, is and always was absurd. The U.S. military presence in Iraq does nothing to hinder jihadist infiltration of democratic nations, but does, as the CIA has pointed out, provide a training ground for the jihadists of tomorrow. Maintaining the linkage between the invasion of Iraq and the war on terrorism is essentially impossible

assert that Tony Blair brought the attacks on the British people through his support of the Iraq War. Both theories are equally, and equally obviously, misguided: Al-Qaeda began its jihad long before the invasion of Iraq. That Bush's defenders and Osama bin Laden have both taken to claiming that the conflicts are causally related is a curious irony with little basis in reality.

PROPAGANDA POINTS ASIDE, MANY ON THE RIGHT GREETED the attacks with what's best described as ill-concealed glee. Indeed, the evening before the attacks, FOX News host John Gibson expressed disappointment that Paris had lost its bid to host the 2012 Olympics on the grounds that it "would have been a treat, actually, to watch the French dealing with the problem of their own homegrown Islamist terrorists living in France already." Then, after the bombings, Gibson offered up the thought, "This is why I thought the Brits should let the French have the Olympics." FOX's Brit Hume recounted that his "first thought" in response to the attacks was that it was a good op-

portunity to make money picking up bargains in the futures market. Brian Kilmead explained that the attacks work “to the Western world’s advantage, for people to experience something like this together.” In a more pessimistic vein, classicist turned war pundit Victor Davis Hanson sighed regretfully that memories of 7-7 will, like those of 9-11, fade, leading Bush and Blair “to become even more unpopular.”

The consistent superficial message was Kilmead’s: Attacks are good because they remind us that we are “at war.” But Hanson

don followed New York, Bali, Istanbul, and Madrid) could possibly be construed as the beginning of anything.

Despite the passage of several years and two wars, those pundits able to muster anything resembling actual policy recommendations in the wake of the London bombings appeared to be simply reprinting fall 2001 content. Gaffney’s immediate reaction to 7-7 resembled nothing quite so much as his immediate reaction to 9-11. “The states that sponsor and support” terrorism are, now as then, the main focus. We learned back then that

“the fight that has now come to our land is the same one Israel has been fighting for many years.” He conceded that “its perpetrators may or may not be exactly the same.” Today, with the knowledge that they are not, it still makes no difference, and continued occupation of the Gaza Strip is seen as a reasonable retaliation for an attack perpetrated by unrelated groups. Indeed,

Gaffney’s reaction to the Madrid bombings was, again, the same advocacy of a “strategy of offensively and, if necessary, preemptively engaging terrorist cadres, networks, and state sponsors.”

Late on the afternoon of July 8, *The Weekly Standard* published Bill Kristol’s article on the subject, which spoke of the need “to deter or remove regimes that cooperate with terrorists” as the cornerstone of future strategy. Again, the similarities to Kristol’s first post-9-11 article—written in the form of an open letter to the president, calling for “measures of retaliation against ... known state sponsors of terrorism”—are striking.

It’s hard to see how the fifth—and least deadly—major al-Qaeda attack of the past four years could be construed as the beginning of anything.

brought the subtext to the surface: Attacks are welcome because they allow the right to recapitulate its finest hour, the days and weeks immediately following 9-11, when Bush’s popularity reached historic highs and liberals were too cowed to criticize conservatism on any front. Indeed, some columnists like the omnipresent Mark Steyn appeared to be stuck in a time warp, offering readers of *The Daily Telegraph* the bizarre thesis that the attacks were “the beginning of a long existential struggle, for Britain and the West.” Really? It’s hard to see how the fifth—and least deadly—major al-Qaeda attack of the past four years (Lon-

LETTER FROM LONDON: BRITANNIA STAYS COOL

Finished with their Sunday morning of studying the Koran, the dozens of young boys in the Muslim Center in east London raced to put their shoes back on. Talking excitedly, they filed upstairs to spend the rest of the afternoon playing Arabic board games and Ping-Pong. Three days earlier, terrorist bombs had ripped open three subway cars and a double-decker bus, taking the lives of at least 52 people and injuring 700. Now, life was getting back to normal.

The Muslim Center, which adjoins a mosque, is just a 10-minute walk from where one of the bombs went off. And for the city’s 600,000 Muslims, the bombings had made their place in society suddenly precarious. Some Islamic organizations had issued warnings for Muslims to stay off the streets for fear of reprisals.

But by the weekend, the streets were again bustling with veiled women and men wearing traditional beards. “Yes, I’m worried, but I’m not overly worried,” says Shibbir Ahmed, a local government official who

volunteers with the Young Muslims Organization U.K. Ahmed, who was born in Bangladesh but grew up in England, said he has faith in Londoners’ ability to maintain respect for different cultures. The terrorists, he said, “are trying to destroy that social cohesion. But I don’t think they will succeed.”

So far it seems that Britain will not go the way that America did after September 11. Following the World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks, while anti-Muslim attacks were relatively scarce, there was a general hysteria about terrorists “in our midst.” The government, if anything, was more hysterical than the citizenry, with legislation that ran roughshod over civil liberties, as well as mass arrests and eventually the detention of more than 13,000 people. There were mass arrests, deportations, public displays of military might, and clash-of-civilizations media coverage, like *Newsweek*’s cover story “Why They Hate Us,” which bore a picture of a turbaned child holding a machine gun.

Of course, there are big differences be-

tween the 9-11 attacks and the London transit bombings, not least because of the (thankfully) much-smaller death toll. Britons were not caught unawares, having long expected an assault on their capital. It’s also something for which they have decades of experience, from the Nazi blitz during World War II to more recent Provisional IRA bombs.

Yet even with the different scale and historical context, the British reaction to the assault on their capital has provided lessons in civil society and liberty to which America’s leaders should pay attention. Within a day of the attacks, Londoners were back on the Underground and in pubs. They could do this because their institutions, political parties, police, and media had all withstood the attacks as well.

There have been some scattered anti-Muslim incidents, especially in the North where Muslims are a small minority but a substantial one in many towns. About a half-dozen mosques suffered assaults, from graf-

THE VERY CONSTANCY OF THE HAWKISH RHETORICAL response to terrorism highlights its fundamental flaw. A strategy genuinely geared toward fighting al-Qaeda would necessarily change in response to the dramatic events of the past several years—most notably, the apparent flight into territory nominally under the control of Pakistan by the group's leadership. Serious commentary would grapple with the reality that most terrorism experts believe al-Qaeda no longer has or needs a centralized command-and-control infrastructure. Instead, local radical groups take matters into their own hands and choose to affiliate themselves with the bin Laden brand. This new reality is what must be grappled with in order to devise a feasible counterstrategy.

Instead, the hawks relentlessly change the subject from al-Qaeda to the basically unrelated problem of state sponsors of terrorism. As has become clear, the intended referent of the state-sponsorship notion in the wake of 9-11 was not the Taliban mini-state but Iraq and, to a lesser extent, the Palestinian Authority. This was made clear in the original Kristol open letter, which argued that “even if evidence does not link Iraq directly to the attack, any strategy aimed at the eradication of terrorism and its sponsors must include a determined effort to remove Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq.”

Today, the state-sponsorship meme is an apparent effort to coax the United States into war with Syria or Iran, or both. On December 20, Kristol wrote of the “need to take action to punish and deter [Hafez al-] Assad’s regime,” citing the opportunity to “bomb Syrian military facilities” and to “occupy the town of Abu Kamal”

(“real options,” he called them.) A *Forward* op-ed by AEI resident scholar Michael Rubin, published the day after the London attacks, outlined options for the nonviolent overthrow of the regime in Iran, which, he said, should be backed up by “pinpoint military strikes” in case the nonviolent approach fails. The Heritage Foundation’s Nile Gardiner and John Hulsman published a policy memo the afternoon of the bombings arguing that there “must be immediate retaliation by the U.S. and U.K.,” prompting Brookings Institution scholar Ivo H. Daalder to observe reasonably that there do not seem to be targets to retaliate against.

While the Iraq hawks eventually engaged in massive efforts designed to convince the public that Saddam Hussein was a sponsor of al-Qaeda in general or the 9-11 attacks in particular (and, indeed, there are many indications that most of the proponents of this theory believe in it quite sincerely), as the Kristol letter indicated, the truth or falsity of such claims was never integral to their view of the merits of the issue. The conservative view—as seen in everything from the administration’s pre-9-11 lack of interest in al-Qaeda to its drive to invade Iraq to the response to the London bombings—is and always has been that “rogue states” like Syria and Iran are a serious threat to American security, while informal terrorist networks like al-Qaeda are not. Similarly, state acquisition of nuclear weapons is viewed as a grave problem, while mere insecurity of existing nuclear material such as might allow terrorists to buy or steal the material necessary to construct a nuclear or radiological device is not. Actual, existing terrorist attacks are seen as fodder for fostering fear, uncertainty, and doubt in the American population in order to

fiti to arson, and at least one Muslim man was assaulted. But Islamic leaders attribute these actions to extremists or thugs, and say that overall, they continue to be well treated by British society. In particular, they praised the restraint shown by politicians, the police, and the media in the aftermath of the attacks.

“They have all been extremely responsible,” said Massoud Shadjareh, the chairman of the Islamic Human Rights Commission, an advocacy organization in London. “I am surprised myself that I am saying so, speaking as someone [who] is usually critical of their actions,” he said.


In a press conference after the attacks, Metropolitan Police Deputy Assistant Commissioner Brian Paddick made a special point of disassociating Islam and terrorism. “The words ‘Islam’ and ‘terrorist’ do not go together,” he said. “These acts go totally against what I understand is the Muslim faith.”

Anwar Ali, an 18-year-old who works in an

Islamic bookshop around the corner from the Muslim Center, said that while he wasn’t surprised to hear of anti-Muslim incidents in economically troubled northern England, where there has been longtime friction, he did not expect serious trouble in London, with its cosmopolitan spirit. “There’s mutual respect,” Ali says. “Everyone’s all right with each other.”

London’s Islamic community occupies a unique place in the Western world. It is the most diverse in terms of class, country of origin, and history. It makes up fully 8 percent of the city’s population. People of South Asian descent appear as newscasters and soap-opera characters, sports stars and business leaders, yet at the same time, many Muslims maintain traditional dress, with women in veils and men in traditional clothing seen in both rich and poor neighborhoods. “There is a lot more confidence in Britain to hold on to your identity and be part of your society,” says Shadjareh.

The British reaction also stands in »



bolster support for an agenda that, when seen for what it is, the public lacks enthusiasm for.

Under the circumstances, the liberal response must be to avoid the errors of fall and winter 2001. Then, an overblown sense of propriety and simple fear of the conservative onslaught led too many liberals either into silence or into pointless attacks on marginal, misguided figures on the far left, as if they would receive Rupert Murdoch's blessing for being a few shades tougher. Such pusillanimity helped ensure that the hawks' intellectual

expressed a wish for a one-day "refrain from political point-scoring over the London attacks," though it's clear that the right has no interest in reciprocating. Besides, much more is at stake than political points: These disputes delve far deeper than mere partisanship and into the heart of substantive policy, with thousands of lives at stake. Ed Kilgore, vice president for policy at the Democratic Leadership Council, took the time in his initial response to take swipes at far-left British MP George Galloway, as if there were a substantial risk that Galloway's views would carry the day in London or Washington.

The real risk is of a resurgent neoconservative movement succeeding in its efforts to use the attacks as a pretext for rolling back support for a number of policy measures that represent the best hope for unifying the world's democratic powers around a terrorism-fighting agenda: negotiations with Iran, Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, re-

assessment of the Guantanamo Bay detention center, American re-engagement with the issues of global poverty and climate change, moves to end the occupation of Iraq, efforts to encourage Hezbollah's transformation into an actor in Lebanese domestic politics, etc. Instead, the neoconservatives advance the agenda of further military clashes with Arabs. Time and again, liberals have erred by "misunderestimating" the right's determination and ability to move fringe ideas to the center of the public agenda. If we let it happen again, the consequences for the country—and the world—could be nothing short of disastrous. **TAP**

Liberal weakness after 9-11 helped ensure that the hawks' intellectual edifice won out. London should be its death knell—if the point is made firmly.

edifice would be firmly in place. The events of the past two years have begun to dislodge this edifice, and the reality of the London attacks should be its death knell, but only if the point is made firmly and forcefully.

Unfortunately, early signs the weekend after the attack indicate a repetition of yesteryear's failures. The Center for American Progress, set up to provide a counterweight to conservative infrastructure, responded with a laundry list of disjointed counterterrorism criticisms à la Bush rather than a clear statement of the progressive view of the problem. Popular blogger Kevin Drum

contrast to that of the Spaniards, who, after the Madrid attacks of March 11, 2004, reacted with massive public demonstrations, denouncing both the war in Iraq and what they saw as a cover-up by the conservative party then in power, which resulted in that government's ouster. Here, though, party politics has remained at the sidelines.

In the United States, the post-9-11 response was most apparent in subway stations and shopping malls, where commuters and shoppers suddenly found themselves being watched over by machine gun-wielding National Guardsmen. This GI Joe response was ostensibly to protect against further attacks, although how a potential machine-gun battle in the middle of Grand Central Station was supposed to make anybody feel at ease is unclear. It did, however, mentally prepare Americans for the feeling that they were at war—and appropriately so, one supposes, considering that they were about to embark on two.

Britain already has an official secrets act that allows prior censorship, a domestic intelligence agency, the MI-5, and a very extensive network of video-camera surveillance. But it also has had a potent civil liberties backlash in response to police excesses during the years of the Irish Republican Army bombings. A British law allowing indefinite preventive detention for suspected terrorists, enacted in December 2001, was overturned last December by the Law Lords, Britain's counterpart to the U.S. Supreme Court. Current law allows house arrest in some circumstances, but only with the personal approval of the home secretary. The Blair government is seeking new anti-terrorism legislation, but it is being resisted by rank-and-file MPs in all three major parties, including Blair's own.

"We are very conscious of the fact that we don't want to tear up our civil liberties," says Ramesh Chhabra, the spokesman for Tory Party Shadow Home Secretary David Davis. Chhabra said that while the Conser-

vative Party has long complained about the current immigration system, it's not going to use the attacks as a way to promote tightening the law. And in comparison with the religious rancor that erupted in the United States, with Christian leaders like Franklin Graham referring to Islam as "a very evil and wicked religion," England's Islamic, Christian, and Jewish leaders issued a joint statement condemning the attacks.

"The interreligious community is strongly united, but it is in a state of fragility after acts like this," said the Reverend Alan Green, the Church of England representative who has been meeting with Muslim leaders since the July 7 attacks. "We have been as proactive as possible to show that the different faith communities stand together."

Londoners, so far, are following the lead of Mayor Ken Livingstone, who said, "We won't let a small group of terrorists change the way we live."

— Samuel Loewenberg

The Fraud Caucus

To hear the media tell it, moderate Republicans are the greatest thing to hit Washington since air-conditioning. Enough already.


BY MATTHEW YGLESIAS AND MARK LEON GOLDBERG

ON THE EVENING OF MAY 23, A BIPARTISAN GROUP of 14 senators emerged from a series of semi-secret meetings to announce that they'd brokered a deal ending the standoff over Democratic filibusters of several of President Bush's judicial nominees. The group's seven Republicans agreed to vote against the "nuclear option" and to kill the nominations of two of the filibustered judges, while Democrats promised to confirm the most controversial nominees and to deploy the filibuster in the future only under "extraordinary circumstances."

The deal was a bitter pill for many liberals to swallow. But worse was the glowing media attention paid to the deal-makers that immediately followed. A *Washington Post* news analysis termed the pact "a dramatic break with the ideological warfare that has defined the politics of Washington for much of the past decade," and praised the "courage" of the compromisers, who "demonstrated that there is an alternative to the partisan polarization that has been so much in favor in both parties." Shortly thereafter, National Public Radio aired a sympathetic interview with moderate former Republican Senator Alan Simpson in which he bemoaned the harsh treatment faced by moderates at the hands of the GOP leadership and praised Ohio Senator Mike DeWine for standing up to such pressure.

The moment perfectly captured the media's typical coverage of the Republican moderates, which alternates between laudatory praises of their courage and principle and lamentations of their decline and relative lack of power.

But the deal they struck reflected little in the way of independence, and nothing in the way of principle. The standoff over judges posed two questions—one about the suitability of Bush's appointments to the federal bench, the other about the rules of the Senate. On both points, the Republican moderates' position was wildly incoherent. If the nuclear option was wrong, they should have voted against it without extra inducement: Demanding a bribe in exchange for not breaking the rules is behavior befitting a gangster, not a principled, independent-minded maverick. Conversely, if judicial filibusters are wrong, the thing to do was to vote for the nuclear option. And with regard to the substance of the judges' qualifications, the GOP



No Guts: GOP moderates always cave when it matters.

moderates managed to dodge that debate entirely. Does moderate Lincoln Chafee of Rhode Island *really* think that paleo-conservative nutcase Janice Rogers Brown should be on the bench? Well, he—and every other "moderate"—voted for her. And somehow, the media forgot to criticize him.

THE EPISODE WAS FAR FROM THE DRAMATIC, PARADIGM-shattering move portrayed by the media. Instead, it was entirely typical of the Republican moderates' behavior in federal office. Far from applying a brake on the conservative agenda, GOP moderates just dole out the salami of hard-core right-wingery in small slices rather than in a large chunk. Lacking real backbone—and, more importantly, any coherent ideology that represents and tries to advance moderate Republicanism—these folks have done far less good on Capitol Hill than is usually presumed.

Examples are rife. On May 12, DeWine's Ohio Republican colleague, George Voinovich, tearfully urged the Republican caucus not to confirm John Bolton as U.S. ambassador to the United Nations. "The confirmation of John Bolton would send a contradictory and negative message to the world community about U.S. intentions," Voinovich said.

The remarks earned him the praise of liberals, while conservative radio host Bill Cunningham took the opportunity to label Voinovich “a clown, a crying clown.” His conclusion isn’t far off the mark. Bolton’s confirmation could have been killed on May 12 had Voinovich simply chosen to vote against him in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. But Voinovich declined to do so, saying, “We owe it to the president to give Mr. Bolton an up-or-down vote on the floor of the United States Senate.”

Here, Voinovich chose to stand on a nonexistent principle. Legislation and nominations alike have regularly been killed in committee. During the Clinton administration, for example, 66 judicial nominees never made it to the floor for a full vote, 42 of them during Voinovich’s first term in the Senate without him raising a single objection.

A veritable parade of Republican senators has, at one time or another, offered dissenting opinions to the White House’s Tinkerbell line on Iraq. Responding to Vice President Dick Cheney’s assertion that the insurgency was in its “last throes,” Senator Chuck Hagel told *U.S. News & World Report* in June, “The White House is completely disconnected from reality. It’s like they’re just making it up as they go along.” Strong words. But neither Hagel nor other frequently off-message GOP senators, like Indiana’s Richard Lugar, have yet mustered the wherewithal to, say, hold hearings to examine the politicization of prewar intelligence, the Coalition Provisional Authority’s apparent loss of nearly \$9 billion, the no-bid contracts, the shoddy prewar planning, or any other aspect of the strategy.



Chuck Hagel

Abu Ghraib is another case in point. Outrage over the notorious detention center was visible on the faces of Republicans Lindsey Graham, John McCain, and the chairman of the Armed Services Committee, John Warner, during the Senate hearings on May 11, 2004. That month, Warner pledged “to investigate up and down and sideways in the chain of command.” In response, *Salon* ran a gushing profile that proclaimed Warner “determined to get to the bottom of the Abu Ghraib scandal even if it costs George W. Bush the election.”

It never happened. Instead, while reports of more widespread abuse of detainees in Iraq, at Guantanamo Bay, and elsewhere trickled in, Warner lost his zeal. “I’ve got some other issues I need to solve,” Warner told Knight-Ridder on April 30 of this year. Frustrated by the gaps resulting from 12 separate and narrowly circumscribed Defense Department inquiries, Carl Levin and Jack Reed, two Democratic members of the Senate Armed Services Committee, wrote to Warner on May 26 to urge him to join their call for an independent inquiry or bipartisan staff investigation. “The most serious scandal in recent military history needs an objective investigation,” they wrote. Two weeks later, they got a written response in which Warner proclaimed himself “not prepared to support the concept of an independent inquiry, or a joint investigation by Committee staff.” Minority staff declined to characterize their reaction to Warner’s change of

heart, hoping to preserve a good working relationship with the chairman in the future. But it’s clear where Warner stands: with the White House. And anyone who thinks he can be coaxed, rather than shamed, into changing it is suffering from the legislative equivalent of Stockholm syndrome.

Even apparent action doesn’t stand up to scrutiny. Back in 2001, the White House asked for \$1.6 trillion in tax cuts. Moderates demurred, scaling it back to “only” \$1.35 trillion. Fair enough. But then in 2003, the administration came again, demanding an additional \$800 billion in tax cuts. Instead of saying “no,” moderates once again scaled it back, this time to \$350 billion. In 2004, the Republicans, once again with moderate support, passed a \$143 billion corporate tax-cut bill. The earlier rollbacks were largely illusory, accomplished through budgetary gimmicks and phaseouts designed to disguise, rather than reduce, the cuts’ actual cost. Saying that taxes should be continually reduced in the face of ever-higher deficits through a series of small steps rather than a few giant leaps isn’t an especially

“moderate” position. During the budget fight earlier this year, Democratic efforts to restore pay-as-you-go rules that would have forced the Congress to stick with the scheduled phaseouts were defeated. Moderate senators did provide enough votes to block Republican attempts to cut Medicaid spending, but those cuts were restored in a House-Senate conference committee—and the objecting senators didn’t vote “no” on the final budget. Worse, most of them signaled that they were committed to

voting for the budget before the conference committee started its work, thus ensuring that the House version would win out.

THERE IS MUCH LESS CONFLICT BETWEEN MODERATES and the Republican leadership than is often assumed. Representative Chris Shays of Connecticut is the one GOP moderate who is most likely to stray from the reservation. In April, Shays earned praise from liberal pundits for being the first congressional Republican to call for Tom DeLay’s resignation as House majority leader. Less widely known is that on June 1, the Connecticut Republican netted \$70,000 at a fund-raiser with House Speaker Dennis Hastert at the posh Belle Haven Country Club in Greenwich.

Hastert and DeLay are different people, to be sure, and Hastert has not been directly implicated in the sort of ethical improprieties that DeLay has. Nevertheless, posing as a prominent enemy of the power behind the House throne while collecting largesse with the help of the man who sits in the throne is self-evidently absurd. In exchange, the leadership knows how to take care of its own. When the hard-right Club for Growth and various cultural conservative outlets backed Representative Pat Toomey’s challenge to moderate Pennsylvania Senator Arlen Specter last year, Republican leaders didn’t see it as an opportunity to off a traitor. Instead, they threw their weight behind Specter, campaigning with him in person, helping with fund raising, and



Chris Shays

making it known that the party liked Specter just fine.

This probably made the difference in Specter's primary, after which he proceeded to defeat his Democratic opponent handily and assume in January the chairmanship of the Judiciary Committee. This last turn of events provoked some controversy, as conservatives wondered whether a pro-choicer could really be trusted to shepherd Bush's judicial nominees through a contentious confirmation process. Specter promised loyalty, and he delivered—backing Bush's judges to the hilt and raising no objections to the nuclear option, all the while maintaining a pro-choice stance that has electoral appeal in the Philadelphia suburbs but little impact on the direction of policy.

The cozy relationship is exemplified in the House process known as "catch and release." Republican leaders allow members who need a moderate reputation in their home states and districts to go unpunished for breaking with the party on controversial votes—allow them, that is, as long as their votes aren't needed to pass the bill. In exchange, members are expected to vote as they're told when their votes are actually needed to pass something.

Shays is an eager beneficiary of this practice. DeLay was eager to add an amendment to the energy bill that would shield manufacturers of the gasoline additive MTBE for liability from environmental damage caused by their product. Democrats opposed the idea, as did virtually all legislators from the Northeast, a region where MTBE use is high.

As a result of regional defections, the vote was extremely close, but Shays backed the leadership, helping to put the measure over the top. The overall bill had more support and was destined for easy passage in the House. At that point, Shays, who likes to style himself an environmentalist, cast an ineffectual and meaningless "no." His vote wasn't needed on the budget provision to permit drilling in the Alaska National Wildlife Refuge, so he voted "no" on that, too, and for his trouble the League of Conservation Voters (LCV) sent a glowing letter around his district applauding Shays for "rejecting this back-door attack on the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge and voting to protect this incomparable wilderness." This, however, is political posturing, not genuine environmental advocacy.

OF COURSE, DEMOCRATS, TOO, HAVE BEEN KNOWN TO portray themselves as more moderate than they really are for electoral purposes. But there is a difference. Centrist institutions on the left side of the spectrum, like the Democratic Leadership Council (DLC), are not *merely* pushing political tactics; they're pushing ideas. Moderates and liberals within the broad Democratic tent have substantive disagreements about policy issues that are, to some extent, reflected in the behavior of electoral officials. Moderate Republicanism, by contrast, completely lacks real institutions or core beliefs.

The Republican Leadership Council, once intended more or less explicitly as a center-right version of the center-left DLC, has become nothing but a front for typical hatchet politics. Its former executive director, Allen Raymond, is now serving out a five-month prison sentence for his role in a dirty-tricks campaign against New

Hampshire Governor Jeanne Shaheen's 2002 Senate bid.

The Ripon Institute, a 1960s-vintage Rockefeller Republican operation that used to do real public-policy work, is now, as reported by Elizabeth Drew in the July 23 issue of *The New York Review of Books*, little more than a money-laundering operation for business lobbyists—offering trips, as Drew put it, that are "famous among lobbyists for the opportunities they present for pressing their cases with members of Congress." Roughly speaking, it would be illegal for, say, General Motors to give a representative a bunch of money or an expensive trip. Corporations can, however, give money to the Ripon Educational Fund to help underwrite its annual "Transatlantic Conference" (i.e., European vacation), to which friendly members of Congress get all-expenses-paid invitations.

The Republican Main Street Partnership is more of a going concern, but, as such, it exemplifies the hollowness of today's moderate Republicanism. The group's dissent from the GOP leadership is essentially limited to the question of stem-cell research, where House moderates did join with Democrats to pass a measure that, if seconded by the Senate, would roll back some

Shays backed Tom DeLay on a key energy amendment, helping to put it over the top. Then, on the overall bill, he cast a meaningless "no."

of the restrictions Bush has placed on the use of federal money. More to the point, Main Street Republicanism is defined by its adherents almost exclusively in tactical terms. It has no real policy arm, and describes its mission as "working to Grow Our Party through a pragmatic approach to governing that reaches out to a broad base of Americans who share the Republican ideals of fiscal responsibility and limited government."


It is only a small exaggeration to say that there are no moderate Republicans at all. There are grandstanders who enjoy the notoriety and media access that can be gained from the occasional off-message statement to the press. There are vulnerable Republicans who need to move to the left every so often in order to win elections. But there is no group of Republicans that, through real actions with consequences and meaningful policy engagement, makes any significant effort to block the conservative agenda or implement a centrist one. That people who *say* different things from their co-partisans but *act* the same when the votes are counted can acquire reputations as independent-minded mavericks says a great deal about the culture of our political media—and very little about where the legislative balance of power lies.

The disconnect between the ostensible aims of moderate Republicanism and its actions in practice is often accounted for by invoking the awesome disciplinary apparatus of the White House and the congressional leadership. Obviously, it's difficult to ascertain the extent to which DeLay, Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist, and the White House lean on GOP moderates. The pressure is

probably considerable. Even so, pundits never give any thought to the opposite, also plausible, explanation: that the moderates are *happy* to be whipped. Remarkable as the lack of dissent on policy votes is, the lack of dissent from moderates about the Bush administration's unprecedented centralization of power is even more so. The lack of pushback suggests a group of people content to have a ready excuse to offer their constituents if they wind up voting with the right when the roll is called.

THE REAL REASON ALL THIS MATTERS SO MUCH IS THIS: The myth of the GOP moderates has led the Democratic Party and liberal advocacy groups to accept an idea about them that is completely backward. Democrats and liberal groups tend to see moderate Republicans as precious models of sanity with whom they can work. Instead, given the districts and states the moderates tend to represent, Democrats and liberals should view the moderates as people who can be beaten, thereby building a Democratic majority.

Chafee, for example, is potentially ripe for defeat in navy-blue Rhode Island. But NARAL Pro-Choice America kicked off the 2006 campaign season with a very early, preemptive endorsement of him in what many are reading as a warning shot to a Democratic Party that contemplated nominating an anti-abortion Democrat to run against the pro-choice Chafee.



Lincoln Chafee

Diane Farrell, the Democratic first selectman of the wealthy coastal town of Westport, Connecticut, ran a tight race against Shays in 2004, giving him one of the slimmest margins of victory of all Republican incumbents. Farrell was likely done in by such "crossover" endorsements. Shays, as reward for breaking with his party's leaders when they had a majority anyway, got endorsements from the LCV and the Sierra Club. "Admittedly, [Shays] is better than most," says Farrell. "But as I said to the environmental groups, 'No pun intended, but you are missing the forest for the trees.'"

Ironically, endorsements of Shays from *The New York Times* and groups like WILD PAC and the Human Rights Campaign had a tendency to give him extra credit for taking stances as a Republican that would be unexceptional for a Democrat. Why one should get special praise from a group for being a member of a political party that's unremittably hostile to the group's agenda is unclear. A Democratic member of Congress from suburban Connecticut no doubt would have less opportunity to demonstrate what the *Times* called Shays' "rare thoughtfulness and considerable independence" because there would be fewer times when doing the obviously right thing required "fearlessness."

Republican-endorsing liberal groups, of course, have their reasons for doing what they do. An occasional cross-party endorsement maintains a veneer of nonpartisanship that's useful for fund-raising and tax purposes. Groups often have moderate Republicans on their boards or among their donors. What's more, no lobby wants to back itself into a corner where it can safely be taken for granted. Tossing endorsements to a few Re-

publicans helps encourage Democrats to stay on the straight and narrow and gives Republicans at least some incentive to break with their party. What's more, political power, especially in the House, is largely zero-sum. While a Democratic majority could do a great deal for the environment, one additional backbench freshman member of a Democratic minority would be unlikely to accomplish anything.

At the end of the day, however, as Farrell says she told LCV President Deb Callahan, progressives need to ask themselves: "Do you want to win the battle and lose the war, or do you want to win the war?" Democrats have lost Senate and congressional races in the South over the past several years precisely because conservative groups don't play nice with moderate Democrats. Oklahoma's Brad Carson and South Carolina's Inez Tenenbaum, both Senate candidates in 2004, were—quite correctly—seen by conservatives as stalking-horses for a Democratic Senate majority, not for a social-conservative takeover of the Democratic

Party. As a result, these were the states where the right pushed hardest. Republicans and conservative groups stay focused on winning the war.



Susan Collins

THE PRESS LIKES MODERATE Republicans, first and foremost because tales of their supposedly embattled existence and pseudo-compromises make for good copy. In addition, their ideological viewpoint—in essence, sensible conservatism without the religious fundamentalism and ersatz

populism—is broadly in line with the media's as a whole. Embattled liberals can ill afford delusions. This is not, as the cliché has it, an "endangered species" of cuddly would-be progressives at risk of being devoured by Tom DeLay. It's right-wingery with a hypocritical face, designed to allow the GOP to reap the benefits of political polarization without paying the price. Too often, however, liberals seem eager to throw vulnerable Republicans a lifeline rather than drive a stake through the heart of the beast.

Maine's Chellie Pingree, for example, seemed to have a good shot at unseating Senator Susan Collins in the summer of 2002 with a campaign centered on health care when, back in Washington, Collins suddenly found herself the co-sponsor of a modest prescription-drug reform bill along with John Edwards. Deprived of its best issue, and with Democratic leaders apparently contradicting the line that a vote for Collins was a vote for Trent Lott (then the Senate majority leader), the Pingree campaign deflated.

"It is a real dilemma," says an understanding Pingree, "and there are a lot of people in this climate who would say you've got to make alliances when you can to get what you want—and, honestly, that's what good legislation should be." But modest tinkering with the health-care status quo *isn't* what liberals want. Structural reform will never be undertaken without a Democratic majority, a majority that will have to be built largely on the backs of the very Republicans most inclined to talk a good game when it doesn't really count. **TAP**

High Court, High Stakes

On morality, regulation, and privacy, the right seeks a Supreme Court revolution. Senate hearings have one job: to block it.

BY BRUCE ACKERMAN

AS WE GO TO PRESS, WE DON'T KNOW THE NAME of President Bush's Supreme Court nominee or nominees. But it is clear that he will eventually get two, and maybe more—enough to lead a radical transformation of constitutional law. The challenge is to keep this point at the center of the debate and to avoid diverting attention with personal attacks or strategic maneuvering.

The president has repeatedly promised us justices like Clarence Thomas or Antonin Scalia, and I propose to take him at his word. If we simply take the trouble to read their opinions, it becomes evident that a Court dominated by Thomases and Scalias would launch a constitutional revolution on a scale unknown since the New Deal.

The Senate should also take the president seriously. Bush has already told us the kind of justices he wants, and if he has had a last-minute change of heart, it should be up to individual nominees to convince us that they are not in the Thomas-Scalia mold.

Placing this burden on the nominee permits senators to define a more decorous and consequential role for themselves in giving "advise and consent." Rather than browbeating nominees, senators should take the president at his

word, unless the candidate convinces them otherwise. They should repeatedly confront nominees with the opinions of Thomas and Scalia, and ask them to state, clearly and without equivocation, whether they agree or disagree. This approach would focus public attention on the main issue: the sweeping revolution promised by a Thomas-Scalia ascendancy.

If words have any meaning, it's wrong to call Thomas and Scalia "conservative." Conservatives seek to conserve the hard-won wisdom of the past and adapt it in small steps. But Thomas and Scalia propose to rip it up by the roots and replace it with

a visionary alternative. Sandra Day O'Connor is a conservative; they are something very different: neoconservative revolutionaries. If the president does appoint an O'Connor, it would be easy for his nominee to clearly separate him- or herself from the revolutionary opinions written by the neocons. But if the nominee bobs and weaves, senators should not play cat and mouse. They should say that the risk of confirming another Thomas is

simply too high. Unless we call a halt, the Constitution of 2015 will look radically different from the Constitution that has governed this country since World War II. As a practical matter, our 20th-century Constitution hasn't done a bad job in steering us through countless crises. Do we really want to chuck it overboard and navigate with a compass of visionary design?


The neoconservative revolution is a complex affair, and I will be distinguishing three elements: its effort to transform constitutional morality, its attack on social and environmental regulation, and its support for the president's assault on fundamental freedoms in the war on terrorism.

CONSTITUTIONAL MORALITY

Thomas and Scalia see *Roe v. Wade* as a symptom of a deeper jurisprudential dis-

ease. *Roe* is based on the traditional understanding of the due-process clause as the source of fundamental rights to "life, liberty, and property." For the neocons, this tradition is merely the handiwork of a cabal of activist judges who have imposed *Roe* and a host of other liberal rights on an unsuspecting nation.

This is a gross distortion of history. Over the course of the 20th century, the champions of the due-process tradition have not been activists but the leading exponents of judicial restraint, most notably Felix Frankfurter and John Marshall Harlan. It was Harlan, an Eisenhower appointee and the Warren Court's fiercest



The Worst: Clarence Thomas

critic, who wrote the great opinion expounding the due-process foundations of the right to privacy. The particular issue was contraception, and he found that statutes criminalizing their use would violate “a most fundamental aspect of ‘liberty,’ the privacy of the home in its most basic sense.” Conservatives like Anthony Kennedy, a Reagan appointee, are only carrying forward this tradition into contemporary life.

Looking at the broad range of cases, these genuine conservatives have been more deferential to the political process than Thomas and Scalia. Their defense of privacy is part of a discriminating philosophy of judicial restraint, not wild-eyed activism. And yet deference has its limits, as Kennedy said in the Court’s recent *Lawrence v. Texas* decision: “Had those who drew and ratified the due-process clauses of the Fifth or the 14th Amendments known the components of liberty in its manifold possi-

due-process tradition. The Constitution doesn’t explicitly guarantee religious families the right to send their children to parochial schools. And this right was repeatedly endangered by waves of nativist patriotism until the Court struck down a state statute requiring all children to go to public schools. Written in 1925, *Pierce v. Society of Sisters* is worth remembering. It assured Americans that the “fundamental theory of liberty” expressed by due process “excludes any general power of the state to standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only.” Neoconservative jurisprudence would throw *Pierce* into the trash can of history along with *Roe v. Wade* and *Lawrence v. Texas*. To top it off, *Pierce*’s result can no longer be reached through the free-exercise clause because Scalia has persuaded the Court to give it an extremely narrow interpretation. Is this really what religious people want?



A Close Second: Antonin Scalia

bilities, they might have been more specific. They did not presume to have this insight. They knew times can blind us to certain truths, and later generations can see that laws once thought necessary and proper in fact serve only to oppress. As the Constitution endures, persons in every generation can invoke its principles in their own search for greater freedom.”

In dissenting from *Lawrence*, Scalia, joined by Thomas and Chief Justice William Rehnquist, treats this traditional understanding with contempt, as the “product of a Court, which is the product of a law-profession culture that has largely signed on to the so-called homosexual agenda ...” Scalia forgets that all exercises in judicial interpretation are the product of a “law-profession culture.” Only the Court’s openness to professional critique keeps it honest and distinguishes it from an organ of naked political power. And his claim that the Court has signed on to the “homosexual agenda” is characteristically extreme: The majority held that the state could not throw gays into jail, not that it was required to provide civil unions, much less marriage.

The religious community has much at stake in upholding the

But the religious right doesn’t appreciate the dark side of neocon constitutional doctrine. It has been blinded by visions of revolutionary triumph. Its target is the traditional understanding of the First Amendment, which bars government from endorsing religion in American public life. Dissenting for four justices in a recent case involving the Ten Commandments, Scalia rejected existing case law with disdain. The state doesn’t “establish” religion, he asserted, even when it favors the three monotheistic religions—Judaism, Christianity, and Islam—over others, like Hinduism and Buddhism, that reject the First Commandment. Whatever the growing number of Asian Americans might think, Scalia tells them that public disparagement of their profoundest beliefs doesn’t make them second-class citizens.

These views aren’t radical enough for Thomas. Breaking with all other justices of

the modern era, he insists that the establishment clause only applies to the federal government, not to the states. As a consequence, there is nothing stopping Utah from making Mormonism into the state religion, so long as other sects retain the freedom to huddle together in private worship.

Scalia’s views suffice to generate grave concern. What counts as One God is a notoriously controversial matter (even the Ten Commandments come in different versions), and when it comes to drawing lines, politicians will follow the Christian sects with the most votes, leaving a trail of bitterness behind.

A neoconservative revolution would transform the nation’s constitutional morality. The modern Supreme Court has consistently barred the state from endorsing religion, and it has protected each American’s right to make intimate decisions about sexuality, childbearing, and child rearing. A Court dominated by Thomases and Scalias would strip away these rights and unleash unending sectarian strife over the version of religious truth that should be imposed on public education, welfare, and much else besides.

THE CONSTITUTION IN EXILE

Before the New Deal, the Supreme Court intervened aggressively to deny Congress the power to control the abuses of a market economy. When Congress banned the products of child labor from interstate commerce, for example, the Court took a harsh view of this morally compelling act. The commerce clause, it explained, could not be used as a platform for regulating labor conditions within the states. This involved “manufacturing,” not “commerce,” and on the basis of this wordplay, the statute was held unconstitutional.

All this came to an end during the Great Depression. When Franklin Delano Roosevelt filled his first vacancy with Hugo Black in 1937, 76 out of 96 senators were Democrats. During the following years, the Senate readily confirmed a string of New Deal justices who transformed the commerce clause into a wide-ranging grant of congressional power to correct the social injustices and economic failings of *laissez-faire*.

This New Deal consensus remained unchallenged on the Court until Clarence Thomas denounced it as a “wrong turn.” The case was *United States v. Lopez*, and when it came up in 1995, it didn’t seem to raise much of a problem under New Deal principles. Congress had made it a crime to carry a gun within a school zone, and while schools may be local, their graduates move throughout the nation, using their skills in interstate commerce. Gun-toting hoodlums obviously disrupt classrooms, and the nation’s economic future depends on its schools. So why couldn’t Congress prevent violent classroom disruptions under the commerce clause?

Rehnquist, writing the opinion of the Court, responded with the wordplay that led the pre-1937 Court to strike down progressive legislation prior to the New Deal. He treated “education” as if it existed in an entirely different sphere from the “economic” activities governed directly by the commerce clause. He then denied that unsafe schools “substantially affected” commerce, ignoring the compelling factual demonstration supplied by the four dissenters. Although they refused to join Thomas’ separate opinion denouncing the New Deal, the other justices in the majority had actually embraced the old methodology that had been repudiated, after sustained democratic debate, 60 years earlier.

The Court escalated its attack in *United States v. Morrison*, decided in 2000, striking down the Violence Against Women Act as beyond the powers of Congress. But the 14th Amendment explicitly grants Congress the power to “enforce” the amendment’s promise of “equal protection.” Violence against women perpetuates their subordination. Yet the five-judge majority ignored historical evidence that the Framers of the 14th Amendment expected Congress, not the Court, to take the lead in fighting inequality. Despite their unending professions of faith in the original understanding, their faith mysteriously ran out when it came to civil rights.

If read expansively, *Morrison* and *Lopez* render many of the great legislative achievements of the New Deal and Great Society problematic at best, unconstitutional at worst. But the two true conservatives in the majority—Kennedy and O’Connor—have had too much common sense to allow an explosive confrontation with Congress to occur on their watch. They have let

the Court only nibble around the edges of the traditional consensus, sometimes even seducing Rehnquist or Scalia away from Thomas’ vanguard positions. As a consequence, the Court’s case law is currently an unprincipled morass, making it tough for court watchers to guess what will happen next.

It is all too clear, however, that the revolution would move into higher gear with two young neocon justices providing the momentum. Environmental law would be a tempting target. The Endangered Species Act serves humanity’s long-term economic interest in preventing environmental catastrophe. But long-run appeals to the economic interests of the nation no longer satisfy the neocons, as *Lopez* showed in rejecting Congress’ power to keep guns out of public schools. It would be child’s play to strike down the Endangered Species Act, and other key environmental statutes, as beyond the commerce clause.

The neocons have opened up another front in their attack by an increasingly expansive interpretation of the takings clause. Despite their protestations of strict construction, they don’t limit compensation requirements to cases in which property is literally “taken” away from its owners. They increasingly insist on payment when environmental regulations restrict property owners’ freedom to build on their land. If this trend continues, governments would be obliged to pay crippling amounts of money if they hope to protect the environment against free-market exploitation.

And with the next vacancy, the neocons will be in a position to enshrine their ideology of the “Constitution in Exile.” In the good old days when Herbert Hoover was in the White House, even child-labor laws were beyond Congress’ power, and once the New Deal’s “wrong turn” is corrected, these old precedents will provoke a broad reassessment of the Occupational Safety and Health Act and other protective legislation.

Such sweeping challenges would make current disputes into quaint memories. To take only two examples, the Court recently reaffirmed the use of well-crafted affirmative-action programs by a vote of 5 to 4, and it recently upheld McCain-Feingold by the same margin. These decisions would be swept away with a further shift to the right: There would be no affirmative action, and the neocons’ First Amendment would dramatically cut back on permissible congressional controls over campaign slush funds.

During the 20th century, the federal government became a general problem-solver capable of responding flexibly to new issues as they came onto the horizon. A neoconservative Court would force Congress to accept the dominion of the invisible hand on an increasingly broad front.

THE WAR ON TERRORISM

The Court responded uncertainly to its first three terrorism cases a year ago. Over the dissent of Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas, the majority rejected the president’s effort to insulate Guantanamo Bay from all judicial review. But it didn’t go further and explain what due process required, leaving this to future litigation. And by a 5-to-4 vote, it refused to say anything at all about the even more important Padilla case.

Jose Padilla is an American citizen who has never fought on

a traditional battlefield. He converted to Islam when in prison and later traveled to a number of Islamic countries. When he was seized on his return at Chicago's O'Hare Airport, the president declared him an unlawful combatant in the war against terrorism, stripped him of all his rights, and detained him indefinitely in a military prison.

The stakes are enormous: If the president can throw Padilla into jail on his say-so, no citizen is safe. After more than two years in confinement, Padilla finally got his case to the Supreme Court. But he did not get relief. A narrow 5-to-4 majority deferred decision for a year or two while the lower courts resolved some preliminary issues. Padilla will stay in solitary confinement on orders of the commander in chief.

Worse yet, he may never get to defend himself before a jury of his peers; the Court's final terrorism decision leaves this issue very much in doubt. It involved another American citizen, Yaser Esam Hamdi, but he was picked him up on the battlefield in Afghanistan—a far more suspicious place to be than an airport in Chicago. Once again, the president claimed the unilateral right to lock him up in solitary confinement, and this time the Court did reach the merits of the case.

Only one justice gave the president everything he wanted in the Hamdi decision: Thomas wrote an astonishing opinion, worthy of a jurist of a militarized Latin American “democracy.”

Happily, only one justice gave the president everything he wanted: Thomas wrote an astonishing opinion, worthy of a jurist of a militarized Latin American “democracy.” The decisive plurality opinion, written by O'Connor, did rein the president in, but only mildly. It did not accept Hamdi's claim that, as an American citizen, the Bill of Rights entitled him to a jury trial. The best O'Connor would give him was a “meaningful opportunity” to convince a “neutral” tribunal of military officers that he wasn't an “enemy combatant.” At this hearing, Hamdi would not be able to avail himself of the traditional presumption of innocence, nor was he guaranteed the right to confront and cross-examine key witnesses. The justices might find this “meaningful,” but the Bill of Rights offers a very different view.

When Padilla's case returns to the Court in 2006, he will have to distinguish his case from Hamdi's. This might seem easy: There is an obvious difference between seizing an American on the battlefield and grabbing him at an airport. But that doesn't mean that a majority will have the courage to draw the line, especially if the case returns in the aftermath of another terrorist attack.

At the very least, the Court could use some stiffening of its collective spine. But two more Thomases would offer us something very different. Two more Scalias would be much better because on this occasion, the justice was faithful to his “origi-

nalist” creed. Scalia's dissenting opinion in *Hamdi v. Rumsfeld* is a strong defense of the Bill of Rights in general, and trial by jury in particular. Unfortunately, President Bush's commitment to the war on terrorism makes it far more likely that his nominees will follow Thomas, not Scalia, in their blind enthusiasm for presidential power.

Each aspect of the neoconservative revolution is troubling, but we can now glimpse the full extent of the challenge. The Constitution of the 20th century emphasized religious tolerance, social welfare, equality, and a profound commitment to due process of law. Should the Constitution of the 21st century serve as the foundation for religious intolerance, weak federal government, laissez-faire, and the president's arbitrary power to wage a never-ending war on terrorism?

The Senate hearings should be measured by the clarity with which they raise this question. If the American people come to recognize the high stakes, I cannot believe that they will endorse the neoconservative effort to destroy the hard-won gains of 20th-century constitutionalism. We will lose the struggle for public opinion only if senators get bogged down in personalities or let procedural matters, like the filibuster, trivialize the large

issues at stake. This would allow the neocons to portray the confirmation hearings as a rearguard battle waged by a few special interests bitterly opposed to anything that comes out of the Bush White House.

But if thoughtful senators of both parties keep asking the nominees whether they endorse the revolutionary opinions of Thomas or Scalia, it will quickly become clear that the neoconservative challenge does not divide most Republicans from

Democrats, or conservatives from liberals. There are tens of millions of old-fashioned conservatives who cherish the right of parents to send their children to parochial schools. But a Scalia Court, if intellectually honest, would find it constitutionally impossible to vindicate this fundamental right. And a Thomas Court would allow the war against terrorism to eviscerate the right to trial by jury. There are also plenty of Republicans who would be appalled by a Court that strikes down key environmental legislation. True conservatives have as much to fear from the neoconservative revolution as racial minorities or labor unions or defenders of the right to privacy. If we win the battle of public opinion, procedural questions like the filibuster will take care of themselves. Thoughtful moderates of both parties will follow the public and refuse to allow the confirmation of a neocon on a vote of 51 to 49, let alone permit Dick Cheney to break a tie.

The American people have had quite enough of visionary schemes at the moment. This is a time for more Sandra Day O'Connors, not more Clarence Thomases. **TAP**

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Dreamers Without Borders

What happened to the EU treaty looks a lot like what happened in America last year. Leaders in both places should think about that.

BY BENJAMIN R. BARBER

EUROPE IS IN SHAMBLES: FRANCE SLEEPWALKING, Germany in a tailspin, the euro falling, the left in disarray. Now, just weeks after the defeat in France and Holland of the innovative new treaty that was supposed to usher in a new constitutional era for an enlarged Europe of 25 nations, terrorist bombings in London are reinforcing the politics of fear and lending fuel to the contention that individual nations should reclaim control of their borders from a porous European Union.

The treaty that seemed a sure thing eight months ago went down hard. Its advocates claimed it was at once more pro-business and more progressive than the old one. With its new declaration of rights and social measures, it supposedly embodied a social-democratic vision for Europe such that most left elites had embraced it, just as the libertarian *Economist* had often ridiculed it. But at the same time, it promised a free-market Europe that business approved of and conservatives like Jacques Chirac could campaign for.

Yet among the voters the treaty was supposed to benefit, it evoked disdain. It was defeated in France (by 55 percent) and annihilated a few days later in Holland (by 62 percent). Tony Blair quickly bailed on a planned British referendum, and the polls on the upcoming vote in Poland (now delayed) dropped 20 points. Gerhard Schröder took the defeat in May of his red-green coalition in North Rhine Westphalia (where the Social Democratic Party had ruled for 40 years) so hard that he moved up elections by a year and is in danger of being displaced by Angela Merkel, the Christian Democrats' new and untested leader who hopes to become Germany's Margaret Thatcher. "No" is Europe's mood today.

Of course no one really said "no" to the proposed constitu-


tion. Who had even read it, with its 4-inch thick compendium of technocratic legalese and opaque compromises? It was as long as Proust and far less engaging. Ordinary citizens said "no" to the elites on the left and the right who had dumped this incomprehensible but vaguely threatening mess on them (Chirac could have had a safe parliamentary vote on it but opted for the popular referendum).

Voters said "no" less to the new treaty than to their fears of what it seemed to stand for. After all, in the early decades of the EU they had been enthusiastic supporters of what in America

would have seemed radical ideals of pooled sovereignty, European-wide social policies, and open borders. Led by great socialist statesmen like Jacques Delors, the French stood at the forefront of a new Europe.

So when, in June, so many socialists voted against their leaders (including Delors) and said "no" to an enlarged and seemingly unaccountable Europe—despite the new declaration of rights, a new focus on participation, and new institutions intended to enhance democracy—they seemed to be turning their backs on their own idealism. When they said "no" to a feared onslaught of "Polish plumbers" (newly enfranchised eastern European workers who would steal their jobs), they seemed to turn from hope to despair. When they said "no" to Turkish membership in Europe that would dilute their national identities

with Islamism (even though Turkish membership is at least a decade away and uncertain, even had the treaty been affirmed), they seemed to react to new forces that have emerged only since the fall of the Berlin Wall. And when they said "no" to lying elites—*Le Nouvel Observateur* put Chirac on the cover with the headline "The Last Crook"—they announced a crisis of faith in their own leadership.



French Kiss-Off: France's EU "no" was multifaceted.

TO SOME EXTENT, MUCH THE SAME THING HAPPENED last year in the United States. The left, faced with globalization, marketization, and the challenges of a malevolent interdependence, blinked, divided, and stumbled. The failure of American progressives to stop George W. Bush's unilateralist politics of fear is the same story of the French and European left's failure to stop the populist right's anti-European politics of fear. Although the European left had once staunchly supported a strong, integrated Europe, whereas the American left had been more ambivalent about international cooperation and more willing to advance the military option (think of John F. Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson), progressives today on both sides of the Atlantic seem baffled, if not actually paralyzed, by the new realities of a malevolent interdependence.

In the face of economic globalization, the left everywhere is suffering from schizophrenia, torn between its egalitarian eco-


Supreme Court decision won't help much) or in the (re-)excising of the word "God" from the Pledge of Allegiance.

The ambivalence about globalization and the populist response to it ended up splitting progressives on both sides of the Atlantic between me-too neoliberals opting for markets without frontiers (but let's have a modest safety net) and fearful union protectionists opting for stronger frontiers (but let's sustain the rhetoric of global fraternity). Obviously the stories in Europe and the United States vary in tone and pitch, and Europe's class politics still exercise a hold on the left's imagination in Europe that has long since vanished (if it ever existed) in America. Moreover, Europe began with an openness to notions of pooling sovereignty and creating new transnational institutions that the American left has never imagined.

But when today Lou Dobbs embraces the Minutemen patrolling the Mexican border as patriotic vigilantes to keep out the "illegals" drawn into the United States by market forces, he plays on the same fears the Dutch populist right manipulates when it turns once tolerant burghers into critics of what they see as a Dutch "multiculti" disposition run amok. When Jean-Marie LePen in France or Jörg Haider in Austria or the heirs to Pim Fortuyn in Holland castigate freeloading immigrants trying to cash in on the European welfare state even as they disdain its Christian and civic traditions, how like Pat Buchanan they sound. When small businesses in the taxi and plumbing trades complain that they cannot compete with the cheap labor of workers from new EU members in eastern Europe, their cries for higher walls and more subsidies echo the cries heard in America among steelworkers and garment-makers who wonder how long their jobs will survive before the firms employing them simply pick up and move out of the country.

In Europe's referenda, the politics of fear is now trumping the politics of hope with which the treaty's less-than-compelling compromises were hammered out. Yet this was mainly a failure of elites, who put the constitutional cart before the political horse, assuming that a technocratically compelling reform document would commend itself to frightened citizens no longer convinced that "Europe" represented their best interests. Dutch, French, and Danish nationals feel like they are being invited to surrender their national sovereignty, and before a democratic Europe is constituted, one that might popularize and legitimate genuine European popular sovereignty. The elites and their mythmakers reading their own broadsides don't get it. Not here and not there. Citizens are not doing what they are supposed to do. Time, as Bertolt Brecht once wrote with bitter irony, to elect a new citizenry.

French voters took a long, hard look at a Europe being shaped by the forces of neoliberal globalization and shrank back, just as a slender plurality of Americans—confronted with the choice



Udder Insecurity: Potential Turkish EU membership may have been a deal-breaker.

omic instincts and its reactionary cultural fears. Many economic egalitarians are simultaneously cultural separatists. Many progressives endorse democracy "for us" (us French, us Americans) but not "for them" (those Algerian immigrants, those undocumented Latino workers), at least as long as *they* refuse to play by *our* cultural rules and to live in accord with *our* religious values. For ordinary Americans, globalization is OK when it comes to buying flat-screen TVs, iPods, and SUVs, but not when it comes to bleeding our industries and undermining our way of life. Progressives have not figured out how to turn this conundrum into a convincing affirmative politics.

In Europe, populists on both the left and the right were beset by doubts about hyper-multiculturalism and the treaty's compromise decision to omit any reference to religion or to the Christian origins of Europe. American economic populists were divided about gay marriage and the seeming banishment of religion from the American public square, evident in the removal of the Ten Commandments from courtrooms (the recent

between a world at the mercy of transnational institutions like the United Nations and uncertain allies like Germany and France and a cowboy president willing to use unilateral force—opted for Bush. For potentially progressive rank-and-file voters on both sides of the Atlantic, the choices being offered vis-à-vis globalization are simply not palatable. Embrace market anarchy and let global Darwinism—its successful productivity and its disastrous inequality alike—determine the future; yield to a plundering productivity and hope you can get yours. Or build new walls against global anarchy but shut off the future and pretend away the brute realities of interdependence. Go with the ultra-liberals or succumb to ultranationalists.

NO PATH OFFERS PROGRESSIVE OR DEMOCRATIC responses to the challenges of interdependence. But facing the choice of giving in to a world dominated by market and corporate forces they neither understand nor control or walling themselves inside the old sovereign communities they identify with, many ordinary citizens opt for the latter. After all, the Nazis were “national socialists”—economically progressive socialists whose fears and resentments were shaped by fear-mongers to reactionary ultranationalist purposes.

Readers of *The American Prospect* know that there are viable civic alternatives to these toxic extremes, but the debates among intellectuals rarely translate to the real choices offered by the political parties or their blinkered, one-issue-at-a-time policy wonks. And even in our progressive journals, as in *El Nouvel Observateur* or *Liberation* in France, *El Pais* in Spain, or *La Repubblica* in Italy, progressive conversations remain parochial and insular, restricted to the usual suspects.

In Europe and America, then, the defeats for the democratic left are about the democratic deficit that issues from globalization's tough challenges. Democracy, the left's strength, is at stake because the rules of a global market seem to moot national choices to pursue diverse paths, and the left cannot seem to figure out an appropriate democratic response to globalization. For Europeans, this means being forced to choose between embracing Europe as an ultra-market (rather than a civic and democratic entity) or resisting Europe (by falling into the clutches of the neonationalist populist right). For Americans, it means choosing between embracing globalization (at the cost of embracing global inequality and insecurity) or affecting to “stop globalization” (and choosing xenophobia and isolationism). Neither option offers equality and justice for Americans or others. We need an entirely different menu of choices.

The right, of course, has no such democracy problem, for its ideal is liberty, not equality, and the sustaining of productivity and profit, not the securing of justice. It trumpets authority, discipline, and leadership and regards democracy as a formally representative system where citizenship is confined to occasional elections. It privileges private liberty and property over

public equality and justice and prefers to leave their balancing to markets. It equates citizens with consumers and thinks that the latter can do the work of the former.

WHAT IS MISSING IS AN AFFIRMATIVE APPROACH TO globalization that accepts its inevitability but insists on its transformation. If progressives do not find a way either to democratize globalization or to globalize democracy, they will be defeated again and again—either by the neoliberal center or the populist neonationalist right. For starters, American progressives and European leftists need to deepen their all-too-episodic conversations and broaden them from the rhetorically minded World Social Forums to a substance-centered permanent engagement. Michel Rocard and José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero need to talk with Eliot Spitzer and Antonio Villaraigosa. François Hollande needs to be in regular conversation with Howard Dean. Jack Lang needs to instant-message Cornel West. And that's just the Atlantic, a narrow Europe–U.S. conversation that should open the way to discussion and collaboration with Latin American, African, and Asian progressives.

***Michel Rocard and José Luis Rodríguez
Zapatero need to talk with Eliot Spitzer and
Antonio Villaraigosa. François Hollande needs
to be in regular conversation with Howard Dean.***

All the challenges progressives face are challenges of a world of interdependence. Corporate elites understand this and, with their client states, have their economic forums and Bretton Woods institutions (the International Monetary Fund, or IMF, and the World Trade Organization, aka WTO), plus the common agendas to prove it. But the left remains reactive rather than affirmative, parochial rather than cosmopolitan, knowing what it is against (globalization) rather than what it is for. The realities of global interdependence—which include AIDS, weapons proliferation, climate change, technology, inequality, rules for economic markets, and, of course, terrorism—define the politics of nations today. These realities will not be addressed one country at a time, nor will they be kept at bay by raising walls. They demand common strategies, close collaboration, and global cooperation. Until the left starts talking across frontiers, it will remain the party of losers without frontiers, defeated again and again by neoliberals and neonationalists—neither of whom are democrats.

There is no going back. Interdependence is our destiny, though for now it is mostly a malevolent interdependence of AIDS and global warming and predatory markets, of corporate anarchy and nihilistic jihad. Either the left constructs a new politics of benevolent interdependence or it backs itself into the “no” corner, where all it can do is complain about what it can't stop, eventually opening the door to the politics of *ressentiment* and fear.

An affirmative approach to globalization, by definition, cannot be done one party at a time, one nation at a time, one desperate people at a time. The power of anarchic globalization is that it enforces a race to the bottom, setting this nation's worker against that nation's worker. The cost of protectionism is that it allows French farmers to flourish only if African farmers suffer. There can be no justice in one nation, no security in one nation, no prosperity in one nation. Interdependence mandates collaboration.

Why must globalization belong to corporations when interdependence can also belong to civic organizations, people's movements, and citizens without frontiers? But progressive globalization cannot happen without political leadership. Global democracy means access to, and control over, global power.

The task, then, is to offer progressive solutions to the challenges of interdependence that draw citizens out of their parochial identities but do not run afoul of cultural, moral, and value concerns that attach citizens to those identities. How to accept and even embrace diversity without overly diluting identity? How to root cosmopolitanism in a scary world of permanent change? A true conundrum.

Here are a few suggestions about strategies and solutions, at least as a starting point for a transnational progressive conservation:

- Develop a political strategy to make the democratic use of the IMF and the WTO a feature of national political campaigns. These global financial institutions are technically "democratic," subject to the control of their member nations; if those nations choose, they can be used to leverage social justice and, say, develop global labor, consumer, and environmental standards as a condition of loans. The left today tends to vilify these organizations. What if progressive leaders in the major nations demanded that they be turned to progressive purposes? To do this would mean to put them on national political agendas and ensure that a progressive political victory in France, Spain, Japan, or the United States is also a victory for transforming the IMF and the WTO into instruments of global justice, with policies that promote social and labor rights instead of just property rights.

- Develop worker policies that require those who currently benefit from undocumented workers to pay appropriate social costs. It is the market that draws workers across borders, whether legally or not, and it is the market that should bear the costs. Taxpayers rightly complain that they pay for the health, educational, and social services that undocumented workers incur. It is the corporations that benefit from their cheap labor that should be asked to share the burden of these social costs. For too long we have privatized the profits and socialized the costs of labor mobility. That must change by becoming part of a political agenda.

- Develop a framework for transnational unions that recognizes the differing stages of development of different national economies. Many of the race-to-the-bottom problems that confront competitive global markets today once defined the Darwinist competition among the states in America, when nonunion low-wage states (often in the South) drew industries (and hence jobs) away from union states in the North (a problem for the enlarged Europe of 25 today). American unions are, at present, necessarily enemies of workers in Africa and Asia. Wage parity is

not possible, but an international wage scale cognizant of both developmental differences and the costs of compliance with safety, child-labor, and environmental standards would be less Darwinist than the current anarchic system.

- Support the proposal for a "Tobin tax" on international currency transactions, both to discourage destabilizing speculation of the sort that swamped Asian economies in the late 1990s and to raise funds to help pay the costs that developing nations incur when they try to meet environmental and safety standards imposed on them by developed nations that, in their time, never paid such costs.

Redressing North-South inequality would inevitably involve some North-South wealth transfer, whether in the form of debt forgiveness, foreign aid, or other devices. Most current options pit developed-world taxpayers against developing-world workers. The aim should be to tax the companies and shareholders who most benefit from global markets and, by shifting the direct burden off taxpaying workers in the developed countries, turn them into the allies of the developing world.

We need a politics of interdependence that does not pit cosmopolitanism against rooted moral beliefs. The right has prospered by claiming, falsely, that to be tolerant, democratic, and cosmopolitan is also to be a moral relativist, an enemy of individual liberty, and a stranger to patriotism. Religion is not the enemy of democracy but, as Tocqueville showed, the necessary foundation for political liberty and civic diversity. There is a tradition of patriotism—Jürgen Habermas calls it "constitutional patriotism"—that is not only compatible with but absolutely indispensable to democracy. There is no reason for the left to be at war with religion; there is no clash of civilization between democracy and belief. Faith and reason have always been partners in the most stable and tolerant democracies.

These approaches are not easy sound bites. And it is the right that flourishes in times of fear and danger because it favors the simple over the complex, the easy over the hard, the values that divide people over what might bring them together. That is why progressives have such a hard time finding their voice on talk radio, where derision and exclusion work better than deliberation and inclusion, or on the infotainment media outlets, where getting people's attention is much more important than doing something with it.

Yet it is also true that in the ineluctably interdependent world in which we live, neither the anarchy of ultraliberal markets nor the provincialism of ultraconservative nation-states is likely to meet the challenge of surviving inequality, anarchy, and terrorism, let alone of securing justice and comity. In this, the advantage goes to progressive democrats. But only if we learn to do democracy across borders. Only if we can find a way to give a home to others in the world without surrendering our own. Only if we find ways for an engaged citizenship to trump passive fear, and use what we can achieve together across borders to overcome what we do to one another when we are separated by fear's intimidating walls. **TAP**

Benjamin R. Barber is the Gershon and Carol Kekst Professor of Civil Society at the University of Maryland. He is the author of 17 books, including Jihad v. McWorld.

With God on Our Side?

*The next big debate for Democrats concerns the r-word:
Do they need to get—or at least start talking about—religion?
A progressive evangelist and an aggressive secularist have at it.*

Time to Take Our Faith Back

BY JIM WALLIS

RELIGION DOES NOT HAVE A MONOPOLY ON morality." I've made that statement virtually every night on the tour for my recent book, *God's Politics*. We've been holding town meetings disguised as book signings; 56 cities over 20 weeks during

the spring and summer, and the watchword has been "inclusion." These large and diverse gatherings have not been narrow discussions of religiosity but, rather, a series of moral conversations about our public life to which all are welcome. A moral discourse on politics is something we all need and are all needed for.

Here's who is coming:


Evangelical Christians who don't feel represented by Jerry Falwell, Pat Robertson, or James Dobson are turning out with great energy to make their voices heard (and there are millions of such moderate evangelicals who are key to America's political future). Many Catholics, who don't feel spoken for by a handful of right-wing bishops who tell them to vote on one issue—abortion—and ignore the rest of Catholic social teaching, are coming. Their presence is a clear "no" to such hierarchal instruction. Mainline Protestants from all the major denominations have been eager to join the discussion, having felt disrespected by fundamentalists who don't even regard them as people of faith. Lots of African-American Christians are in attendance because the media conver-

sation about faith and politics has been so white; when the media describe the conservative politics of "evangelicals," they really mean "white" evangelicals, and not the black churches. Latino and Asian Christians who are changing the shape of many American churches are on hand to say that they are not in anyone's political pocket. Lots of rabbis are turning up with many from their congregations, eagerly responding to the biblical prophets Micah, Amos, and Isaiah. Young Muslims are also there, working for a more open, tolerant, compassionate, and peaceful Islam. Others have identified themselves as Unitarians, Buddhists, and members of "unity" churches.

But not everybody is religious. Large numbers of young people come each night, and many of them call themselves "spiritual" but not "religious." And every night, people raise their hands to say, "I'm an agnostic, but I also care about moral values. Thanks for including us tonight." At the book table afterward, self-described atheists have expressed their thanks at being acknowledged as playing critical roles in the great morally based social-reform movements in our nation's history. In Boston, a young man came up to get his book signed and said, "I'm gay. Thanks for making me feel so welcomed today. But, you know,

it's really easier to come out as gay in Boston than to come out as religious in the Democratic Party."

That's a problem. It's as if there is something wrong with being religious if you're a Democrat. I've talked to many Democratic elected officials who are people of faith but who feel marginalized, not just by the religious right or the Republicans but also within their own party.



THE WAY THE MEDIA COVER RELIGION AND POLITICS IS likewise problematic for Democrats. They seem to operate with an unspoken assumption: If a Democrat talks about religion, he or she is “pandering,” while Republican talk about faith is natural and expected.

Do we really want Democrats to be regarded as the “secular party” and even “hostile to faith,” as many on the religious right have painted them? Should one party be allowed to define the relationship between faith and politics and control the whole conversation of religion and public life? If the issues of faith and values are conceded to the religious and political right, should we be surprised when religion is turned into a partisan wedge and ideological weapon to attain political power?

Democrats should be more willing to use moral and reli-

ica (and many around the world) has been driven in part by faith—including the movements to abolish slavery, for child-labor-law reform, for women’s suffrage, and, most famously, for civil rights. Faith-inspired activists have always worked alongside those with no religious faith but motivated by deep moral and ethical commitments. “Religious” and “secular” progressives have a long and deep history of relationship. That must become true again.

What will that take? As far as the religious partners are concerned, they must believe, as their secular counterparts do, in the separation of church and state. But the separation of church and state does not mean the segregation of moral values from public life, or the banishing of religious language from the public debate. Where would we be if King had kept

his religion to himself? With his Bible in one hand and his Constitution in the other, King convened a *moral* conversation on politics, not a sectarian one. Many on the left frequently quote his famous 1967 “A Time to Break Silence” speech at New York City’s Riverside Church. Indeed, it was one of his most powerful speeches, with its indictment of the war in Vietnam and its call for a “genuine revolution of values” that could conquer the “giant triplets of racism, materialism, and militarism.” But few remember that King began that speech by reminding his audience that “I am a preacher by trade,” and by speaking passionately of “my conviction that I share with all men the calling to be a son of the living God.”



gious language. But they shouldn’t make the same mistake Republicans have made in trying to co-opt religious leaders and communities for their political agenda. Nor should they suggest that religious people have an exclusive hold on the issue of morality, disrespecting millions of Americans who have deep moral concerns about the direction of their country but no religious affiliation. The issue is not religiosity per se but, rather, the moral compass a political leader or party brings to public life. Religion is often a critical factor creating that compass, and therefore is an appropriate campaign discussion, but faith is certainly not the only issue.

I believe history is best changed by social movements, and the best and most powerful reform movements are shaped by spiritual and moral values. Recall that Lyndon Johnson did not become a civil-rights leader until Martin Luther King Jr. and the civil-rights movement made him one.

And that’s what too many modern progressives forget—their history. Almost every major social-reform movement in Amer-

ica and he reminded us that this conviction means that “we are called to speak for the weak, for the voiceless, for victims of our nation, and for those it calls enemy ...”

He concluded with a call for “a worldwide fellowship that lifts neighborly concern beyond one’s tribe, race, class, and nation ... a call for an all-embracing and unconditional love for all [humanity].” This love “is somehow the key that unlocks the door which leads to ultimate reality ... beautifully summed up in the first epistle of Saint John: ‘Dearly beloved, let us love one another: for love is of God: and every one that loveth is born of God and knoweth God. He that loveth not knoweth not God: for God is love ... If we love one another, God dwelleth in us, and his love is perfected in us.’”

King’s radical call for a political, economic, and moral “revolution of values” was grounded in his faith. He wasn’t attacked, at the time or since, for that. Rather, people of faith and people of no faith were attracted to his message and to the movement he led.

Religion must be disciplined by democracy. Religious citizens must not enter the public square by saying this is a “Judeo-Christian nation” and suggesting that they should therefore win the public debate. Citizens who are religious are free to bring their religious convictions—which motivate and mobilize their political concerns—to the public square, just as secular citizens are free to bring their moral and political convictions to public life. But when religiously motivated citizens get to the public square, they must enter into a moral and political discussion, not a religious one. They must learn that bringing faith into public life isn’t best facilitated by the takeover of the mechanisms of the state—the school boards in Orange County, for example. We bring faith into the public square when our moral convictions demand it. But to influence a democratic society, you must win the public debate about why the policies you advocate are better for the common good. That’s the democratic discipline that religion has to be under when it brings its faith to the public square.

We don’t want to see competing religiosities in politics or competitive scriptural proof-texting to decide public policy. We don’t want people voting for candidates who share their denominational affiliation, have memorized more Bible verses, or pray and go to church most often. As the great leader of the Protestant Reformation, Martin Luther, is reported to have once remarked, “I would rather be ruled by a competent Turk than by an incompetent Christian.”

Secular citizens must not require their religious neighbors to keep their faith silent in public life or confine it to merely private matters. While there is, of course, nothing wrong with being secular, there is something wrong with a kind of secular fundamentalism that shows a disdain for religious faith and believers and would restrict their political conscience. And if religious fundamentalists have too much influence in the Republican Party by seeking to impose their orthodoxies on their party and the nation, a militant group of secular fundamentalists wrongly influences Democrats against being “faith friendly.”

Secular fundamentalists make a fundamental mistake: They believe that the separation of church and state means the separation of faith from public life. While it is true that some conservative religionists do want to blur the boundaries between church and state, most advocates of religious and moral values in the public square do not. Most of us do not support state-sanctioned prayer in public schools or school-backed prayers at high-school football games or huge granite blocks inscribed with the Ten Commandments in every courthouse.

Of course, some Republicans are people of faith and some are not, just as some Democrats are and some are not. Those Democrats who are should let their faith shine through on matters of social and political conscience, just as those of either party who are motivated by moral values should let their values shine through on matters of public policy. The Founders chose not to establish any religion in American public life, not to diminish the influence of faith and its moral values but, rather, to increase

their influence on the social fabric and political morality. By setting religion free from the shackles of the state, they protected the independence needed to keep faith healthy and strong. An attempt to strip the public square of religious values undermines the moral health of the nation, just as any attempt to impose theocratic visions of morality is a threat to democratic politics.

A good and fair discussion of how a candidate’s faith and/or moral convictions shape his or her political values should be viewed as a positive thing—it’s as relevant and appropriate as many other facts about a politician’s background, convictions, and experience for public office. The more talk about values the better in political campaigns, and religion is a primary source of values for many Americans. Clearly, minority religions and nonreligious people must always be respected and protected in our nation. But the core commitments of religious liberty need not be compromised by an open discussion of faith and public life. Indeed, the right kind of talk about religion and politics represents, according to political observer and columnist E. J. Dionne Jr., “not a threat to religious liberty but its triumph.”

The American people are divided on how their faith affects

***While there is nothing wrong with being secular,
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their vote. The Bliss Institute/Pew Forum poll following the 2004 election showed that 47 percent said their faith was “more important” or “about as important” as other factors in determining their vote, while 53 percent said it was “less important” or “not at all important.”

Yet most Americans have no problem with political leaders expressing religious beliefs. John Green of the Bliss Institute produced “The American Religious Landscape and Political Attitudes: A Baseline for 2004” last spring. By a 63 percent to 37 percent margin, respondents disagreed with the statement, “It makes me uncomfortable when politicians talk about their personal religious beliefs.”

The subtitle of *God’s Politics* is *Why the Right Gets It Wrong and the Left Doesn’t Get It*. Where the right goes wrong is the narrowing of all “moral values” and religious issues to a few hot-button social issues like abortion and gay marriage. Those matters need a much deeper moral conversation on all sides to help find the common ground that my experience these last few months showed me is more possible than many think. But no one can say that there are only two moral issues in politics. When we find thousands of verses in the Bible on the poor, we must insist that overcoming poverty is also a moral issue. Protecting the environment (known to some of us as God’s creation) is a moral and religious issue. And the ethics of war—whether we go to war, when we go to war, and whether we tell the truth

about going to war—is a profoundly moral and religious matter. When Jesus has somehow become pro-rich, pro-war, and only pro-American, many of us feel that our faith has been stolen, and it's time to take it back.

What the left doesn't get is that religion is not all right wing, nor does relating faith to politics inevitably result in theocracies and jihads. Religion can be compatible with both pluralism and democracy and can add important values to both. And the separation of church and state does not require the silencing of religious and moral conscience in politics. The biggest mistake that progressives have made in the last several decades is conceding the whole territory of religion and values to the religious and political right. The results of that have been disastrous for progressive politics. Religious or not, most Americans care about the moral compass of their society.

Last summer, I concluded a speech at a People of Faith luncheon at the Democratic National Convention by saying: "By withdrawing into secularism and failing to define critical political issues in moral and, when appropriate, religious terms, the Democratic Party concedes the 'religious issue' to the Republican Party, which then defines it solely on their own terms. It also deprives Americans of an important moral and religious debate on crucial issues like poverty. We must not let that happen."

It happened in the 2004 campaign, and that mistake should not be made again. **TAP**

*Jim Wallis is the author of *God's Politics*, the editor of *Sojourners*, and the convener of *Call to Renewal*.*

Reason Before Religion

BY SUSAN JACOBY

IT HAS BECOME AN ARTICLE OF FAITH AMONG MANY leading Democrats that they lost the 2004 election because their party and its candidates were considered "too secular" and too removed from the "moral values" cherished by a majority of American voters. According to this credo, Democrats, to regain the White House, must adopt a strategy of fighting fire with fire—presenting socially progressive religious values as an alternative to the right-wing religious ethos so forcefully articulated by President George W. Bush. Americans are to be convinced that God himself is displeased by the Bush administration's tax cuts for the rich, its war in Iraq, and a host of other initiatives that the Republican religious right has cast in its image of the deity.

If the advocates of faith-based campaigning have their way—and there is good reason to fear that they will, given the Democrats' panic at the election results—it could mean nothing less than the end of the American experiment as we have known it since 1789. If Democrats opt to place an irresolvable conflict of biblical interpretation front and center in politics, they would be turning their backs, as Republicans have already done, on the genius of the first secular Constitution in the world—and on the

Framers who shocked the religious rightists of their day by deliberately omitting any mention of a deity, instead ceding supreme governmental authority to "We the People."

Political campaigns would be reduced to a duel of theologies, with each side claiming that its version of religion—defined, for the most part, as biblically based Christianity—represents the true soul of America. Opponents of the Iraq War would quote the Jesus who said, "Blessed are the peacemakers," and pro-war hawks would cite the Jesus who declared, "I came not to bring peace but a sword."

Jim Wallis makes it clear in *God's Politics* that many liberals are as determined as conservatives to invoke divine authority. In a broad and startling assertion, Wallis argues that Bush is guilty of "bad theology" in his attitudes on war and social justice, and that "the answer to bad theology is not secularism; it is good theology."

But Americans are not electing a theologian in chief—not yet, at any rate. What Democrats and liberals need to do is convince voters not that Bush is a bad theologian but that he is a bad president. Moreover, liberals who cite the peace-loving, wealth-redistributing Jesus as their authority are every bit as selective in their interpretation of the Old Testament and the New Testament as are Bush and his favorite Supreme Court judge, Antonin Scalia, who frequently uses biblical quotations to argue on behalf of the government's right to impose the death penalty. That I generally agree with Wallis' politics and disagree with Scalia's is irrelevant to the civic danger inherent in looking heavenward for solutions to social problems that can only be resolved on the earthbound plane of human reason.

On a pragmatic level, an explicitly religious campaign strategy would surely fail. In the first place, politicians who have never been comfortable talking about religion are bound to look like hypocrites—even if their faith is of long standing. Howard Dean, who was tarred with the dreaded s-word (for "secularism" or "Satan," take your pick) during the 2004 primaries, got no points in Iowa for suddenly discovering that he prayed daily. As Democratic Party chairman, Dean's tin ear for religious sensibilities recently resurfaced when he described Republicans as an exclusionary party of white Christians. Dean would have been accurate had he amended his remarks to note that the Republican Party is beholden to a minority of far-right Christian fanatics—but that statement would have created an even greater furor.

Indeed, there is scant evidence to support the theory that religious values were decisive in the last election. A post-election poll conducted by the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life found that only 21 percent of voters considered faith "more important than other factors" in casting their ballots. An additional 26 percent said that faith was "about as important as other factors." A majority—53 percent—declared that faith was "less important than other factors" or "not important at all." Why should Democrats base their campaign strategies on the one-fifth of voters for whom faith outweighs everything else?

Much has also been made of the fact that Bush won a majority of Catholic votes. But here again, there is little evidence that religion was decisive. Among non-Latino Catholics, Bush's ma-

jority was 53 percent, but 69 percent of Latino Catholics voted for John Kerry. Are white Catholics more devout than Latinos? Given the vast economic disparity between white and Hispanic Catholics (many more of whom are first-generation immigrants), it seems likely that Mammon had more to do with the election results than God. The drift of American-born Catholic voters from the New Deal coalition is of long standing and parallels the upward economic mobility of the overall Catholic population.

In any event, Democratic candidates can talk about God's green earth and beating swords into plowshares all they like. They can speak of "our Bible" in the ingratiating, proprietary tone that New York Senator Hillary Clinton recently adopted. But right-wing fundamentalists are still going to favor the party whose leadership displays open contempt for the separation of church and state. That would be the Republican Party.

YET CRITICS OF RECENT DEMOCRATIC campaigns are absolutely right to argue that civic life would be greatly enhanced by a discussion of moral values that transcends the current American fixation on sexual issues. The advocates of faith-based politics are also right when they call for Democratic candidates to begin speaking about values with a passion and moral conviction that has been sorely lacking. But they are wrong to confuse, as they regularly do, the appropriate presence of religion in public life with an inappropriate relationship between religion and government.

Numerous politicians have cited the leadership role of black churches in the civil-rights movement as evidence that strict separation of church and state is a fantasy of the secularist left. But men and women of faith wield their most effective influence in public life when they speak truth to power, as the Reverend Martin Luther King Jr. did so eloquently, from *outside* the governmental structure. Proponents of publicly financed faith-based programs never stop to consider how ineffective the civil-rights leadership of the African American clergy would have been in the 1950s and '60s if the black church had been dependent on a faith-based government dole.

The civil-rights movement succeeded because it helped to forge a new moral consensus that transcended all religions and ran counter to some. The blood of Michael Schwerner and Andrew Goodman, secular Jews and atheists, was shed for the same moral principles as that of James Chaney, a Christian murdered alongside them in Mississippi during the summer of 1964. To imply that secular moral values are inferior to religion-based moral values is an insult to the memory of all the freethinkers, agnostics, atheists, and secular humanists—however they iden-

tify themselves—who have put their lives, fortunes, and sacred honor on the line for this country.

The push for faith-based politics is based not only on the unexamined philosophical premise that there can be no morality in the absence of religion but also on the fallacious historical premise that American leaders have always appealed to their countrymen on the basis of faith. In fact, American presidents before 1976 almost never emphasized religion—particularly their personal beliefs—in their most important speeches. (Abraham Lincoln's second inaugural address is the exception that proves the rule, but Lincoln's observation that both North and South prayed to the same God, while receiving entirely different answers about slavery, is hardly an argument for the efficacy of divine guidance in resolving political conflicts.)



For those appalled at the direction in which the Bush administration has taken the country, the paramount task is finding a way to appeal to the conscience of the nation in an inclusionary, rather than an exclusionary, way. I have a hunch, given the strong public support for embryonic stem-cell research and the widespread public disapproval of Congress' sanctimonious attempt to intervene in the Terri Schiavo case, that mainstream voters have had enough of politicians who claim that their morality should dictate moral—and legal—standards for all Americans.

To reach those fed-up voters, an invocation of reason—not religion—is of primary importance. A concept that once figured prominently in both ordinary and elevated American political discourse, "reason" now seems as verboten a word as "secularism." Whatever the nature of their individual religious beliefs, the most important members of the revolutionary generation were united by the Enlightenment (another naughty word) conviction that if God existed, he had created human reason as the supreme instrument for understanding and governing the natural world.

But Democrats can look to more recent examples of the power of forthright appeals to reason. On June 10, 1963, John F. Kennedy, in a major speech at the American University, announced his decision to begin negotiations with the Soviet Union on the comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty. Kennedy did, in fact, make two biblical allusions. One quote, “the wicked flee where no man pursueth,” was used to characterize the views of Soviet military leaders trying to convince Nikita Khrushchev that the United States intended to launch a preventive war.

The body of the speech—now considered the beginning of détente—is a masterful invocation of reason and its power for good. Noting that each nation possessed the capacity to destroy the other many times over, Kennedy described peace as “the necessary rational end of rational men.” He continued:

I realize that the pursuit of peace is not as dramatic as the pursuit of war—and frequently the words of the pursuer fall on deaf ears. But we have no more urgent task ... Our problems are man-made—therefore they can be solved by man. And man can be as big as he wants. No problem of human destiny is beyond human

A Democratic candidate today must—as John Kerry failed to do—challenge the slanderous right-wing assertion that respect for secular government means disrespect for religion.

beings. Man’s reason and spirit have often solved the seemingly unsolvable—and we believe they can do it again. I am not referring to the absolute, infinite concept of universal peace and goodwill of which some fantasies and fanatics dream. I do not deny the value of hopes and dreams, but we merely invite discouragement and incredulity by making that our only and immediate goal.

Kennedy then noted that “in the final analysis, our most basic common link is that we all inhabit this small planet. We all breathe the same air. We all cherish our children’s futures. And we are all mortal.”

It is difficult to imagine a stronger statement of secular moral values than the contention that it is our obligation to secure peace not because we hope for immortality but because we are mortal. Kennedy might, of course, have quoted the “turn the other cheek” adage, as well as Jesus’ command to “love your enemies” and “do good to them that hurt you.” But the president understood that history offers little support for the idea that people can be persuaded to love their enemies, however laudable that may be as a personal or spiritual goal. What citizens can be persuaded to do, albeit with considerable difficulty, is to stop trying to obliterate their enemies through war.

Because Republicans (and not only President Bush) have cited divine authority in support of their policy views, the next Democratic candidate must—as John Kerry failed to do—deal forth-

rightly with the religious issue. Kennedy’s famous speech before the Houston ministers in 1960 was necessitated by Protestant suspicions that any Catholic president would pose a threat to the separation of church and state. But a Democratic candidate today must challenge the slanderous right-wing assertion that respect for secular government means disrespect for religion.

I am assuming, by the way, that the next Democratic candidate will be a believer in God as well as a member of some church. I believe the polls indicating that a majority of Americans would refuse to vote for an atheist. I doubt that even Abraham Lincoln—who steadfastly refused to join any church because his personal faith had nothing to do with conventional religious hierarchy—would be acceptable today as a major-party nominee. If I were a speechwriter for the next Democratic campaign, I would advise the presidential nominee to say something like this:

I stand before you as a candidate for the presidency of the United States, and I believe that it is my duty to share my views on the proper relationship between religion and government. For eight years, Republicans have mounted an unprecedented assault on America’s cherished tradition of separation of church and state. They have attempted to write their particular religious views into law and have suggested that anyone who disagrees with their policies is lacking in values, morality, and respect for religion. This suggestion is an affront both to God and to a free people, and I will never insult your intelligence or your faith by claiming that I, or my government, speak for the Almighty.

I believe in God and am a practicing ———, and I believe just as deeply that separation of church and state was America’s founding gift, not only to its own citizens but to the world. Above all, I believe—as the Founders of this country believed—that God has given us the gift of reason to solve our earthly problems. I will never suggest that my policies are the right ones for our country because my God says so. I will never allow one form of religion to exercise a veto power over any policies that I believe to be in the best interests of Americans. Rather, I will emulate Abraham Lincoln, who, when approached by ministers claiming that God had told them what the president should do about emancipating the slaves, replied, ‘Unless I am more deceived in myself than I often am, it is my earnest desire to know the will of Providence in this matter. And if I can learn what it is, I will do it! These are not, however, the days of miracles, and I suppose it will be granted that I am not to expect a direct revelation. I must study the plain, physical facts of the case, ascertain what is possible, and learn what appears to be wise and right.’

If you elect me, I pledge to you not miracles but a total commitment of my heart and mind to the hard work that lies before us all. Join with me as Americans—whether you are religious believers or religious skeptics—in this great enterprise. I speak of peace, social justice, and human rights—at home and around the world—as the necessary rational ends of rational men and women ... **TAP**

Susan Jacoby is the author of Freethinkers: A History of American Secularism.

Culture & Books

"Those of us who opposed the war ...
may perhaps be forgiven a degree
of bitterness in seeing these words
written three years later ..."

—PAGE 53



Untouched: The supposed "truth" about Hillary has taught us more about Ed Klein.

PUBLISHING

VAST WRITE-WING CONSPIRACY

*Ed Klein's scurrilous *The Truth About Hillary* should serve as a warning to New York houses. Unfortunately, it's more of an augury.*

BY CHRISTOPHER DREHER

IDEA AND REALITY ARE OFTEN MILES apart, especially when it comes to business schemes. It's a Panglossian truism displayed a few weeks ago with the release of Ed Klein's *The Truth About Hillary*, the first high-visibility title from Sentinel, the imprint of the august publishing house Penguin that was launched in August 2004 for the specific purpose of publishing red-meat, right-wing fare.

The idea was that a high-profile, "ideology-free" author with mainstream credentials would give Sentinel a bit of ideological cover and get the book taken seriously in literary circles in a way that

titles from Regnery, the hydra-headed monster of right-wing publishing, do not. *The Truth* promised startling revelations about the junior New York senator that would, as Matt Drudge put it in a breathless April 10 posting, "sink [her] candidacy for president." Sentinel even moved up the publication date from fall to June 21 to get the most out of the incipient publicity.

The reality, of course, is that the book is nothing more than a cynically fourth-rate homage to the long-standing obsessions of the well-organized Hillary resistance movement on the right. It's been exposed as rife

with inaccuracies and attacked—and the author vilified—by both left and right.

But in spite of—or because of—all the criticism, Klein's book is a financial success, debuting at No. 2 on *The New York Times* nonfiction best-seller list on July 10. So, far from being a warning to other publishers, *The Truth*, it's sad to say, represents a new trendlette in a Manhattan publishing industry that will do just about anything to improve a lagging bottom line. Call it the "Regnery North" strategy.

THE HISTORY OF RIGHT-LEANING book publishing in New York has been an episodic one at best. Some traditional nonfiction houses have carved out occasional runs of right-wing books. The Free Press, first under Erwin Glikes and later under Adam Bellow, ruled the conservative roost during the 1990s, with the wildly successful marketing of books like Dinesh D'Souza's *Illiberal Education*, the since-converted David Brock's *The Real Anita Hill*, and Charles Murray and Richard Herrnstein's *The Bell Curve*.

But that was one imprint (within Simon & Schuster; it still exists but is no longer right-leaning). And it was accepted because, however problematic the titles referred to above, The Free Press published actual intellectual fare as well; it leaned left with the odd title, and both Glikes and Bellow were respected in the trade. Now, however, *three* imprints have arisen: In addition to Sentinel, there's Crown Forum, started by Random House in June 2003, and the just-announced Threshold, Simon & Schuster's new entry, headed by that well-known literary lioness Mary Matalin (her first book: a memoir by Mary Cheney, the vice president's lesbian daughter, due out in May 2006). Having observed the commercial success of last year's *Unfit for Command* (another Regnery title), the New York publishing scene seems willing to serve as

a ready megaphone for the ardent partisans of the conservative movement. And it's doing it in the most crudely effective way possible—by ransacking Regnery talent outright (Jed Donahue at Crown Forum and Bernadette Malone at Sentinel are both from the Regnery stable).

Malone came to Sentinel after having been lured from her Alexandria, Virginia (red state), digs for dark-blue Gotham. "Everything I saw coming out of New York were books for New Yorkers by New Yorkers," she told me not long ago. "I never had any desire to go join that exercise. But if New York was going to start publishing conservative books one way or another, I wanted to make sure they were going to be done by conservative editors. I want to see these books work and influence as many people as possible."

The basic point of the conservative rant industry is to turn the ranters on the right into celebrities. Even mid-list Regnery authors go through a brutal schedule of interviews for their books.

Malone is constantly on the prowl for new names and faces, movement figures primed to rant their way into the media spotlight. At one event in early 2004, a suggestion from former Ronald Reagan press secretary Marlin Fitzwater led Malone to sign Jim Kuhn, a onetime executive assistant to Reagan, to pen Sentinel's debut title, last July's *Ronald Reagan in Private*, which turned out to sell poorly. But what Malone needs more than ready propagandists are titles that stay relentlessly on message, books that—chapter by chapter, line by line—reaffirm the beliefs of the core readership.

To achieve that, Malone will sometimes push to make a book more confrontational in tone in order to attract the conservative movement's media constituency, the highly motivated network of activists who will recommend a book online or perhaps orchestrate bulk orders for fellow proselytizers. For example, Malone pushed to keep buzzword references to Christopher Columbus on the cover of January's *A Patriot's History*

of the United States as a way to "signal to [book buyers] that he's our guy, and that this book is going to defend Columbus, not trash him." At other times, she's had to modulate a book's content to appease the family-values constituency, such as removing curse words from Sentinel's late summer George W. Bush apologia, *A Matter of Character*.

THE BASIC POINT OF THE CONSERVATIVE rant industry is to turn the ranters on the right into celebrities. "There's a strong market for conservative books because there's such a strong and effective marketing machinery in place," says Bellow, now an editor-at-large for Doubleday. "You have FOX News and all the various talk-radio shows—along with conservative bloggers and Web sites like

the Drudge Report and NewsMax, which draw in millions of visitors—that generate book sales." Even mid-list conservative authors at Regnery, and now at other conservative reservoirs, go through a brutal schedule of scores or hundreds of radio interviews during the initial launch of their books.

Regnery perfected this MO in the mid-'90s, when it realized that the traditional book-promotion strategies of reviews and readings weren't working for its list. Most mainstream reviewing outlets ignored their titles completely. So the house began producing shriller titles, keyed to the pre-occupations of the energetic Clinton-haters then thronging to Rush Limbaugh and *The American Spectator's* dubious string of exposés on everything from "Troopergate" to the Vince Foster case. As the Regnery list got more aggressively polemical, so did the house's marketing strategies. Editors honed books into ready talking-point formats so as to maximize play on TV and conservative talk radio. Margi Ross, Regnery's current publisher,

put it bluntly. "What we're using," she says, "is a pointy stick in the eye to attract media attention."

Going back in the Regnery files, one can see all sorts of unlikely breakout titles that enjoyed similar tours through the freestanding conservative media. One can also see in Regnery's backlist the makings of a Ronco late-night-TV offer: the greatest hits of the Clinton-hating right. There's former White House Secret Service agent Gary Aldrich's 1996 Clinton tell-all, *Unlimited Access*, which in many ways set the standard for other lurid, right-marketed tales from the Clinton dark side, such as Ambrose Evans-Pritchard's paranoid ruminations in *The Secret Life of Bill Clinton*, and the late Barbara Olsen's successive screeds against the Clintons. There's Ann Coulter's maiden work clamoring for a Clinton impeachment, *High Crimes and Misdemeanors: The Case Against Bill Clinton*, published in 1998 (Coulter is now a Crown Forum author). And there's *Bias*, Bernard Goldberg's sensationalistic j'accuse against supposed liberal ideological distortion at CBS News. All are Regnery titles that effectively staked out the contours of red America's reading habits long before the construct emerged out of the heads of weary news producers on election night 2000.

And now, from their more prominent perches in New York, Donahue and Malone have taken this process an additional step further—tailoring an idea for a book in-house and then going out to recruit an author likely to win it maximum media exposure. "Sometimes we just feel there should be a book on something," says Donahue, who convenes regular brainstorming sessions among the staff to determine what a hot conservative title of the moment should be. "Rather than sitting back and waiting, we're being proactive and doing books that should be done."

IT ALL SOUNDS BRILLIANT. BUT ONE might ask, for example, whether these titles meet the standards to which venerated publishing houses are meant to hew.

Gary Aldrich, for instance, demonstrably invented a tale about Bill Clinton meeting women in a Marriott hotel (he

himself called the visits “hypothetical”). Coulter’s lies have been richly documented—as have others’, as most certainly have Ed Klein’s. Bias is one thing, and one would be a fool to deny that the vast majority of people who work in New York publishing lean left (although, for the record, the best-known conservative pundits all have mainstream publishers). Of course they do. But the vast majority absolutely do not, whatever their political views, knowingly publish books in which the author just makes stuff up. Ideological fervor doesn’t excuse outright invention. So the right has pulled off a neat trick: Under cover of “diversity,” it has actually persuaded Penguin, Random House, and Simon & Schuster to lower their standards for truth.

It wasn’t easy finding publishing people willing to talk about this for the record, but these comments, from one well-connected agent, are typical of what I was told when I asked people if Penguin had gone to the dark side. “I find it very disingenuous, and also humorous, that these people who are now trying to lay claim to a certain segment of this market launch their books under the guise of some sort of social responsibility,” this agent said. “Why don’t they just admit that Regnery’s making a fortune, and they want a piece of it? They’re just trying to get a piece of the pie, and it’s an ugly piece of the pie. They’re being so disingenuous in owning up to what they’re actually doing that I think they must feel guilt about something.”

But profit goes a lot further these days. “Clearly our editors here have traditionally been more plugged into what’s going on on the left, which reflects what books you publish,” says Simon & Schuster Publisher David Rosenthal. In 2003, I asked the very liberal Rosenthal whether his house would launch a conservative imprint, and his reply was derisive laughter. Now, with Threshold on the horizon, he gives a more tough-minded business response. “Any imprint works if the books sell,” he says. “It doesn’t matter if it’s about conservatives or field hockey or gastroenterology. Pick the right [titles] and you make a lot of money. If you don’t, then you’re out on your ass.”

Maybe so. But it’s not clear what sort of long-range business model Malone, Donahue, and Matalin will be presiding over in the notoriously unstable world of publishing. The initial runs each imprint has made at the best-seller list have proven a bit deceptive, as Sentinel and Crown Forum titles typically enjoy one- to two-week spikes on the list, thanks to spasms of interest resulting from carpet-

bombed publicity on the radio or Internet, and then settle into middling sales. In that sense, *The Truth about Hillary* reveals more about conservative books and the standards of mainstream publishing than it does about the besieged junior senator from New York. **TAP**

Christopher Dreher is a writer living outside Boston.

BOOKS

CALIFORNIA’S MASTER BUILDER

CALIFORNIA RISING: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF PAT BROWN

BY ETHAN RARICK University of California Press, 501 pages, \$29.95

BY HAROLD MEYERSON

ON THE RAINY JANUARY MORNING in 1959 when Pat Brown took the oath as governor of California, he delivered an inaugural address that today would stun listeners as breathtakingly bold, if not suicidal. Seven times in the first eight paragraphs, notes Ethan Rarick in this engaging and important biography of California’s greatest governor, Brown used the words “liberal” or “liberalism.” Brown committed himself to a vast range of progressive policies: banning racial discrimination in employment, limiting consumer-credit charges, expanding publicly funded medical care for the poor, establishing a state minimum wage, improving public schools, doing something about that smog that had settled over much of the state, setting up a state office of research and development, and even enabling workers to have portable pensions.

It was an expansive agenda, but “liberalism” still enjoyed a good name. Besides, Brown had the mandate to back up his proposals. He had just defeated one of the nation’s leading conservatives—U.S. Senate Republican leader William Knowland—by more than a million votes in November’s gubernatorial election. Democrats had swept to power in both houses of the California Legislature. The state was growing by leaps and bounds (it was soon to surpass New York as the nation’s largest). And Brown had run on

a platform of expansive public investment and targeted public provision, with pioneering civil-rights guarantees thrown in for good measure.

Brown didn’t have a catchphrase with which to label his program, but by 1966, his final year as governor, he came up with an evocative comparison. Lyndon Johnson called his vision the Great Society, Brown noted. “We call that same vision California.”

Today, both Brown and his California are cloaked in the mists of nostalgia. On his watch, the freeways worked, the traffic flowed, the University of California doubled in size, the public schools were the nation’s best, gigantic aqueducts were erected, industry flourished, the beaches were clean, knowledge increased, the sun always shone. During the 2003 gubernatorial recall election, even the rightmost candidate, libertarian state Senator Tom McClintock, waxed rhapsodic about Brown and the earthly San Fernando Valley paradise to which McClintock’s family had relocated from the Midwest in 1965.

But 1965 was also the year of paradise lost in California. The preceding December, the student left burst forth in Berkeley with the Free Speech Movement’s occupation of the administration building. Then, in August, Watts exploded in a spasm of rage against the L.A. cops and the exclusion of black Angelenos from the

world's most prosperous society. Abruptly, Brown and his liberalism toppled from grace. One year later, state voters rejected his bid for a third term, choosing instead a onetime New Dealer named Ronald Reagan, who won the allegiance of white working-class voters by railing against welfare, the threat of housing integration, the mess at Berkeley, the lawlessness of the "urban jungle," and Brown's failure to do anything about them.

backlash at the polls; and both took the New Deal coalition about as far as it could go, only to see it disintegrate on their watch.

The similarities in their stories are all the more striking because the two pols themselves could hardly have been more different. Johnson, as everyone knows, was brilliant, domineering, and sadistic; Brown was affable, good-hearted, irresolute, and sometimes bumbling. But each

years, greatly increasing the progressivity of the state income tax and raising bank, corporation, capital-gains, and tobacco taxes. Legislators balked, but Brown would not relent—"I have nothing but contempt for those who say that no new taxes are necessary," he wrote in his diary—and in the end prevailed. The other measure he refused to compromise on was establishing a powerful Fair Employment Practices Commission, and on that, too, he emerged victorious.

On other issues, Brown dithered. An opponent of capital punishment, he commuted an increasing number of death penalties as his term progressed, but in one case where he could only delay, and not commute, the sentence, political calamity struck. Caryl Chessman, a rapist condemned to death under the state's "Little Lindbergh" law, had become a celebrated (in some eyes) and notorious (in others) author while on death row, and something of a liberal cause célèbre. Brown had resolved to let him die because the state Supreme Court, whose concurrence was required to commute the sentence, had made clear it had no desire to commute. But Brown was visited the night before the scheduled execution by his son (and future governor), Jerry, a dedicated death-penalty foe, who persuaded his father to call San Quentin and delay the sentence. Chessman was executed a few months later, and Brown was subjected to popular rage and ridicule for his intervention. ("I knew I shouldn't have gone" out of town that night, Brown's wife, Bernice, later recalled, because she had feared that her son might change her husband's mind.)

Chessman notwithstanding, Brown won a resounding re-election in 1962 against Richard Nixon, who charged that Brown had stifled the state with high taxes and regulations, and was insufficiently anti-communist to boot. But Nixon's charges didn't stick. California was booming, with freeways and schools popping up everywhere. Taxing and spending and New Dealish liberalism still struck a majority of Californians as a proper way—a necessary way—to build the state.

In his second term, Brown stumbled.



What Brown Did For Them: He built a California that worked.

The rise and fall of Pat Brown—and then, over the past 15 years, his rise again in the assessment not just of historians but of California's political elites of all tendencies—is an important and instructive tale, not just of Brown and California but of American liberalism more generally. Brown's comparison of his vision—and, one might add, his fate—to President Johnson's was apt. Both enacted popular and enduring universal programs; both tilted their respective Democratic parties decisively in the direction of civil rights, at considerable political cost; both mildly inspired and then enraged the early student left (though Brown nowhere remotely near as much as LBJ); both engendered a huge white

was sufficiently accomplished to get a great deal done, even when it undermined his own base of support.

For a time, Brown could do no wrong. Rarick does a particularly good job relating the glories of Brown's first legislative session as governor: persuading the Legislature to double the budget for the University of California, build three new campuses, triple the budget for the state colleges, enact the nation's first auto pollution standards, and authorize an immense dam-and-aqueduct program to bring water to both Central Valley farms and Los Angeles residents. He insisted on paying for all this (all but the aqueduct, which passed as a separate bond measure) through the first tax increase in 25

At his prodding, the California Legislature enacted a bill that outlawed racial discrimination in housing, five years before the federal government passed such a measure. State voters overwhelmingly repealed it by initiative one year later (1964); even San Francisco voted for repeal. Worse was to follow.

Brown agreed with the Berkeley Free Speechers that the ban on political speech on campus was unconstitutional; several months after the demonstrations, the University of California's Board of Regents repealed the ban at Brown's behest. But occupying a building crossed a line in Brown's mind. At first, he simply planned to go into the building the next day and persuade the students to leave, but state police eventually persuaded him to send them in. In the ensuing uproar, Brown won the rebuke of both the left, which thought him draconian, and the right, which viewed him as too lenient.

But it was in Watts where Brown's political prospects went up in flames. Once the riots began (he was in Greece when they started) he did what any governor would, ordering in the National Guard when the Los Angeles Police Department could not restore order. (As Rarick reminds us, many South Central residents wanted the Guard to stay and the notoriously racist LAPD to go—forever.) But

Brown believed, and stated, that the riots, while inexcusable, could at least partly be traced to poverty and exclusion—a belief for which both L.A. Mayor Sam Yorty and fledgling politician Reagan excoriated him. Yorty took 40 percent of the vote away from Brown in the next year's Democratic gubernatorial primary; in the general, Reagan took away Brown's job. Working-class whites were becoming Reagan Democrats: Although Brown had carried 78 percent of the white union household vote in 1958, he won just 57 percent of it in 1966, and far less than that in white communities abutting South Central.

In subsequent years, in California as elsewhere, the white working class, among others, came to view taxing and spending as a way to drain it to the benefit of minorities. In 1978, it enacted Proposition 13, which hastened the downward spiral of schools and services in the once Golden State.

Over the past decade, however, a new, largely Latino working class has supplanted the old at the ballot box. At its insistence, the state is bonding and building once more, schools in particular. After 30 years, the University of California is finally opening a new campus. And Pat Brown is back in vogue. With a good half the state in need of reconstruction, the master builder's moment has come round again. **TAP**

is this assessment that leads to the judgment that the war against Iraq was unwarranted. The direct costs to the United States ... were and are simply too high, given what was at stake."

Those of us who opposed the war from the start, and for precisely these reasons, may perhaps be forgiven a degree of bitterness in seeing these words written three years later by a senior official who failed either to resign in protest against the war or, after leaving the State Department, to speak out against it as long as the bellicose mood in American public opinion still predominated.

However, better late than never, and it must be said that Haass' book sets out a highly intelligent and clear-sighted alternative foreign-policy strategy, which politicians thinking of running for president in 2008 would be well-advised to study closely. This is especially true just now, when public support for the war and the Bush administration are waning, yet Democrats are bereft of alternative visions for foreign policy, and too many of their intellectuals seem chiefly concerned to act as pale shadows of the neoconservatives.

And because Haass is now the president of the Council on Foreign Relations, his book may have an effect. For the council has long been a weather vane of consensual thinking in the U.S. establishment. If its president can produce a book as quietly radical as this one, it may be a sign that under the impact of the Iraq quagmire and what it says about American power and possibilities, majority thinking in that establishment is beginning to shift, not only on specific issues but in its overall attitude to the world.

Haass' overall vision is characterized by a form of tough-minded but also enlightened realism, in the tradition of George Kennan and Hans Morgenthau. The influence of Henry Kissinger is present, especially in Haass' desire for a "concert" of the major world powers, but plays a secondary role. As such, Haass' ideas are widely at variance with the democratic messianism of the neoconservatives, expressed by the administration in its program for democratizing the Middle East and in speeches such as George W. Bush's second inaugural. It is implicitly also crit-

BOOKS

RETURN TO REALISM

THE OPPORTUNITY: AMERICA'S MOMENT TO ALTER HISTORY'S COURSE

BY RICHARD N. HAASS Public Affairs, 242 pages, \$25.00

GULLIVER UNBOUND: AMERICA'S IMPERIAL TEMPTATION AND THE WAR IN IRAQ BY STANLEY HOFFMANN WITH FREDERIC BOZO

Rowman and Littlefield, 168 pages, \$19.95

BY ANATOL LIEVEN

SOME BOOKS DERIVE THEIR significance not only from what they say but also from who says it. Such is the case with new book by Richard Haass, director of policy planning at the State Department from 2001 to 2003, who now calmly but comprehensively

trashes the strategy and record of the administration in which he served. Concerning the Iraq War, planned and executed while he was in office, Haass writes, "What matters in business as well as in foreign policy is the balance or relationship between costs and benefits. It

ical of “Democrat hawks” as represented by *The New Republic* and the Coalition for a Progressive Internationalism.

In Haass’ words, while spreading democracy should remain a U.S. goal, “it is, however, neither desirable nor practical to make democracy promotion a foreign policy doctrine. Too many pressing threats in which the lives of millions hang in the balance ... will not be solved by the emergence of democracy. ... When it comes to relations with Russia or China, other national-security interests must normally take precedence over concerns about how they choose to govern themselves.”

Like Fareed Zakaria and others, Haass is convinced—quite rightly, in my opinion—that to stress democracy as the first step in the social, economic, and political

outcomes” and to bringing in “other countries, organizations, and peoples so that they come to enjoy the benefits of physical security, economic opportunity, and political freedom.”

Another way of describing this vision would be a kind of “capitalist peace,” binding together the leading states of the world in a semi-formal alliance to defend the existing political and economic order. Haass contrasts this approach with the unilateralism of the neoconservatives and much of the Bush administration. He makes clear that it is not enough for the United States to speak of itself as a leader. It must also attract genuine and useful followers, and that imperative requires respect for their interests and wishes.

To create economically feeble, socially backward “democracies” seen by their populations as subservient to the United States would be to invite an endless series of upheavals in the Muslim world.

progress of a country is to put the cart before the horse in historical terms. This is all the more so, he points out, when the democratic strategy being preached emphasizes the outward form of elections rather than deeper processes of genuine democratic transformation.

This is also one of the principal objections of European politicians and officials to the Bush administration’s “Greater Middle East Initiative,” at least as the administration initially conceived it. To create economically feeble, socially backward “democracies” seen by their populations as subservient to the United States would be to invite at best an endless series of the kind of upheavals that we have seen in Latin America. At worst, it would open the way for the kind of fate Weimar Germany suffered.

Haass’ approach is centered instead on what he calls a “doctrine of integration,” which would “aim to create a cooperative relationship among the world’s major powers—a twenty-first century concert—built on a common commitment to promoting certain principles and

Much of this is, in fact, Bill Clinton’s vision of the world order, albeit expressed with a harder realist edge. Possibly for Republican reasons, Haass prefers to describe “integration” as the “natural successor” of the “containment” strategy of the Cold War, in which the United States also not only deterred Soviet expansionism but also sought to integrate an increasing number of states into a capitalist world order.

Whether the containment analogy really makes sense in the context of the struggle against Islamist terrorism and its causes is questionable, given the radical differences between this threat and those presented by the Soviet Union. Haass makes an immensely valuable point, however, in drawing attention to the policy of regime change embodied in Kennan’s containment doctrine, and in bringing out the key difference between this and the neoconservative (and Democrat hawk) approach to regime change today.

As Haass points out, Kennan and his followers explicitly committed themselves

to regime change in the Soviet Union. Part of Kennan’s visionary “Long Telegram” declared that the United States could “increase enormously the strains under which Soviet policy must operate, to force upon the Kremlin a far greater degree of moderation and circumspection than it has had to observe in recent years, and in this way to promote tendencies which must eventually find their outlet in either the break-up or the gradual mellowing of Soviet power.” In the end, that is precisely what happened. Mellowing under Nikita Khrushchev and then Mikhail Gorbachev was followed by the system’s collapse under the latter. But as Haass points out, this process took place—and was envisaged by Kennan to take place—over such a long period that “regime change” was indistinguishable from “regime evolution.” This is the approach Haass now advocates toward hostile states.

By contrast, if the Cold War extremists had had their way and tried to bring down the Soviet system by force, the world would have likely been drowned in fire and blood, and the United States and the capitalist system would have perished in the ruins alongside the communists. Although conservative Republicans often claim credit for winning the Cold War, they have forgotten one of its main lessons.

When it comes to some of the details of what the United States would need to do to bring about the kind of “concert” of major powers that he desires, Haass’ recommendations are eminently sensible and sometimes, by the standards of the American establishment, mildly courageous. Thus he urges the United States to respect legitimate Russian interests in the former Soviet Union and Russian worries about Russian territorial integrity, and not to station U.S. troops in the former Soviet Union. In the same spirit, he strongly opposes moves to “isolate” China. “The United States is not in a position to prevent the rise of other powers,” he writes. “... The issue for American foreign policy should not be whether China becomes strong, but rather *how* China uses its growing strength.”

Concerning energy and the environ-

ment, Haass' views, while according perfectly with mainstream, even conservative, sentiment in Europe, are radically contrary to those of the administration in which he served. Besides the damage to U.S. security and the economy from high levels of energy consumption, he writes, "the use of oil, natural gas and coal exacerbates global warming; one can debate the extent of climate change, but one cannot seriously debate that climate change is taking place and that its consequences will on balance be decidedly adverse for most Americans."

Most striking of all is Haass' statement that the U.S. demand for Palestinian democracy has become an obstacle to seizing the present opportunity to push for a settlement between Israel and the Palestinians, involving real support for the creation of a Palestinian state. Haass also condemns the Bush administration for publicly accepting key Israeli conditions for a final peace settlement while saying nothing of Palestinian ones. And Haass argues that the conflict and the U.S. role in supporting Israel are a "principal source" of both Muslim and European hostility to the United States, implicitly dismissing the Israeli lobby's line that hostility toward both Israel and policies in support of it arises from a current of anti-Semitism that no concessions could relieve.

All this is quite radical stuff by establishment standards, and worthy of profound consideration by that establishment. Unfortunately, as with the rest of that establishment, Haass fails to call for the corollary of his recommendations, which is real U.S. pressure on Israel to extract the concessions needed to bring about a genuine settlement or to convince Europeans and Muslims of America's sincere commitment to peace. Nonetheless, his words are very welcome.

NO ONE COULD ACCUSE STANLEY Hoffmann, a fierce critic of U.S. imperial and messianic tendencies since the '60s, of pulling his punches on Israel or any other subject. He has always been one of the most acute observers of American nationalism. Americans, he said during the Vietnam War, "mixed once

more a nationalism which didn't recognize itself as such and good intentions that nobody but freedom haters could put in doubt."

His latest book takes the form of a dialogue with Frederic Bozo, a leading French academic. A grimly amusing feature of the work is the fact that while Hoffmann delivers a witheringly accurate critique of the hubris and folly of the Bush administration, Bozo offers an only slightly less scathing condemnation of French diplomacy—also not without cause.

For while Hoffmann is generally dead on target in his condemnation of the Bush administration, the conceptual idiocy of the "war on terror," and the wider chauvinism, ignorance, and Francophobia of the U.S. establishment and media, Bozo also makes some good points concerning French arrogance and self-delusion, unfortunately summed up in the figure of the new prime minister, Dominique de Villepin, whose obsession with Napoleon would be sinister if it weren't silly.

Most of their debate concerns the Franco-American relationship. Rather too much of it, in my view, is devoted to discussing the details of the diplomatic process between France and the United States leading up to the Iraq War. Since the book first appeared in French in 2003, the essential question has now been answered by the leak of the "Downing Street Memo"—and who was in a better position to know than the British?—indicating that dominant forces in the Bush administration had already decided on war in the summer of 2002. The memo amply supports Hoffmann's arguments and renders much of Bozo's line otiose.

Too much concentration on past process also distracts attention from the much more important fact that, as Hoffmann points out, the French and other European opponents of the war have since been proved right by events. Iraq before the invasion turns out not to have been the threat that the Bush administration alleged. Iraq after the invasion has become a bloody quagmire. An effective government has yet to be established. Iran has certainly not been made more moderate, as the latest elections have shown. And it

was the death of Yasir Arafat, not the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, that created a new opportunity for resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

As is understandable for a European whose family fled from Hitler and who worked in France before moving to the United States, Hoffmann is especially depressed by the moral tone of American public discourse in recent years:

Contrary to what happened in the past, what particularly shocked me in the crisis of 2003 was the extraordinarily contemptuous attitude of Americans [toward Europeans]: the White House, of course, but also the media, who were equally humiliating. This atmosphere was extremely difficult to live with. The argument was: "you are weak, therefore you are obliged to follow us because we Americans are always right, and when we decide that our national interest is at stake you cannot oppose us; and if you do not follow us, it is because you are not truly our ally."

Unfortunately, the result of the French and Dutch referenda, held after this book appeared, tend to confirm the American view of European weakness. It is all too clear that a majority of the French population does not share the European vision of the French ruling elites, at least not to the extent of making any sacrifices or abandoning more sovereignty to achieve European political unity.

As a result, Hoffmann's vision of a Europe that would act not as a rival to the United States but as a positive counterbalance to American extremism looks unlikely to be fulfilled—unless the Bush administration sets out on another war. For better or worse, the international ball remains very much in America's court. In deciding how to play it, we must hope that Americans listen to the wise men of our time, like Haass and Hoffmann, rather than to the cowboys who have decided policy in recent years. **TAP**

Anatol Lieven, the author of America Right or Wrong: An Anatomy of American Nationalism, is joining the New America Foundation in Washington, D.C., as a senior research fellow.

The Wrong Litmus Test

BY ROBERT B. REICH

THE BATTLES OVER GEORGE W. BUSH'S SUPREME Court nominees are about to be waged on the wrong terrain—on the bloody fields of America's culture wars. Sandra Day O'Connor was the swing vote on many of the nation's most divisive social issues, and activists on both

right and left are mobilized for the fight to replace her based on the nominees' positions on abortion rights, gay rights, and the separation of church and state. But the Court decisions most likely to change the face of America in coming years won't be about sex or religion. They'll concern the rights of individuals against a steadily growing anti-terrorism security state.

The London bombings should remind us of the high likelihood—face it, inevitability—of another terrorist attack here. When it occurs, Americans will be tempted to jettison some civil liberties in order to allow larger roles for the FBI, CIA, and the military in preventing further attacks. Recall that after September 11, the USA PATRIOT Act sailed through Congress with barely a whimper of protest, although it dramatically expanded government's authority to snoop on Americans. And President George W. Bush, as commander in chief, initially was given wide latitude to suspend rights and invoke "executive privilege" to shield executive action from public scrutiny.

Few occasions are more dangerous to a democracy than when a majority fears hidden enemies. Citizens are willing to sacrifice rights in the belief that, because they individually are innocent of any wrongdoing, their own personal freedoms will not be affected. Yet any loss of civil liberty subjects the innocent as well as the guilty to random intrusions on privacy and peace of mind, as well as the possibility of retaliation for

speaking one's mind or voting one's conscience. Moreover, liberty's loss is rarely security's gain.

Nonetheless, when the public's desire for security trumps its love of liberty, the Supreme Court is the last line of defense. Lacking sword or purse, it remains the one institution of government capable of rising above popular passion and reminding society of the promises it has made to itself. While the Court often defers to presidents during wartime (it shamefully upheld Woodrow Wilson's Espionage Act, which made it a crime to say anything that interfered with military success during World War I, and went along with FDR's internment of Japanese Americans during World War II), it is still the conscience of the nation. The current Court has insisted, for example, that Americans deemed "enemy combatants" get a chance to contest the government's charges, and that lower courts be able to consider whether a foreign national is illegally jailed at Guantanamo Bay.

It can be expected that the next Supreme Court will have to make even harder decisions in the wake of the next terrorist acts within the United States. So the question of how far a Bush nominee is likely to go in protecting civil lib-

erties may be the single most important question facing the Senate as it considers whether to confirm. But, so far at least, there seems little chance that this question will be given the centrality it deserves. The culture wars' large and well-financed adversaries would rather focus on the nominees' views about sex and religion.

Case in point: Attorney General Alberto Gonzales. Right-wingers oppose his nomination because of an opinion he authored while a justice on the Texas Supreme Court upholding the right of a teenager to have an abortion without notifying her parents. In response, Democrats and pro-choicers regard Gonzales in a more favorable light. He is deemed a "moderate" in the culture wars and therefore, presumably, acceptable.

But when it comes to civil liberties in the permanent war on terrorism, Gonzales is no moderate. As White House counsel, he urged Bush to opt out of the Geneva Conventions for the treatment of prisoners of war, and he and his underlings came up with the term "enemy combatant" as a way to dodge the rights of citizens accused of criminal acts. He was intimately involved in drafting the PATRIOT Act, and

was almost certainly involved in coming up with guidelines on the use of torture. During his nomination hearings for attorney general, Gonzales expressed no regret for the role he played in expanding the president's war powers and, in the process, compromising Americans' civil liberties.

When the next act of terrorism occurs on American soil, the nation will need a Supreme Court that understands its vital role in protecting the Bill of Rights from an inflamed electoral majority. The culture wars are important, of course, but the ongoing war against terrorism will pose a greater test of our character and values. At the least, Bush nominees to the Court should be able to pass it. **TAP**

Instead of the culture wars, the Supreme Court battle should be fought over the privacy wars.

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**Source: "Lighting the Way to Energy Savings"; 1999

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
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


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


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